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Death of Liability

Think of the liability system as a poker game. Each person, corporation,
or other entity in the economy is a player. Players risk their chips, that is,
their wealth, by tossing them into the pot, that is, investing them in liabilitygenerating economic activity Chips contributed to the pot are at risk of loss;
the system can take them to satisfy liability. Chips withheld are not at risk.
This poker game has an odd twist to it. Withholding chips does not reduce
significantly the amounts players can win or players' likelihood of winning.
Even players who don't put any chips in the pot-that is, players who are
judgment proof-can keep playing the game and are eligible to win.
Why do players put chips in the pot? No rule requires them to do so.
There are social, cultural, and economic pressures.But mostly, they do so for
convenience. A wealthy player who wants that wealth availablefor use, but not
in the pot to be lost through liability must build arcane legal structures and
document them through extensive record keeping.
In recent years, computer techmology has dramatically reduced the cost of
record generation and, consequently the cost of keeping chips out of the pot.
Majorplayers are reducing their stakes. By doing so, they are breaking down
the social norms and cultural barriers that prevent fitrther reductions. The
process is feeding on itself Soon no one will have significant chips in the pot.
When that happens the fundamental nature of the game will change. Liability
will die.
Law is a system for controlling human behavior. In contemporary society,
governments enforce law by essentially two mechanisms: incarceration and
liability. These roughly correspond to the two spheres of the legal system: the
criminal and the civil. In the criminal sphere, the wrongdoer is threatened with
imprisonment; in the civil sphere, the wrongdoer is threatened with deprivation
of wealth.' Liability is crucial because it is one of only two principal means
2
by which governments enforce law.
I. Within both spheres, social shaming is a significant element of the sanction ItIs less so in the c1%il
sphere, and, as will be discussed in this Article. is declining in respects important to the subject at hand
There is some crossover between the two spheres of the system The criminal la imposes fines and
enforces them only by proceeding against the defendant's property See. eg.. Villiams, Illinois, 399 U S
235, 241-44 (1970) (holding that incarceration of indigent person beyond statutor) limit because of failure
to pay fine denies equal protection). The civil law relies on the threat of incarceration for contempt of court
in some aspects of the collection process. See. e.g., CAL. Ci'. PROC CODE § 482.080 (Vest Supp 1996)
(providing for orders directing debtors to transfer property to Icvying officer and inclusion in such orders
of notice that failure to comply may subject defendant to arrest and punishment for contempt of cour)
2. The distinction I make here between liability and incarceration as la\% enforcement mechanisms
closely parallels the distinction made by Guido Calabrest and Douglas Melamed betuen "habiht) rules"
and "property rules." See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed. Properr' Rides. Diabhn Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV L. REv 1089. 1092-93 t0972) Calabrest and
Melamed refer to rules enforceable by criminal law or equitable remedy. ultimately backed b) the threat
of incarceration, as "property rules." Id. at 1126 ("In other words. se impose criminal sanctions as a means
of deterring future attempts to convert property rules into habilit) rules -). see also Ian A~rL, & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Dirt tlenent to Facilitate Coasean Trade. 104 YALE LJ
1027, 1031 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. Do lbabulin Rules Facilitate Bargainig' A Repl6
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The liability system enforces liability through the entry and forcible
collection of judgments for the payment of money. Although liability is most
closely associated with products liability and other tort actions, money
judgments are also the means for enforcing contracts, civil rights, labor and
employment law, environmental regulations, federal tax law, intellectual
property law, most kinds of property rights,3 and just about every other kind
of law on the books. Without liability, the American legal system would be
radically different.
The liability system currently is mired in controversy over who should be
liable, for what conduct, and for how much money. Yet this grand debate may
be over the arrangement of the deck chairs on the Titanic. To hold a defendant
liable is to enter a money judgment against the defendant. Unless that
judgment can be enforced, liability is merely symbolic.
The system by which money judgments are enforced is beginning to fail.
The immediate cause is the deployment of legal structures that render potential
defendants judgment proof.4 The liability system has long accepted that those
who do not have the financial ability to pay judgments do not pay them. The
system employs a complex web of social, economic, and legal constructs to
determine who can or cannot pay. Those constructs can be, and are,
manipulated by potential defendants to create judgment-proof structures. Many
of the constructs are so deep-rooted in culture that they are virtually impossible
to change. Included among them are secured credit, shareholder limited
liability, national sovereignty, and the ownership of property.
These constructs have existed in their current form for a considerable
period. Their strategic manipulation has long been regarded as a problem for
the liability system. Probably most individuals and businesses are either
judgment proof,5 or capable of rendering themselves so between
to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 221-22 (1995) (describing "liability rule" as one under which "the

injurer is free to harm the victim" and describing rule allowing victims injunctions as example of "property
rule").

3. Most property rights are in fact enforced through liability; neither criminal incarceration nor
equitable order is available to the plaintiff. The defendant who negligently destroys the plaintiff's property
in an automobile accident or an industrial accident does not go to jail; the sole sanction is likely to be a
judgment for money damages. When an invasion of property rights is deliberate, the system may sanction
by criminal law or equitable order, but does not necessarily do so. The defendant who deliberately infringes
a patent, holds over as a tenant, or refuses to surrender possession of collateral after default may eventually
be ordered to cease violating the property rights of the plaintiff, but liability is likely to be the only sanction
for violations committed prior to the order. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1093
(recognizing that property interest in one's house is protected by liability rules).
4. A debtor is judgment proof when the debtor has no wealth or holds its wealth in forms not subject
to legal process for collection. That is, judgments against the debtor are uncollectible.
5. See PETER CANE, ATiYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 183-87 (1993) (discussing

difficulty of collecting tort judgments from individual defendants); Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney,
Vicarious Liabilityfor Fraudon Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 707
("We expect that agents apprehended for fraud usually will be judgment proof, because the firm's value
(and thus the agent's wealth and ability to satisfy the optimal damage award) declines dramatically when
the fraud is revealed."); Thomas G. Bousquet, It's Time for MandatoryMalpractice Insurance,TEX. LAW.,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 17 (asserting that approximately 60% of attorneys in private practice in Texas have no
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commencement of a civil action against them and the entry of judgment. The
system has nevertheless been able to function passably well. In most industries,
liability insurance has been readily available at modest cost, leaving system
participants with only modest incentives to adopt judgment-proof structures.
Transaction costs, public relations considerations, and social norms have kept
the largest businesses from judgment proofing themselves. Although those
businesses could6 avoid liability if they so chose, they find it more cost
effective to pay.
In recent years, the introduction of computer technology has dramatically
altered the equation by reducing the costs of recordkeeping. Judgment-proofing
strategies have become cheaper and easier to execute. Some large businesses
now employ them and market forces are driving their competitors to do the
same. The social norms that prohibit their use among reputable businesses have
begun to erode. As this Article will show, the process may well be irreversible.
The method by which I explore this approaching change is a combination
of systems analysis and strategic analysis. Systems analysis is an established
discipline that has been applied to law only recently.' The analyst begins by
identifying a law-related system 9 for analysis-here, the system for awarding
and enforcing money judgments. The analyst treats the system as goal-seeking,
and infers its goals from observations of its operation.'" For example, the
goals I attribute to the system for enforcement of money judgments are to
determine what wealth judgment creditors should be able to reach and then to
assist them in reaching it. This anthropomorphization of systems may be
disconcerting to some readers, but its necessity is a fundamental postulate of
systems analysis. Given the manner in which law-related systems evolve, the

professional liability insurance and that vast majority of those uninsured attome)s *either do not hasc the
assets or the inclination (or both) to compensate clients whom they damage")
6. See, e.g., infra Subsection II.B.2.
7. See, e.g., Edward J.Kane, Interaction of Financial and Regulator- Inovation. 78 AX I ECO% RE%
328, 331 (1988) ("Advances in electronic and financial-contracting technology hase played a major role
by creating unregulated or less-regulated 'loophole' substitutes for tightly regulated traditional products and
ways of doing business."); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J Colleita. Asset Secunt'ization Evoluton.
Current Issues and New Frontiers,69 TEx. L. REv. 1369. 1370-71 (1991) (listing nes' technology as one
of several forces contributing to tremendous growth in asset securuization)
8. For examples of the use of systems analysis in las%.see LUN N M LOPLCKi & ELiiiETn W.N.RRE',.
SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (1995): Todd R Benson. Taking Securtt :n Chitna Approaching
U.S. Practices?,21 YALE J. INT'L L. 183, 209-27 (1996); Lynn M LoPucki. Wi. the Debtor's State of
Incorporation Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing. A Sistemis Aalists. 79 %It.N' L RE% 577

(1995); Lynn M. LoPucki & George Triantis, A Systens Approach to Companng US and Canadian
Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies. 35 HARV INT'L LJ 267 (1994), Elizabeth Wanen.
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World. 92 MICIH. L RE\, 336. 350-52 (1993)
9. A law-related system is a system in which law plays a role, usually along %th social norms and
physical subsystems such as police, courts, and jails. For a general discussion of the problem of identifying
and isolating a "system" for study, see GERALD N1.WEINBERG. A' INr-ROCDLC'sO TO GFL'ERAL SY'SrE.ts
THINKING 144-50 (1975).
10. For a discussion of the difficulties of infemng the goals of a system from obser'aons of its
operations, see id. at 87-122.
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intentions are more accurately attributable to the system than to particular
participants in system design, such as legislators.
Strategic analysis is a developing technique for facilitating the application
of systems analysis to law-related systems. The essence of the technique is to
view classes of participants in a law-related system-for example, secured
creditors, debtors, and judgment holders-as goal-seeking. To the extent
possible, the analyst attributes goals based on empirical observation of
participants' actions." I The analyst identifies incentives generated by the lawrelated system for participants, the strategies by which the participants do or
might achieve their objectives, and finally, the constraints on the use of those
strategies. 12 The principal incentive considered in this Article is the avoidance
of liability. The principal strategies are those by which potentially liable
entities can render themselves judgment proof.
Strategies are changes in conduct by a system participant made with the
intention to improve the participant's treatment by the system. System
designers, such as legislators, judges, and influential commentators, intend to
foster some strategic action by system participants. For example, they design
the system to reward diligent recordkeeping in order to promote diligent
recordkeeping. But participants in a system often devise strategies not
contemplated, or at least not intended, by the system designers. Strategies of
the former type will be referred to as "system-intended"; those of the latter as
"system-unintended."' 13 When the analyst discovers system-unintended
strategies, the analyst considers what strategies the system can employ to
prevent their continued use.
From such an analysis, this Article concludes that currently effective
judgment-proofing strategies are fully capable of defeating the liability system.
The remaining barriers that constrain use of these strategies-principally
expense and cultural resistance-are in decline. The system has available to it
a number of radical strategic responses by which some commentators think
liability might be saved. They include abolishing shareholder limited liability,
granting involuntary creditors priority over secured creditors such as mortgage
holders, and extending liability to all who trade with those who have liability.

I1.By contrast, law and economics attributes goals by postulating that all participants in an economic
system are utility maximizers.
12. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS INBANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS (2d ed. 1991)
[hereinafter LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS] (identifying strategies used by or available to creditors
before and during bankruptcy cases); Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in
Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1498 (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Law in Lawyers' Heads]
(discussing legal strategy and strategic analysis as method for analysis of law-related systems); Mark J.
Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. I (1986) (analyzing mass tort problem
by examining strategies available to actors in system).
13. See LoPucki, The Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 12, at 1522-24 (discussing this
terminology).
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Even if these responses are implemented, they are unlikely to rescue the
liability system. Strategies are available by which participants could continue
to render themselves judgment proof. The ultimate causes of this system failure
are that: (1) the system is unwilling to bar those without wealth from engaging
in liability-producing activity; and (2) the system lacks an effective conceptual
framework for attributing wealth to those engaged in liability-producing
activity. Mandating a modest level of financial responsibility for everyone
engaged in liability-generating activity' 4 might preserve the liability system,
but only as a ghost of its former self.
Finally, it should be noted that only tort and statutorily imposed liability
are at risk of death. Contract liability can be preserved through private
contracting. The paradigmatic transaction is one in which a closely held
corporation seeks a bank loan. Banks routinely condition such loans on
personal guarantees from the owners. The result is a system in which
shareholders of closely held companies have limited liability to their tort
creditors, but unlimited liability to their bank lenders.'" To return to the poker
metaphor, tort liability is confined to the chips in the pot, while contract
liability reaches into the players' pockets and may even tap their friends and
family.
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I describes nine basic principles
on which the liability system is constructed, and which serve as the foundation
for judgment-proof structures. Part I also explores the difficulty of altering
each principle, should such alteration be considered a desirable means of
undermining judgment-proofing strategies. Part II describes the four basic types
of structures that permit a business or person to engage in liability-generating
economic activity without vulnerability to money judgments. Part III identifies
the economic, social, and cultural constraints on the use of judgment-proofing
strategies and demonstrates how those constraints have been undermined by
computer technology. Part IV describes some radical changes the system might
make in response to judgment proofing and the strategies that potential debtors
could employ to nullify each. While predictions regarding these future events
are necessarily somewhat speculative, it would appear that changes in
technology that have already occurred probably make it impossible to maintain
the liability system in anything like its current form.

14. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights ofCreditors ofAffiliate Corporations. 43 U Cii L R1.

%

499.

520 (1976) (proposing that every corporation engaged in dangerous activity should bc requird to post bond
equal to highest reasonable estimate of its probable tort liability)
15. As it currently operates, this system can be deceptive, Contracting paties rel) on their right to ,uc.
only to learn that their debtor is judgment proof and others, who appeared to hase taken the sane risks.
protected themselves in other ways. Once judgment proofing becomes the norm. the s stein lkcl will b
less deceptive; contracting parties will know that they have no recourse except that pro%tded in their

contract.
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LIABILITY SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

The operation of a law-related system typically requires cooperation among
a large number of people. To achieve that cooperation, systems operate
according to basic principles that are few in number and remain stable over
time. Participants in the systems may or may not be conscious of the principles
they follow.' 6 Sometimes the principles will be expressed in maxims, adages,
or black letter rules of law. 17 But just as often they are so deeply embedded
in the systems and the minds of participants that they go virtually
unnoticed. 8 The principles do not necessarily govern every circumstance, but
exceptions must be few enough and sufficiently intuitive that they will not
confuse participants or inhibit system operation.
Changes in such basic principles are difficult to make. The principles
usually reflect deeply held values. The principles may coordinate elements of
the system so that any change in them leads by a sort of domino effect to the
necessity for other changes. Alteration of principles central to participants'
understanding of the system may confuse the participants and slow or muddle
system operations. Changes in the basic principles underlying a law-related
system occur, but seldom quickly. Often the change is accompanied by legal
fictions that provide participants with a stable conceptual framework in which
to understand the system even while the reality of system operation is in flux.
For reasons I have explained elsewhere, these basic principles exist largely
independently of the written law and may be resistant to change through
formal legal process. '9
The nine principles described here provide not only the foundations for
strategies that render debtors judgment proof, but also the foundations of the
system itself. Changes in these principles could render those strategies
ineffective. But because of the system trauma involved in making such basic
changes, the system will tolerate considerable amounts of system-unintended
strategic activity before making changes.20
16. See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDuC. 313, 384 (1995) ("The most fundamental 'superschemas' in the
culture, by whatever name, are so pervasive and intrinsic to the conventions of thought that we are quite
unaware of them. For this reason, the 'paradigms' in every field are generally described as they become
history.").
17. Examples include the rule that shareholders are not liable for the debts of a corporation and the
rule that one who does not have title to property cannot give title to it. The latter is usually referred to as
the rule of nemo dat qui non habet. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1037 (6th ed. 1990) ("He who hath not
cannot give.").
18. Examples of such deeply embedded principles include the principle that all property is owned by
some person or entity and the principle that rights that are not property cannot be taken for debt, even
though they might be valuable and transferable. Examples of such "nonproperty" include a celebrity's right
to exploit his or her own image and various kinds of revocable government licenses. See LoPUCKI &
WARREN, supra note 8, at 243-50.
19. See LoPucki, The Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 12.
20. See id. at 1533-41 (defining system-unintended strategy as strategy that designers of system do
not intend to promote).
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9

A. Enforcement Only Against Property

Courts will enforce a judgment for civil liability against specific property
of the debtor, but not against the person of the debtor. That is,
the sheriff will
take property of the debtor and sell it to satisfy the judgment, but the sheriff
will not arrest or incarcerate the nonpaying debtor. Threatening to seize and
incarcerate nonpaying debtors probably would be an effective means for the
system to coerce the payment of liability. But to incarcerate debtors without
first identifying specific property that each could apply against the debt risks
the incarceration of some persons who cannot pay.22 Though some vestiges
of older practices remain, 2 imprisonment for debt offends deeply held
American values.23
B. Property of the Debtor

The holder of a judgment is entitled to proceed only against property
owned by the debtor. Efforts to enforce against natural persons other than the
debtor historically focused on debtors' spouses. By the end of the nineteenth
century, the women's movement had established a clear norm in favor of the
separate ownership of property by a spouse.24 One effect has been to solidify
the concept of separate ownership by children, other relatives, and even closest
friends. It is now clear that one member of a household or close social group

21. The law of some states does permit the court to order a debtor to surrender specific property and
authorizes imprisonment of the debtor for contempt of court if the debtor does not comply. See tnfra
note
165 and accompanying text. Unless specific property has been identified, the debtor might not have the
present ability to comply and, therefore. use of the contempt po%, er %%ouldbe inappropnate See infra note
166 and accompanying text.
22. The movement to eliminate imprisonment for debt had its roots in colonial times, and by the early
1900s, many states already had taken steps to eliminate "'debtors' prisons " PETER I COLMAN. DEBrTORs
AND CREDITORS INAMERICA 249-68 (1974). In some states, the abolition does not reach all types of debt
for which one might be imprisoned. See. e.g.. OR. CONST. art I. § 19 ("There shall be no impnsonment
for debt, except in case of fraud or absconding debtors."). Compare WIS CONSr an 1.§ 16 ("No person
shall be imprisoned for debt arising out of or founded on a contract, express or implied ").wvuh WIs. STAT
ANN. § 898.01-.31 (West 1983); id. § 898.01 (providing procedures for release of persons "confined in jail
on an execution issued on a judgment recovered in an action founded on a tort") Some jurisdictions
provide for both the imprisonment of debtors and their subsequent release once the court is satisfied that
they have surrendered their property. See. e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:20-1 (W st Supp 1995) ("Any
person, in actual confinement for debt or damages in any jail of this state, who is willing to delhncr up to
his creditor or creditors all his estate, both real and personal. toward their payment. may bnng an action.
in a summary manner, for his discharge under this chapter. in the supenor court."); Paul Marcotte. Debtor's
Prison?: CourtJails N.J. Man Until He DisclosesAssets, Posts Bond.A.B.A J.. Feb 1990. at 28 (reporting
refusal of bankruptcy judge to intervene to free debtor jailed by state court on "body execution")
23. Cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT. JR.. ThIE OUVER WENDELL HoLMES DEVISE
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 820-907 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court's

development of rule prohibiting "peonage," or debt slavery).
24. "[P]rompted by a desire to protect a wife's property from her husband's creditors, as well as to
give her legal autonomy," all common law property states enacted Married Women's Property Acts between
1839 and the end of the nineteenth century. JESSE DUK.IINIER & JAMES E KRIER. PROPERTY 368 (3d ed
1993).
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may own property of unlimited value while another owns nothing and is
therefore judgment proof. The same is true of artificial entities recognized by
law. A judgment against one corporation ordinarily cannot be enforced against
its parent, wholly owned subsidiary, sister corporation, or shareholder.25
C. Transferability of Property
To the extent that property is unencumbered and therefore vulnerable to
liability, the owner can sell it or use it to make payment to a favorite creditor.
Such a transfer is effective instantly to defeat enforcement against the
property. 26 Reversal of an initially effective transfer is sometimes possible,
but the right to reversal is riddled with exceptions and the procedures for
reversal are sufficiently burdensome that reversals are relatively rare. 27 The
reason for imposing such heavy burdens on those who would upset transfers
is to protect transferees. Until a transferee can rely on a transfer, title to the
property is clouded by possible claims for reversal.
D. Exemption

The legislatures of each of the fifty states have enacted laws exempting
specified property from procedures to enforce a judgment for money
damages.28 In most states, the exempted property is limited to specific
categories and moderate dollar values. But some states deliberately exempt
property of substantial dollar value and most states recognize at least one
category of property that is exempt without limitation as to value. For example,
in Florida and Texas, debtors are able to exempt homesteads worth millions

25. The holder of a judgment may, however, enforce it against property formerly owned by the debtor
that the debtor has fraudulently transferred to a third party. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7,
7A U.L.A. 660 (1984) (outlining creditors' remedies for fraudulently conveyed property).
26. To illustrate, assume that an unsecured creditor obtains a judgment against the debtor, obtains a
writ of execution from the clerk of the court, and is about to levy. The debtor can defeat that levy by
transferring his property to a competing creditor in satisfaction of the competing creditor's bona fide debt.
The transfer is not fraudulent because the law deems it to be for "value." See UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT §§ 3(a), 4(a)(2), 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 650-57 (1984). If the transfer is as security, the secured
creditor need only file a financing statement in the public records to perfect it before the levy occurs and
the transfer will defeat the levy. See U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1994). The progress an unsecured creditor makes
through years of litigation can be defeated by acts that the debtor and favorite creditor can perform in a
few minutes.
27. One ground for reversal might be that the transfer is avoidable in bankruptcy as a preference. But
to avoid the transfer on that ground, the judgment creditor may face the formidable task of forcing the
debtor into bankruptcy by the preference deadline, winning the preference litigation, and then collecting
the resulting judgment of avoidance, which is itself an unsecured debt. See LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR
CREDITORS, supra note 12, at §§ 2.8-2.9. Strategies exist by which sophisticated debtors and their favorite
creditors can insulate their transaction against later preference avoidance. See id. §§ 2.4.1, 2.16.3.
28. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995) (setting forth text of
exemption laws of all 50 states).
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of dollars from the enforcement of nearly all judgments for civil liability.29
The laws authorizing such exemptions reflect long-standing, politically vibrant
beliefs that debtors' personal lives should not be disrupted because the debtors
have failed to pay their debts. Political efforts at the national level to rein in
the states with the most liberal exemption laws have been unsuccessful.'
E. Subordination
A judgment for civil liability is merely an unsecured debt. The holders of
valid security interests, liens, and bankruptcy priorities are entitled to absolute
priority over unsecured debts. That is, the value of collateral is considered a
fund available to pay creditors. The fund is applied first to the claims of
secured creditors until they have been paid in full. Unsecured creditors can
recover from the collateral only to the extent of the value, if any, in excess of
the amounts owed to secured creditors. If the amount of the secured debts
equals or exceeds the value of the collateral, unsecured creditors recover
nothing. To illustrate the principle of subordination, assume that a debtor owns
only a single, nonexempt asset worth $100,000. The debtor paid $80,000 of the
purchase price of the asset with the proceeds of a mortgage taken for that
purpose and paid the remaining $20,000 from savings. Later, a court enters a
judgment against the debtor for tort damages in an amount exceeding the
debtor's insurance coverage by $400,000. The judgment creditor can enforce
the judgment against the asset, but the mortgage creditor is entitled to the first
$80,000 of proceeds. The judgment creditor receives the balance of the
proceeds, $20,000, just five cents on the dollar. Among the many arguments
used to justify this striking result, two are particularly powerful. The first is
that without priority, mortgage and other secured lending would be
unavailable. 3 Lenders would withdraw from the market because the mere
entry of judgments such as the one in this illustration would virtually
extinguish their interests. The second is that the priority of the secured lender
does not harm the later judgment creditor; without the value furnished by the
secured lender the debtor would not own the property at all.' 2

Supp 1995. see also
29. See FLA. CONsT. art. X. § 4; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41 001- 002 (WVest
Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors FindingShelter Under a Populist Florida Law. N Y TIIES. Jul) 25. 1993. § I.
at I (discussing purchase by debtors of multimillion dollar homes in Florida)

30. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
of Commerical
31. See. e.g.. Homer Kripke. Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiencl
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929. 941-46 (1985) (claiming that lenders %%llnot lend

without security).
32. In this passage I have attempted to present the argument for the principle of subordination in its
strongest terms. Elsewhere I have argued that involuntary creditors should ha% pnority oser secured
creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The UnsecuredCreditor's Bargain. 80 VA L REv 1887. 1908-16 (1994)
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F. Discharge on Demand
Debtors are entitled to discharge their debts at any time by filing a
bankruptcy case. 33 The justification for this seemingly liberal rule is that

discharge does not harm creditors because it is accompanied by application of
all property the system can reach to the debtor's debts. In the context of the
bankruptcy of a large, insolvent company that continues to operate, the
principle effectively means that all debts are discharged,34 but the creditors
become the owners of the company.
In the case of a natural person, the principle is altered in two significant
respects. First, the property applied does not include the debtor's future
earnings from personal services or the debtor's exempt property. 35 This
reservation of future earnings exclusively and inalienably to the debtor is the
"fresh start" that has been a driving tradition of American bankruptcy law. The
system provides a fresh start at least partly because of the difficulty of denying
it. Debtors who could neither pay nor discharge their debts might adopt a
judgment-proof lifestyle, adopt a new identity, or join the underground
economy. Both debtor and creditor might spend considerable efforts on a
struggle that yielded less for the creditor than it cost the system in the
aggregate. Furthermore, certain debts, including debts incurred through fraud
or for willful and malicious torts, are excepted from discharge. 6
G. Productive Use
During enforcement, bankruptcy courts always stand ready to permit and
provide for the continued productive use of the debtor's property. Thus a
business that files for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code can
continue to operate under the protection of the bankruptcy court.37 The rule
maximizes the value available for distribution to the creditors.3"

33. The typical statement of this principle restricts its benefit to "honest" debtors. The restriction is
largely rhetorical. See LoPucki, The Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 12, at 1552 (explaining how
bankruptcy procedures enable most dishonest debtors to qualify for discharge).
34. See I1 U.S.C. § 1141 (1994) (stating that confirmation of reorganization plan "discharges the
debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation" and providing no exception for debts
incurred through fraud or even criminal wrongdoing).
35. See id. §§ 541(a)(6), 552(b); see also ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 220, 246 (3d ed, 1996) (explaining operation of Bankruptcy Code).
36. See II U.S.C. § 523(a).
37. See id. § 1108 ("Unless the court, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing,
orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor's business.").
38. See Warren, supra note 8, at 350-52 (describing policy behind productive use as preservation of
value of business or assets).
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H. Enforcement Only After Judgment

Except in exigent circumstances, obligations for civil liability are enforced
only after entry of a judgment. Enforcement prior to the entry of judgment is
discouraged because the plaintiff might not be entitled to a judgment at all and
early enforcement might harm the debtor. The state legislatures have enacted
exceptions to this principle, authorizing prejudgment attachment and
garnishment in those rare cases where a plaintiff can prove that the defendant

is deliberately in the process of becoming judgment proof.39 The Supreme
Court has generally upheld the laws creating these exceptions,"" but the

exceptions are narrow and rarely used.4'
I.

Territoriality
As an initial matter, a judgment can be enforced only within the territorial

jurisdiction of the court that entered it. To enforce against property in another
jurisdiction, the holder must establish its judgment in that jurisdiction. The
"full faith and credit" clause of the United States Constitution assures that a
judgment of one state will be enforced in the courts of another; the principle

merely requires formal proof of the existence and validity of the judgment.
Foreign countries, however, may require that the underlying cause of action be
relitigated. The United States is not yet party to any treaties for the
enforcement of judgments. 2
From the foregoing discussion, it should be apparent that these nine

principles are sufficiently basic that the system is unlikely to change them
merely because they enable some debtors to defeat liability through judgmentproofing strategies.

Yet, as the next Part will show, adherence to these

principles renders the liability system itself vulnerable to defeat.

39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.0.4- 05 (West Supp 1995) tstating grounds for attachment). TEX
CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 61.001 (W.vest 1986) (same)
40. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. I. 16 (1991) ("Our cases ha~e recognized [that
a properly
supported claim showing planned activities that would render thedebtor judgment proof by the end of the
pending litigation] would be an exigent circumstance permitting postponing any noticc or hearnng until after
the attachment is effected."); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.. 416 U S 600 (1974) (upholding statute that
provided for seizure of property without notice to owner debtor)
41. See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed. Prelhnunarn Injunctions to Secure Potentual Mone,
Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REv. 257, 276 (1992) ("Many states authorize attachment onl) in certain kinds
of cases-in contract actions, for example." (footnotes omitted)) But see l.L Co'tP STAT A% 5/4-101
(West 1992) (providing for attachment in cases sounding in contract or tort)
42. See Michael W. Gordon et al.. Arbitration of Conmiercial Disputes in Meto and the Unted
States: A Panel Discussion, 2 U.S.-MEX. LJ III. 124 (1994) i'The United States is not party to
any ... bilateral or multilateral treaty for the enforcement of foreign judgments ")
43. The possibility of change because they enable all debtors to defeat liability is explored in Part IV
44. In the discussion that follows, the principles will be referred to by the headings under %%
hich each
was presented in this Part.
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II. JUDGMENT-PROOFING STRATEGIES
The liability system works solely through the entry and enforcement of
money judgments. Debtors can defeat it by rendering themselves judgment
proof. Judgment-proofing strategies are of four basic types: secured debt, thirdparty ownership, exemption, and foreign haven.
A. Secured Debt Strategies

Secured debt strategies are the most complex and the most common of the
judgment-proofing strategies. They are employed primarily by small, relatively
uncreditworthy businesses, whose lenders insist on security interests. They are
constructed from the three basic principles of subordination, productive use,
and discharge on demand. The debtor becomes judgment proof by incurring
secured debts in amounts exceeding the liquidation values of the debtor's
properties. 5 Money judgments thereafter enforced against the debtor's
properties are subordinate to the secured debt.46 Enforcement is by liquidation
of the debtor's property. Pursuant to the principle of subordination, the
proceeds of liquidation go first to pay the secured creditors. Because the
proceeds are less than the secured debt, no balance remains to be paid to the
holder of the money judgment.4 7 It follows that the holder of the money
judgment cannot obtain full or even partial payment by exercising its legal
remedies. The buyer at the sale of fully encumbered collateral will own the
property and the judgment creditor will receive nothing.
Because it is costly and risky for a judgment creditor to liquidate the assets
of its debtor and the judgment creditor recovers nothing anyway, judgment
creditors who understand the system often give up without liquidating their
debtors.4 8 They simply write off the debt. When judgment creditors and
45. In most kinds of businesses, "secured" loans in amounts that exceed the liquidation value of the
collateral are not difficult to obtain. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 35, at 5 (citing Bank of
America lending guide to effect that pledge of "all the assets in the business ... generally is insufficient
value to pay off the loan"). The lender understands that it will be partially unsecured in the event of
liquidation, but bases the amount of the loan on the earning capacity of the business and charges a higher
rate of interest to compensate for the additional risk. In some kinds of businesses-principally those in
which the sole asset is real property-lenders typically seek to lend only the liquidation value of the
collateral. If they lend precisely the liquidation value, that is sufficient substantially to judgment proof the
debtor. If the debtor wants a loan in excess of the liquidation value, the debtor may be able to obtain it by
providing the lender with personal guarantees, letters of credit, or other sufficient "credit enhancements."
46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. For simplicity, I have assumed that the holder of the first security interest exercises its rights to
foreclose. If the holder of the first does not, the procedure is more complicated, but the result is the same.
The value of the collateral is applied first to the most senior lien, then to subordinate liens in their order
of priority until the value is exhausted or all liens have been paid. Only the balance is available to satisfy
the new money judgment. See LoPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 8, at 527-31.
48. See Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few InvoluntaryPetitions and Why the Number Is
Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 803, 844 (1991) ("General creditors need not, and often do not, seek
the aid of the courts and their officers to coerce repayment of delinquent debts."). For an economic model
that attempts to identify the circumstances in which tort claimants should drop their cases, see Kathryn E.
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potential judgment creditors behave in this manner, their debtors can continue

in business indefinitely without paying their debts.
Some judgment creditors will attempt to liquidate their debtors. Those
debtors can still prevail by any of three strategies. First, the debtor who has the

cooperation of a strategically placed secured creditor can enlist the secured
creditor's help in blocking the judgment creditor's levy. In recent years, several

courts have held that a secured creditor whose own debt is in default has the
right to possession of its collateral and that the right primes even the right of
a sheriff who would seize the property under a judgment creditor's writ of
execution. 9
Second, the debtor may allow the sale to take place, but in some indirect

manner become a purchaser at the sale. 5° Sale of the property will move
ownership to a new legal entity, leaving the debt behind in the old. For this
strategy to succeed, the debtor must find a surrogate to purchase the property

for it and must prevent the judgment creditor from purchasing at the sale. In
the most common circumstance, where the debtor is itself a corporation, the

surrogate may be another corporation created specifically for that purpose and
owned by the owners of the debtor or its managers. The surrogate can then
permit the debtor to continue using the property, as a gift or in return for

periodic payment of rent. The principle of enforcement only against the
judgment debtor insulates the surrogate's interest from further attempts at

enforcement of the judgment against the same property.
Theoretically, a judgment lien creditor could defend its position by

becoming a bidder at the sale. If it bid the amount of its own lien and all prior
liens, one of two outcomes would obtain. Either it would win the bid and

acquire the property for a cash outlay equal to the prior liens, or someone else
would bid higher and the judgment creditor would be paid in full. To put it

another way, by "bidding in" the amount of its own debt in this manner, the
judgment creditor can either assure its own payment in full or the debtor's loss
of its property. For a debtor threatened with such a deprivation, one strategic
Spier & Alan 0. Sykes, Capital Structure. Priority Rules. and the Settlement of Civil Claim- (Sept 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal)
49. See, e.g., Security Pac. Bank v. Haines Terminal Highway Co. 869 P.2d 156. 158 tAla-ski 1994)
(stating in dicta that "'the trial court properly held that lthe judgment creditor] could not *attach property
that is subject to a security interest when that security interest is larger than any of the debtor's interesi"
(citation omitted)); Grocers Supply Co. v. lntercity Inv. Properties. Inc. 795 S W2d 225. 227 tTex Cis
App. 1990, no writ) (holding judgment creditor who did not notify secured creditor before lc ying against
collateral liable for secured creditor's damages in recoernng property from judgment creditor) Ho,.escr.
the judgment creditor may eventually be able to force the sale See Frierson % United Farm Agency. 868
F.2d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that secured creditor can preent execution only for purpose of
enforcing its own interest, not to leave debtor in control)
50. This strategy dates at least from the equity receiverships of the late nineteenth century See
Theodore Eisenberg. Baseline Problems ti Assessing Chapter II. 43 U TORO'sTO LJ 633. 642 (1993)
("Indeed, the entire receivership procedure often was structured to assure that one and only one
purchaser-she reorganization committee-could purchase the assets -) It continue- in use today See
LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS. supra note 12. at § I I11 2 (describng use of strategy in cases
under Chapter I I of Bankruptcy Code)

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1

solution is to make sure that the amount of the prior liens exceeds the value
of the property. To defeat the debtor's judgment-proof structure by acquiring
the property, the judgment creditor would then have to pay more than its
value.5 '
For a debtor who can purchase its property at the sale by surrogate, a
sheriff's sale becomes a device for freeing the property from the claims of
judgment creditors. Not only can the debtor's surrogate obtain the property free
of liens, but it often can get it for a fraction of its market value. State court
supervision of sales is generally restricted to assuring that formal procedures
have been followed and bidding has not been restrained by collusion. Sale
procedures are highly formalistic and not reasonably calculated to expose the
property to the market,52 making collusion unnecessary. Debtors are often the
only persons sufficiently familiar with their property to bid on it. Even the53
judgment creditor may find it difficult to get information about the property.
Courts routinely confirm foreclosure and execution sales in which the high bid
is only a fraction of market value.54 In partnerships with new financiers,
debtors are often successful in reacquiring their properties at bargain prices,
stripped of the judgment liens against them. In a common variant of this
strategy, the secured creditor purchases at the sale and then transfers the
property to the debtor's surrogate in accord with an agreement reached
between them prior to the sale.55 For the strategist ex ante, the effect of a
bargain price at sale is to reduce the level of secured credit necessary to create

a judgment-proof structure.56
In many circumstances, the strategy of stripping judgment liens from
property through state court sales will not work. The sheriffs who conduct the

51. To illustrate, a debtor with property worth $100 grants a security interest to secure a debt in the
amount of $120. At any sale of this property, the secured creditor will be entitled either to have its lien
survive the sale or to bid in at prices up to $120, without having to pay in additional capital. See LoPUCKI
& WARREN, supra note 8, at 527-31. To acquire this property by bidding at a sale, a subsequent judgment
creditor probably will have to pay $120, more than the property is worth.
52. See id. at 71-83.
53. See id. at 78-82.
54. See, e.g., In re T.F. Stone Co., 72 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1995) (declining to set aside tax sale of
property for $325 even though property was soon resold for $39,500 because tax sale was for "reasonably
equivalent value" within meaning of fraudulent transfer law). Until recently, bankruptcy courts attempted
to maintain sale prices in these state courts by standing ready to set aside state court sales for less than 70%
of market value in a bankruptcy case filed within one year. See. e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co.,
621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980) (setting aside foreclosure sale). The Supreme Court recently barred the
bankruptcy courts from setting aside regularly conducted, noncollusive state court foreclosure sales of real
estate, regardless of the prices obtained. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1767 (1994).
55. One practitioner estimates that 80% of financial distress situations involving less than three million
dollars in assets are resolved by this method, principally because the parties feel that the cost of Chapter
II is unjustified. Telephone Interview with David Lander, Partner, Thompson & Mitchell, St. Louis,
Missouri (June 13, 1996).
56. To illustrate, assume that property has a market value of $100, but would sell for $70 in a judicial
sale. By granting a mortgage against the property in the amount of $75, the debtor creates ajudgment-proof
structure. That is, if judgments are later entered against the debtor, the alliance of debtor and secured
creditor can control the property by purchasing it at sale for $75.
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sales may insist on interfering with the debtor's possession of the property and

operation of the business between the time of the levy and the time the state
court confirms the sale.
In those circumstances, debtors can employ a third and even more

powerful strategy for defeating subordinate lien creditors. Under the principle
of productive use, the bankruptcy court will permit a debtor to operate its

business while attempting to sell it.5' Thus protected, the debtor can propose
a plan of reorganization that provides for the sale of the property to the new

entity owned by the insiders, for an amount modestly below market value."
Provided that value is less than the amount of the prior liens, pursuant to the

principle of subordination, the judgment creditor recovers nothing from the
bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, Chapter I1 enables the debtor to strip from its
property liabilities in excess of the property's value, even without the formality

of a sale. It permits the debtor to do directly what it could do indirectly under
state court or bankruptcy liquidation procedures.5 9 By confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan, the debtor can reduce its total debt to the value of its property
and reschedule that debt for future payment. The owner-managers of a debtor
corporation ordinarily can retain ownership and control through Chapter II.'
A debtor that enters Chapter 11 with secured debt exceeding the
liquidation value of its collateral is likely to emerge with secured debt

approximately equal to the value of that collateral. 6 The effect is that the
emerging debtor is also judgment proof. If it incurs post-bankruptcy liabilities,

57. See I I U.S.C. § 1108 (1994) (providing for continued operation of debtor's business in bankruptcy
reorganization); id. § 1123 (providing that reorganization plan may pruside for sale of "all or an) part of
the property of the estate").
58. See, e.g., In re Met-L-Wood Corp.. 861 F2d 1012. 1019 (7th Cir 1988) irefung to inalidatc
sale in which owner of debtor corporation purchased property through agent sho did not disclose that
owner was purchaser, because owner outbid at least one disinterested competitor)
59. See II U.S.C. § 1129(b) (mandating that court confirm plan of reorganization that respects rule
of absolute priority among claims and interests). Provided that the debtor's assets arc full) encumbered.
that section mandates confirmation of a plan that provides no distrbutton to junior judgment lienors See
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 35, at 713-14: see also LOPL CKI. STRATEGIES fOt CRtI'rORS, supra
note 12, at § 11.11.2 (describing strategies by which debtorcan strip liabilities through Chapter II, aithout
losing control of property).
60. See In re Landau Boat Co., 8 B.R. 436 (Bankr W.D Mo 1981). In r' Landau Boat Co, 13 B R
788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (confirming plan of reorganization that sold compan) to tour membcer, of
board of directors); LOPUCKfh STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS. supra note 12. at § II 11 2 Idc.cnbing
commonly used methods for retaining ownership and control). L)nn M LoPucki. T7heDebtor tn Full
Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter II of the Bankruptcv Code'. 57 AmdBA-sKR LJ 247. 264
(owner-managers retained control of 86% of businesses that closed dunng Chapter II and 75% ot
businesses that survived Chapter 1I).
61. A creditor secured under nonbankrupicy law has. in bankruptcN, a secured claim for the amount
of the debt or the value of the collateral. See II U.SC § 506(a) Een in a cram doskn tin shi,h a
bankruptcy court imposes a reorganization plan on the parties). the holder, of secured claims are entitled
to "retain the liens securing such claims. .. to the extent of the allosted amount of -such clatms " It
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(l). The emerging debtor has. in essence. 100% secured financing See it re L I Parks
No. I Ltd. Partnership, 122 B.R. 549. 554 (Bankr W.D Ark 1990t (noting that debtor is reciing %,hat
amounts to 100% financing).
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it can file another Chapter 11 case, and strip those liabilities from the assets. 62
This judgment-proof structure can operate perpetually.
The secured debt strategy is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is effective
only in a system that permits debtors to encumber all, or substantially all, of
their assets. 63 The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted widely during the
1960s. Prior procedures for granting security had been cumbersome, there had
been gaps in authorizing legislation, and security interests in some kinds of
assets had been of dubious validity.' The amounts of the secured debts of
small businesses generally were considerably less than the values of their
assets, so that forced liquidations resulted in substantial distributions to
unsecured creditors. 65 Against that background, the drafters of the U.C.C. set
out "to provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense
variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less
cost and with greater certainty. ' 66 They largely succeeded in their effort. The
effect was to increase dramatically the proportion of encumbered assets in the
American economy. The change appeared first in bankruptcy liquidations.67
Early bankruptcy liquidations produced at least some distributions to creditors
in the majority of cases. By 1976, the percentage of bankruptcy liquidations
in which there was a distribution to unsecured creditors had fallen to twenty
percent; 6 by 1991-92 it had sunk to five percent. 69 In 1926-27, unsecured
creditors recovered over twenty-seven cents on the dollar in assignment
liquidations, 70 over ten cents on the dollar in involuntary bankruptcy
liquidations, and about six and one-half cents on the dollar in voluntary
62. A Chapter II followed shortly thereafter by another for the same debtor has become known in the
bankruptcy community as a "Chapter 22." See, e.g., Oliver v. Kolody, 142 B.R. 486, 487 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1992) ("This is a Chapter 22 case ... in that this is the second Chapter II case in which the Debtor seeks
relief under Chapter I I of the Bankruptcy Code.").
63. In a Chapter I I case, unsecured creditors are entitled to the value of any unencumbered assets.
See I I U.S.C. §§ 1I29(a)(7), (b)(2)(B).
64. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1992).
65. See, e.g., Thomas C. Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjusunent", 14
CORNELL L.Q. 413, 436 (1929) (presenting data from liquidations in 1926 and 1927 showing unsecured
creditors receiving 43% of dividends paid in bankruptcy cases and 73% of dividends paid in assignments
for benefit of creditors).
66. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.
67. See, e.g., Vern Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269, 269 (1970)
("[Miany practitioners and bankruptcy referees tell me... more and more bankruptcy cases emerge with
every scrap of the bankrupt's property covered by some sort of a Code security interest .... That means,
of course, that nothing will be distributed to any unsecured creditor, with or without priority.").
68. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 8-9
(1978) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS].
69. See U.S. GEN. AccT. OFFICE, CASE RECEIPTS PAID TO CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS I (July
1994); see also Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond. Virginia: The
DistributionofAssets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy ProceedingsClosed During 1984-87, 22 U. Rict. L. REV.
303, 316 (1988) (finding that 4.4% of Chapter 7 cases in study period resulted in distributions to unsecured
creditors).
70. See Billig, supra note 65, at 433. An "assignment liquidation," more commonly referred to today
as an "assignment for the benefit of creditors," is a legal proceeding by which a debtor assigns all of its
nonexempt assets to a trustee. The trustee liquidates the assets and distributes the proceeds to creditors in
accord with their priorities. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 35. at 192-94.
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bankruptcy cases. By 1976, the average recovery in all bankruptcy cases had

fallen to less than one cent on the dollar."
Persuaded that expansion of secured debt is good for the economy, the

Reporters for the Permanent Editorial Board Article 9 Study Committee have
sought to make the transfer of a security interest "'as easy, inexpensive, and
reliable as possible."7 2 In furtherance of that agenda, the Article 9 Study

Committee has sought to eliminate nearly all of the remaining exclusions of
personal property from the scope of an Article 9 security interest." In the
near future, security interests that encumber all of the debtor's assets beyond
their liquidation value may be even easier to grant, and secured debt judgmentproofing strategies may be even easier to execute."
B.

Ownership Strategies

Lenders to large, highly creditworthy businesses rarely insist on security
interests.75 Judgment proofing is less common among large businesses. When
large businesses do judgment proof, they use different techniques. The two
71. See BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 68. at A-16 (reporting data from shich it can be
calculated that only 19% of bankruptcy cases resulted in any distnbution to general creditors and that.
within that subset of cases, average dividend was 4.5 cents per dollar). Herbert & Paciui. supra note 69.
at 316 (finding average dividend to unsecured creditors in 4.4% of Chapter 7 cases that produced any
dividend at all to be 3.2% of unsecured claims).
72. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney. Jr.. A Propert'.Based 7Teory ofSecuritn Interests Taking
Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021. 2021 (1994) ("[Wle take as our "tirst pnnciple' that
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 should facilitate the creation of security interests Stated othcrisc.
we think the transfer of an effective security interest ought to be as easy. inexpenste. and reliable as
possible.").
73. See Report of the Article 9 Stud Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code 43, 48. 50, 56. 60. 67. 68 (Dec. I. 1992) (arguing for expansion of Artcle 9 vcope in
areas of general intangibles, credit card receivables, intellectual propenry, insurance policies, tort claims.
real estate, oil, gas and minerals-related collateral, and deposit accounts). t CC §§ 9-102tat2Ht3). 9104(7), (11). and Alternative B(12) & (13) (Apr. 16. 1996 Discussion Draft) (eliminating portions of
exclusions for agricultural liens, payment intangibles. insurance policies, tort claims, and perhaps deposit
accounts).
74. This development has prompted at least four proposals to modify the pnnciple of subordination
See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried. 77ie Uneasy Case for the Prorrs of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 909 (1996) (proposing to limit secured status to fixed fraction of amount
of secured debt, for example, 75%); LoPucki. supra note 32. at 1907-16 (proposing to gise insoluntary
creditors priority over secured creditors); Ronald J. Mann. The First Shall Be Last A Contetrial Arguimient
for Flipping Lien Priority, 75 TEX. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (proposing that mechanic's liens hase
priority over construction mortgages); Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren. Leo Gotieb Profcssor of Las.
Harvard University, to Council of the American Law Institute (Apr 25. 1996) (proposing to limit -ecured
status to 80% of collateral value).
75. See LoPucki, supra note 32, at 1925-26 (discussing extent of unsecured lending, id at 1930-31
(speculating that managers of largest companies protect themsehes against ouster by causing ihcir
corporations to borrow unsecured, even though such borrowing is more expensisc. Ronald J Mann.
Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit from the Ground Up. 110 HARV L RE% (forthcoming 1997)
(presenting evidence that creditworthiness, not size, is pnncipal factor determining s hethcr credtt is s cured
or unsecured and arguing that highly creditworthy debtors are able to borrou unsecured because costs of
securing debt exceed risk of loss from nonpayment); Robert E Scott. A Relational Theor- of Sec ured
Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901. 941 (1986) (arguing that small finns cannot pro%ide proof of capable
management or solid base of existing assets, but can offer secunty)
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most common are both based on the principle that liability can be enforced
only against property of the debtor. Through both these techniques, debtors
arrange their affairs so that the liability-generating entity does not own the
most valuable property of the business.
1. Parent-Subsidiary
In the parent-subsidiary strategy, the debtor isolates the most valuable
assets of the business in an entity other than the one that conducts the liabilityproducing business activity.7 6 For example, assume that a large company
(Operations, Inc.) sells its products on credit and then borrows from banks
against its accounts receivable. To employ a secured debt strategy, the
company would grant the banks a security interest in the accounts. To employ
the parent-subsidiary strategy, the company incorporates a subsidiary (Finance,
Inc.), and retains ownership of all the stock. As Operations sells its products,
it creates accounts receivable. Operations sells the accounts to Finance, and
distributes any proceeds beyond its immediate cash needs to its shareholders.
Under the principle of transferability, both transfers become final as they
occur, leaving Operations with minimal assets. Finance pays for the accounts
by borrowing on an unsecured basis from a bank. If Operations sells defective
products and incurs liability, its creditors eventually will obtain judgments
against Operations. They can force the liquidation of Operations's assets,
including its shares of stock in Finance. But in the ensuing liquidation of
Finance, the bank will have priority over the judgment creditors. The bank
claims the assets of Finance as an unsecured creditor while the judgment
creditors claim them as a shareholder. Unsecured creditors are entitled to
absolute priority over shareholders, so by the principle of subordination the
bank prevails and the judgment creditors take nothing.
If the bank makes sure that Finance engages in no liability-generating
activities, but is merely a borrower and a repository of accounts receivable, the
bank assures itself of priority over any liability the business generates. That is
precisely the result obtained through use of the secured debt strategy. But the
parent-subsidiary strategy is an ownership strategy rather than a secured debt
76. Scholars writing about this phenomenon from an economic perspective tend to focus on isolation
of risk rather than on isolation of assets. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
UnlinitedShareholderLiabilityfor Corporate Torts. 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920 (199 1) ("[T]he subdivision
[of a corporate group into constituent corporations] chosen for purposes of externalizing tort liability is
likely to involve a larger number of subsidiaries and perhaps also a different partitioning of functions
among them, as the firm tries to segregate its riskiest activities into separate corporations."); David W,
Leebron, Limited Liability Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1613-14 (1991) ("A
corporation can ... limit its exposure to tort victims by segregating the business which causes injury into
a separate corporate unit."), The difference may seem just a controversy over "half full" or "half empty,"
but the perspective adopted by these scholars appears to have prevented them from seeing the unrestrained
potential of the parent-subsidiary strategy. Once one realizes that assets can be isolated, not just risks, the
potential for judgment proofing becomes apparent.
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strategy because the bank defeats the judgment creditors by proving ownership
by a separate entity rather than subordination to secured debt.
This parent-subsidiary ownership strategy is in wide use among the largest

companies in America." Most large companies consist of numerous corporate
entities. Limiting liability-that is, defeating part of it-is the principal reason
for creating those entities. 78 But the parent-subsidiary strategy itself rarely
renders companies entirely judgment proof. Alone, it defeats only liability in
excess of the value of the assets of the operating company. Nevertheless, the
parent-subsidiary strategy has had a major effect in the bankruptcy
reorganizations of large, publicly held companies.

9

Its use in combination

with a secured debt strategy can defeat a company's liability entirely.
77. See. e.g., MICHAEL MORITZ & BARRETr SEAMAN. GOING FOR BRoKE LEE- IACOCCA'S BArrLt,
TO SAVE CHRYSLER 65-68 (1984) (discussing Chrysler's financial, leasing, and realty subsidianes. and
similar subsidiaries of Ford and General Motors): Lynn M LoPucki & William C Whitford. Wickes
Companies, Inc. 2 (Oct. 8. 1990) (memorandum. on file ssith author) (noting that carlls in Wickcs
reorganization effort, unsecured creditors of \Vickes credit subsidiaries %ere successful in %%inning
confirmation of plans of reorganization providing them with payment in full). L)nn M LoPucki & Wlham
C. Whitford, White Motor Co. 4 (Mar. 17. 1989) (memorandum. on file %kithauthor, inoting carl)
confirmation of similar plan for White Motors credit subsidiary)
78. For example, the Eighth Circuit has written.
The doctrine of limited liability is intended precisel) to protect a parent corporation %hose
subsidiary goes broke. That is the whole purpose of the doctrine, and those %%hohac the right
to decide such questions, that is. legislatures, believe that the doctrine, on the %%lole.is socially
reasonable and useful. We think that the doctrine would largely be destro)ed if a parent
corporation could be held liable simply on the basis of errors in business judgment
Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp.. 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992) See also i re Acushnect Riser. 675 F
Supp. 22, 34 (D. Mass. 1987) ("T]here is nothing fraudulent or against public policy in limiting one's
liability by the appropriate use of corporate insulation.') (quoting Miller % Honda Motor Co. 779 F 2d
769, 773 (1st Cir. 1985)); Robert B. Thompson. Unpacking LimitedLiabhtn Directand carsto Liabdt s
of Corporate Participantsfor Torts of the Enterprise. 47 VAND L REv 1.6 (1994) ("The creation of a
corporation ... offers many advantages ... but its most powerful effect is its insulation of participants
from financial responsibility for debts of the enterprise."): Michael TK Horsath & Michael J Woysode.
Entrepreneurs and the Choice of Limited Liability (1996) (working Paper No 129. John M Olin Program
in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School) (unpublished manuscript. on file with the author) (purporting
to prove, from data on German firms, that "'riskier firms tend to organize as limited liability firms.
controlling for firm size and entrepreneur characteristics")
Professor Robert Hamilton identifies isolation from the liabilities potentially generated by risky
enterprises as the principal reason for maintaining the separate corporations in a corporate group He also
has identified the following as reasons for some separations, tradition, the desire for a -eparate board and
officers; avoiding the jurisdiction of foreign courts; meeting minimum local onership requirements in
foreign countries; blocking the use of names and trademarks by others, and reducing the expenses of
transferring the business of a subsidiary upon sale. Telephone Inter%tess %%
ith Robert W Hamilton, Miner a
House Drysdale Regents Chair, University of Texas School of Lass (July6. 1995)
79. In our study of the 43 largest bankruptcy reorganization cases of the 1980s. Profcssor Whitford
and I found nine cases-Anglo Energy. Braniff Airlines. Charter Company. Combustion Equipment. Dreco
Energy, Evans Products, FSC Corp.. HRT. Manvlle Forest Products. Penn-Di ie. and Wi'ickes
Companies-in which the percentage recoveries of unsecured creditors vaned substantially depending on
which wholly owned member of the corporate group owed the debt See Lynn M. LoPucki & \%rilharn
C
Whitford, Valuation Spreadsheets (various dates in 1988) (unpublished calculations, on file stth author)
These statistics may understate this strategy's importance because some members of corporate groups
remained outside bankruptcy and paid their creditors 100 cents on the dollar %%hile others paid less See also
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Ling. 837 F Supp 1128. 1138 (N D Ala 1993) (refusing
to disregard corporate entity of bankrupt Dow Coming to reach parent companies) But 5ee /it re Silicone
Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig.. 887 F. Supp. 1455. 1460 IN D Ala 19951 (sacating summary
judgment in part to consider holding one parent company liable on "negligent undertaking" theory)
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The parent-subsidiary strategy is vulnerable to legal attack. In theory, at
least, courts can disregard a corporate entity if it is being used too aggressively
to defeat liability. But the rhetoric of entity disregard far outstrips the reality.
For example, commentators argue that corporate entities should be disregarded
more readily in the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship 8 and talk of
making liability "coextensive with the enterprise." 8' But in his empirical
study of 1583 published opinions in corporate disregard cases, Professor
Robert Thompson found that plaintiffs more frequently sought disregard of
corporations owned by individuals than of those owned by corporations, 2 and
courts more frequently ordered disregard of corporations owned by individuals
than of corporations owned by corporations. Among tort cases, courts more
frequently ordered the disregard of corporations owned by individuals than
corporations owned by corporations. 8 Overall, disregard of the
entities that
85
compose a corporate group remains very much the exception.
These results are consistent with the legal doctrine governing disregard. To
judgment proof a company, the strategist must undercapitalize the liabilitygenerating entity. But one can undercapitalize an entity without rendering its
separate existence vulnerable to disregard. Undercapitalization is only one of
numerous factors the courts consider in deciding whether to disregard a
corporate entity. Alone, it is almost universally regarded as legally insufficient
for disregard. 6 For example, Dean Robert Clark has noted that
80. For a brief survey of such arguments, see Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of tie
Corporation: Limited Liability Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 173 (1992). See also
Thompson, supra note 78, at 35 ("Analyzing the parent-subsidiary cases under the economic factors
discussed earlier ... the case for limited liability, is, if anything, less persuasive.").
81. Note, Liability of a Corporationfor Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1122,
1131 (1958); see Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, I I J. CORP. L. 573, 575-76
(1986) (arguing that limited liability within corporate groups is neither historically nor economically
justified).
82. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv.
1036, 1055 (1991) (786 cases sought disregard to charge individual shareholders, 637 sought disregard to
charge corporations).
83. Id. (showing piercing rate of 43% against individual shareholders and piercing rate of 37% against
corporate shareholders).
84. See Thompson, supra note 78, at 23 ("[T]he percentage of courts piercing the veil in tort cases
within corporation groups (26.32%) is even less than in all tort cases (30.97%) or all cases involving
corporate groups (37.311%)."). Professor Thompson concludes that "there remains a perplexing judicial
reluctance to hold a corporate parent liable for the obligations of its subsidiaries when the parent possesses
both the opportunity to control and the potential to share in residual earnings of a subsidiary." Id. at 5.
85. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 336-39 (6th Cir. 1990)
(upholding division of single business among three corporations-one to hire truck drivers, one to own
trucks, and one to own real estate-and refusing to enforce NLRB back-pay order, obtained against
corporation that hired drivers, against corporations that owned assets); PHILLIP 1.BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS INTHE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES 7, 699-703 (1985) (arguing for use of

"enterprise" concept but acknowledging that "entity" concept, which allows disregard only in "exceptional"
cases, remains rule in cases involving principle of limited liability).
86. See, e.g., Alberto v. Diversified Group, Inc., 55 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that no
single factor can justify decision to disregard in Delaware); In re Vermont Toy Works, 82 B.R. 258, 307
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) ("'The conclusion to disregard the corporate entity may not, however, rest on a single
factor, whether undereapitalization ... or what-not ....') (quoting DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray
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undercapitalization "[v]ery rarely, if at all" leads to disregard when other
grounds are not present." Thus, the strategist nearly always can prevail by
undercapitalizing the company and making sure no other factors favoring
disregard 8 are present. 9
2.

Asset Securitization

Asset securitization is the issuance of securities representing the ownership
of designated assets.9 In the prototypical asset-securitization transaction, the
asset is the accounts receivable of a business. As part of the asset-securitization

transaction, the debtor 9' creates a "bankruptcy-remote vehicle, '" - a separate
legal entity, and "sells" the accounts to it. The bankruptcy-remote entity

obtains the money to buy the assets through a public or private offering of its
own securities. The debtor may continue to service the accounts under contract

with the bankruptcy-remote entity, processing payments, dunning customers
who fail to pay, and filing lawsuits against some of them. All that necessarily
changes is that the debtor no longer owns the accounts.

Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 1976)); see also Presser. supra note 80. at 165-66
(arguing that undercapitalization alone is not regarded by courts as sufficient grounds for disregard of
corporate entity).
87. ROBERT C. CLARK. CORPORATE LAW 74 (1986) It is also ssorih noting that fihe doctrine of
undercapitalization refers only to the initial capitalization of the corporation See Prc-sscr. stipra note 80.
at 165. Debtors employing the parent-subsidiary strategy may be able to asoid disregard b) the simple
strategy of initially providing a capitalization which later becomes inadequate b reason of business losscs
or a change in the nature of the business. Capital withdrawal that left an initiall) adequately capitalized
corporation undercapitalized would arguably be a fraudulent transfer. See UNt1- FRAt ot
D tl-*,'
TRA.%Ni-R
ACT § 4(a), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985). The judgment creditor's remedies for fraudulent transfer are
considerably less effective than those available through disregard of the corporate entity See ainranotes
111-16 and accompanying text.
88. One such factor would be the exercise of direct control oser the operational decisions made b)
the subsidiary. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods Liab Litig. 837 F Supp 1123 IN D Ala
1993) (finding insufficient direct control to disregard corporate entity)
89. By this method, the strategist defeats only involuntary and unsophisticated creditors Sophisticated
lenders will require personal guarantees from the owners. See supra text accompan)\Ing note 15
90. See. e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Secunrtation. I STA% I L Bt s & F1% 133.
133 n.1 (1994) (defining asset securitization as "a company's use of cash fiosss from its assets to rais
funding"). Shenker & Colletta define asset secuntization as:
[t]he sale of equity or debt instruments, representing owvnership interests in. or secured b). a
segregated, income-producing asset or pool of assets, in a transaction structured to reduce or
reallocate certain risks inherent in owning or lending against the underlying assets and to ensure
that such interests are more readily marketable and, thus. more liquid than ornership interets
in and loans against the underlying assets.
Shenker & Colletta, supra note 7,at 1374-75.
91. Throughout this Section I refer to the onginator of the asset-secuntization transaction as the
"debtor." The parties to an asset-securitization transaction would not use that term because the) seek to
create an owner-account servicer relationship rather than a debtor-creditor relationship The difference
between the two relationships is, however, minimal and does not. in my opinion, justlf the confusion that
would be created by referring to the user of secured credit as a borroser and the user of assts
securitization as an "originator" or some such term.
92. These entities are sometimes referred to as "special purpose chiecles'" or "SPVY See Schsarcz.
supra note 90, at 135-36 (describing use of 'special purpose vehicles" in asset-sceuntization transactions)
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Asset securitization is by far the most rapidly growing segment of the U.S.
credit markets.93 Financial historians have traced asset securitization back
more than a century,94 but the boom in asset securitization began in the 1970s
with the U.S. government's efforts to encourage the development of secondary
mortgage markets. Once the technique proved successful, it quickly spread to
student-loan-backed securities, credit-card-receivable-backed securities and
other sectors of finance. From 1990 to 1993, the percentage of all consumer
debt that is securitized grew from 10.5% to 15.5%.' 5 By 1988, securitized
credit obligation issuers accounted for about 15.7% of total net borrowing by
financial sectors of the U.S. credit markets; by the second quarter of 1993,
they accounted for 38.8%.96 It has been predicted that by 1997, 80% or more
of all new capitalization might be securitized 97-- a prediction that may not be
far off.
Asset securitization is both a substitute for borrowing98 and a powerful
new strategy for judgment proofing. Like the parent-subsidiary strategy, the
asset-securitization strategy puts ownership of the company's valuable assets
in an entity separate from the one that is at risk for liability. The advantage of
the asset-securitization strategy over the parent-subsidiary strategy is virtual
elimination of the risk that the courts will disregard the entity that holds the
assets. Though the bankruptcy-remote vehicle is created pursuant to the
debtor's plan, it is not only separately incorporated but is at all times
controlled by arms-length investors. The terms of the transaction between the
debtor and the bankruptcy-remote vehicle have real economic consequences for
both. What is perhaps more important, by the time the issues are litigated, the
bankruptcy-remote vehicle may be publicly held, with hundreds or thousands
of innocent investors. 99 Considering that even the most provocative division
of a company into separate asset-holding and liability-incurring entities-one
with one hundred percent congruity of ownership-is likely to be honored by
93. See, e.g., Fred Vogelstein, Credit Cards Fuel Asset-Backed Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1995,
at CI (reporting that original issuance of asset-backed bonds grew at annual rate of 36% for previous two
years).
94. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 7, at 1380-81 & n.49.
95. See 80 FED. RESERVE BULL. A-40 tbl. 1.5 II. 5, 12 (Feb. 1994).
96. Id. at tbl. 1.57 Il. 29, 52.
97. See Changes in Our Financial System: Globalization of Capital Markets and Securitization of

Credit: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 137
(1987) (statement of Lowell L. Bryan) (explaining that such increases are made possible by benefits to
players and sheer superiority of technology).
98. See Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2267-69 (1994)
(recognizing that sales of accounts produce same problems as assignment of accounts as security and
advocating public notice through filing for both); Mann, supra note 75, manuscript at 13 n.35 (reporting
interviews in which debtors indicate that they regard borrowing and selling assets as functionally equivalent
methods of financing); Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird,
80 VA. L. REv. 2273, 2294-300 (1994) (criticizing Baird's filing proposals as unnecessary and impractical).
99. See Thompson, supra note 78, at 9, 29, 34, 40 (arguing that courts have been rightly reluctant to
impose liability on passive shareholders, both in veil-piercing cases and failed leveraged buyouts, and
concluding that "the insulation of limited liability should remain undisturbed for passive shareholders").
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the courts,' °° it seems unlikely that the courts will consolidate the
bankruptcy-remote vehicles created in asset securitizations, which typically
have no congruity of ownership with the debtor.' ° '
Today, asset securitization is used primarily with regard to obligations
owing to the debtor, including accounts receivable, mortgages, student loans,

credit card receivables, and commercial loans. But practitioner-commentators
stress that any income-producing asset can be securitized, including, as Joseph

Shenker and Anthony Colletta suggest, "office buildings, shopping centers and
other commercial real estate[, as well as] computer, automobile, equipment,
and

other leases."'01 2 Kravitt,

Forrester, and

Rosenberg

also

suggest

"previously constructed and operational infrastructure projects such as power
plants" can be securitized.'

3

Steven Schwarcz notes that securitization

techniques have even been applied to assets such as inventories that do not
themselves produce a cash flow but will be converted later into assets that

do.' 04 Transaction costs are probably the only limit on what may be the
subject of securitization10 5 By selling any asset to a bankruptcy-remote entity
and leasing it back, the debtor can transform it into an "income-producing"
asset that can then be securitized. Even a debtor's bank account, which is both
an account and an income-producing asset, might be included.'

Through asset securitization, a company potentially could divest itself of
all of its assets, yet continue to use all of those assets in the continued
operation of its business. To grasp the enormous potential, assume that,
100. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd.. 910 F2d 331. 333. 341-42 (6th Cir 1990)
(upholding division of single business among three corporations-one to hire truck dnc . one to own
trucks, and one to own real estate-and refusing to enforce NLRB back-pay order. obtained against
corporation that hired drivers, against corporations that owned assets)
101. If courts showed any inclination to hold bankruptcy-remote sehicles to the liability of their
sellers, strategist-originators of future asset-securitization transactions could omit the bankruptcy-remote
vehicles from the transactions. Public investors would then be direct owners of the secuntized assets of
large corporations. Courts should be no more willing to disregard such a transaction than they are to
disregard the entity of a publicly held company-which they apparently have neser done See Presser.
supra note 80, at 158 & n.36 (discussing literature and concluding that no court has pierced corporate vcil
of publicly held company).
102. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 7. at 1380.
103. J. Paul Forrester et al., Securitzation of Project Finance Loans and Other Pritate Sector
Infrastructure Loans, FINANCIER: ACMT, 1994. at 7-10.
104. See Schwarcz, supra note 90. at 152. Shenker and Colleita state that s,uritization of raw land
that is not income producing also is "conceivable." Shenker & Colletta. supra note 7. at 1376 n 27. see also
Vogelstein, supra note 93, at C18 (reporting deal in which cows are secuntized and payments to investon
"come from the sale of the fattened cattle for slaughter").
105. Cf. You Can Securitize Virtually Everything. BLS \VK. Jul) 20. 1992. at 78 (discussing rapid
growth of securitized finance and quoting Wall Street manager as saying "imagination is our only
constraint-and time, because you can't chase every deal"); Charles Gaspanno. Non" Tes 'r' Thinkmng of
Investing in Deadbeat Dads, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1996. at CI (reporting proposal from Morgan Stanley
& Co. to New York City to securitize alimony and child support arrearages by issuing municipal bonds
backed by security interest in arrearages).
106. Bank accounts are subject to wide. rapid fluctuations in amount But the debtor might be able
to deal with the problem by guaranteeing the bankruptcy-remote entity a fixed balance and assuring its own
performance by providing "credit enhancement facilities" such as bank letters of credit or surety bonds See
Schwarcz, supro note 90, at 139-40 (discussing credit enhancement facilities)-
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through a series of asset securitizations, Exxon Corporation disposes of all of
its assets.' 0 7 As the cash from these transactions becomes available, Exxon
distributes the cash to its shareholders in the form of dividends, leaving the
company with neither assets nor liabilities.' 8 (I will refer to this judgmentproof Exxon as "Zero-Asset Exxon.") Because Exxon contracts to continue use
of each asset even as Exxon sells it, the operations of Zero-Asset Exxon
remain exactly as they were when it was a multibillion dollar company." °9
But as a result of the asset-securitization transactions and the distribution of
the proceeds, Zero-Asset Exxon is now judgment proof." o

107. Companies rarely dispose of all assets that a judgment creditor might reach. Disposing of nearly
all assets is almost as effective and is much easier. It follows that judgment proofing is not something that
particular companies have or have not accomplished, but something that nearly all companies have
accomplished to one degree or another. Later, I use the term "hard" judgment proofing to refer to situations
where the judgment creditor can reach only nominal asset values and the term "soft" judgment proofing
to refer to situations in which the judgment creditor can reach assets of substantial value, but insufficient
value to satisfy the judgment.
To hard judgment proof Exxon would appear to leave it without the cash necessary to conduct its
business. But Zero-Asset Exxon could solve that problem by borrowing whatever cash it needed to operate
and allowing the lender to retain a right of set-off or a security interest in its cash and deposit accounts.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-304(l), 9-305 (1992) (providing for perfection of security interests in money and
instruments); II U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (treating right of set-off as equivalent to security interest for
purposes of determining secured claims in bankruptcy); In re Housecraft Indus., USA, 155 B.R. 79, 93
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1993) (illustrating perfection of security interest in deposit accounts by giving written notice
to depositary banks).
108. To avoid taxation, the actual form of the distributions is likely to be more complex than cash
dividends, but I assume cash dividends for simplicity of presentation. Few asset-securitization transactions
today are followed by a distribution of the proceeds to shareholders. But see Holiday Corporation
Announces Finalization of Recapitalization Financing,BUS. WIRE, Apr. 16, 1987 (describing transaction
in which Holiday Corporation borrowed $1.225 billion and immediately distributed part of financing in $65per-share dividend to shareholders). "Exxon" in this illustration distributes the proceeds to demonstrate the
judgment-proofing potential of asset securitization in its simplest, most direct form. The typical purpose
of an asset-securitization transaction today is to remedy a working capital deficiency, to replace more
expensive financing, or to acquire the working capital necessary for expansion of the company's operations.
The proceeds either remain with the company or are used to retire other financing.
Even so, the effect of these transactions is to reduce the ratio of available assets to potential liability,
thereby "soft" judgment proofing the companies that engage in them. See supra note 107. These
transactions soft judgment proof the company in a manner similar to secured lending but to a somewhat
greater degree. Secured lenders usually require that the debtor retain equity in the asset that serves as
collateral; that equity will be available to lower priority creditors. The point of asset securitization is that
the debtor retains no significant equity. This makes asset securitization superior to secured lending for
"hard" judgment proofing because it will defeat all or substantially all of the company's liabilities. Hard
and soft judgment proofing are discussed further infra at text accompanying notes 203-04.
109. Its finances do not. From its revenues, Exxon would make periodic payments for the continued
use of the assets it sold. A downturn in the business could throw Exxon into bankruptcy and its managers
out into the job market. In modem finance theory, however, this is considered a positive feature of the
financial structure rather than a problem with it. See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
I10. It is interesting to speculate on who would choose to own the shares in such a company. The
shares would be a high risk investment because the company would be bankruptcy prone, and, if
bankruptcy results, the shares likely would be extinguished in return for only nominal compensation. See
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 141-43 (1990) (showing
mostly nominal recoveries for shareholders of insolvent companies in bankruptcy reorganization). The right
to control Zero-Asset Exxon might be a substantial part of the value of the shares. If so, perhaps the type
of firm that would place the highest value on the shares would be a management company that would
attempt to keep Zero-Asset Exxon out of bankruptcy.
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Even in this extreme application, the courts are unlikely to disregard the
asset-securitization transactions. Pursuant to the principle of transferability, the
transactions are effective until avoided through litigation so that innocent
parties who rely on the transactions in the interim are protected. An argument
might be made that a particular securitization is avoidable because it was made
"with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.....
But to recover from the bankruptcy-remote entity, the judgment creditor would
have to prove that the bankruptcy-remote entity did not receive the transfer "in
good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value.""2 That seems highly
unlikely with regard to an arms-length transaction in which the buyer paid the
full fair market value of the property. To attack this judgment-proof structure
would require extensive litigation. A judgment creditor of Zero-Asset Exxon
who levied on assets used in the company's business would be levying on
assets owned by some bankruptcy-remote vehicle. By that wrongful levy, the
judgment creditor would incur liability to the bankruptcy-remote entity for
3
conversion.''
As an alternative source of recovery, judgment creditors of Zero-Asset
Exxon could pursue the proceeds of the asset-securitization transaction that
were used to pay dividends. To do that, the creditors would sue the
shareholders who received the dividends under a theory that the dividends were
a fraudulent transfer. t"' As a practical matter, however, the dividends would
be unrecoverable. First, they may have been paid out to tens of thousands of
shareholders, each of whom would be liable for only the amount that
shareholder received." 5 Second, the statute of limitations on the most likely
theory of recovery would run four years after the transfer, so that four years

11l.
UNiF.

FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1). 7A U LA 652 (1985)

An asset s.cuntization.

however, clearly would not be avoidable under § 4(a)(2) That section pro%ides that
A transfer made ... by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor. shether the creditor's claim arose
before or after the transfer was made ....if the debtor made the transfer
%%
ithout racei, ing
a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer
. and the debtor

(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for vhich the
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or

transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should hac belieed that he [or shel
would incur, debts beyond his [orher] ability to pay as they became due
Id. That the transaction is at arms length between the debtor and the public ins estors demonstrates that the
debtor receives a reasonably equivalent value in an asset secuntization
112. See id. § 8(a) ("A transfer ... is not voidable under Section 4(a)( )against a person %%
ho took
in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee
")
113. That liability for wrongful execution is the primar) legal reined) aailable to defend a structure
designed to defeat liability is ironic. If the attacker is judgment proof. the defender %tillhae to be content

with an injunction against future interferences with its propert)
114. See UNtF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2Xit. 7A U LA 653 t1985) (prosiding that
transfer is fraudulent "if the debtor made the transfer .
without receising a reasonably equi'.alcnt %alue
in exchange for the transfer ... and the debtor
was engaged or %%as about to engage in a business
for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relatton to the business")
115. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of enforcing habilit, against

individual shareholders of publicly held company)
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after Exxon became a zero-asset company, its judgment-proof
structure would
6
1
unassailable.
legally
become
purposes
for all practical
One might suppose that the problem lies with fraudulent transfer law for
failing to provide an appropriate remedy. But in fact the problem runs much
deeper. First, fraudulent transfer law is limited by the principle of
transferability; allowing easy avoidance of transfers would disrupt markets by
clouding nearly all transfers and forcing expensive and time-consuming
investigations by would-be subsequent transferees. Second, the Zero-Asset
Exxon structure could be achieved without Zero-Asset Exxon making any
transfer at all. Exxon could form a new company, Zero-Asset Exxon, to which
Exxon rents all of its assets. Because the new company would start with only
nominal assets, it would be judgment proof. The new company could not be
faulted for fraudulent transfer because it would not have made any transfer.
This demonstrates that the fault lies not with fraudulent transfer law but with
the more fundamental principle of enforcement only against property of the
debtor.
The schemes in the preceding examples show the structure of the future
that judgment proofing will produce. There will be entities that own things and
entities that do things. Those that own things-the bankruptcy-remote
vehicles-will not do anything, lest they expose their assets to liability. Those
that do things-the operating companies-will not own anything, lest their
judgment creditors have something to attach. "'
From the fact that few large corporations have become entirely judgment
proof, a purely economic analysis might conclude that the costs of judgment
proofing exceed the benefits. But, to force a simple idea into the complex
language of economic analysis, the costs of judgment proofing may be
culturally determined. That is, judgment proofing may be costly solely because
it conflicts with cultural norms. Reliance on such structures might bring
consumer boycotts, management insecurity, and judicial hostility.
Asset securitization has not been restrained by cultural norms against
judgment proofing because it has not been recognized as a judgment-proofing
technique. Yet it is. Asset securitization is booming because investors are
willing to pay more for securitized assets than for securitized businesses.', s
116. Even though Zero-Asset Exxon would remain solvent after the dividend, it could be argued that
payment of the dividend was a fraudulent transfer under UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A
U.L.A. 653 (1985). But the statute of limitations would run on claims under that section four years after
payment of the dividend. Id. § 9(b).
117. Grundfest hints at the development of such a division in response to shareholder unlimited
liability, calling it a "clientele effect." See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability:
A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (1992) ("The result is a separating equilibrium in
which no investor whose assets can be reached under a proportionate liability regime holds shares that
could expose her to that risk.").
118. By "business securitization" I mean the sale of traditional interests in or claims against the
business, such as stock or unsecured bonds. Asset securitization, by contrast, is a claim against the assets,
not the business.
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In an article aptly titled The Alchemy of Asset Securitization,"9 Professor
Schwarcz attempts to explain why. He begins by acknowledging the
troublesome principle of "exposure conservation."' 2'0 Finance theory tells us
that selling securities that allocate the risks and returns from a business
enterprise does not change the total risks and returns. Slicing the rights in
different ways may add to the value of one type of security, but only by
detracting from the value of another. Securitization renders investments liquid
at lower transaction costs, so it is certainly plausible that securitization may
add value. But that cannot explain why asset securitization would be chosen
over business securitization. Schwarcz considers several possible explanations
for the market's preference for securitized assets over securitized businesses
and ultimately selects the one most often mentioned by others: Asset
securitization, unlike business securitization, "eliminat[es] the risk of
2
bankruptcy to investors."' '1
What risk of bankruptcy is eliminated by asset securitization? That
depends on the form in which the investment would have been made if it had
not been made through asset securitization. From Schwarcz's description, it
would appear that asset securitization is being substituted principally for
unsecured bank lending and unsecured issues of public debt. Such debt is a
liability, and in bankruptcy it shares pro rata with other kinds of liability
claims. The owners of securitized assets, by contrast, keep their assets when
the debtor files bankruptcy; they need not share with the holders of liability.
In other words, debtors are substituting asset securitization, a judgment-proof
financial structure, for unsecured debt, a non-judgment-proof structure.' z
That a debtor's cost of funds obtained by asset securitization is lower than the
cost of funds obtained by unsecured borrowing'23 may be just the market's
way of saying that it prefers judgment-proof companies because they are
"efficient" liability avoiders.'24

119. Schwarcz, supra note 90.
120. Id. at 148.
121. Id. at 151.
122. That is, absent the availability of asset secuntization as a financing device. these types of
companies would finance through unsecured debt I do not mean to assert that the companies generally arc
using the proceeds of asset securitization to retin. unsecured debt. though some probably arc
123. See, e.g., Committee on Bankr. & Corp. Reorg of the Assoc of the Bar of the City of N Y.
Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAw. 527. 530-31 (1995) [hereinafter Structiured Financing

Techniques] ("Not only is the credit rating of the financing likely to be enhanced, but also the cost of the
financing in the capital markets may be less than the cost of comparable financing in the bank or insurance
company private market.").
124. There could be other explanations. For example. bankruptcy reorganization may be an inefficient
means for dealing with financial distress. See. e.g.. Douglas G. Baird. The Uneasi Case for Corporate
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) (asserting that bankruptc) liquidation may be more
efficient than bankruptcy reorganization): Christopher W. Frost. Structured Finance and Corporate Risk
Allocation 32 (May 23, 1996) (unpublished manuscript. on file with author) (If the bankruptcy process
is inefficient, structured finance may be a means by which all insestors could make a binding promise to
avoid the process (at least with respect to the secuntized assets) -) But see Lynn M LoPucki & William
C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankrupicy Reorganization of Large. Publicls Held Companies.
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Another way of stating essentially the same argument is to note that stocks
and bonds are the most junior claims against the assets of a company. They are
defeated by anyone with a direct claim against the assets. The claims of thirdparty owners, such as those created in asset securitization, are the most senior
claims. That the market will pay more for senior claims against the same assets
than it will pay for junior claims against them suggests that priority matters.
Perhaps the principal advantage of third-party ownership of assets over mere
ownership of the company is that third-party owners of assets have priority
over liability claims while stockholders do not. 25
Asset securitization may be the silver bullet capable of killing liability. In
the few skirmishes in which asset-securitization structures have been
challenged in bankruptcy, they have been upheld.' 26 Though the effect
ultimately may be to defeat liability interests, this outcome should not be
surprising. Liability is in disrepute. Asset securitization, by contrast, is widely
regarded as an engine of the U.S. economy.' 27 Commentators all seem to
agree that the savings available through asset securitization depend on the
insulation of the securitized asset from bankruptcy' 2 -- in essence, from
liability. For the courts to strike down routine asset securitizations simply
because they render the debtors judgment proof would eliminate the central
advantage of asset securitization over the more traditional issuance of public
debt.
C. Exemption Strategies

As previously noted, the laws of all fifty states and numerous federal
statutes exempt various kinds of property from procedures to enforce
141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 753-67 (1993) (presenting data indicating that bankruptcy liquidation would be
less efficient).
125. Even when the asset securitization replaces secured debt, the debtor obtains an advantage. Claims
of ownership get full respect in bankruptcy, while the claims of secured creditors do not. See Bebehuk &
Fried, supra note 74, at 871 (arguing that "certain features of Chapter II reorganizations tend either to
waste value or to enrich junior claimants at the expense of secured creditors").
126. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 123, at 565-67.
127. On May 27, 1993, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that accounts sold to a third party
prior to bankruptcy remained property of the debtor and were part of the bankruptcy estate. See Octagon
Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993). As applied to asset securitizations involving
accounts, the effect of Octagon Gas would have been to render the securitized accounts property of the
bankruptcy estate. Asset securitization then would have failed in its essential purpose. In less than two
weeks, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code issued Commentary No. 14,
U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b), referring to the holding as "erroneously stated." Commentators have criticized the
decision for its potential to interfere with asset securitization. See Baird, supra note 98, at 2267 n.42
(criticizing Octagon Gas for making sales of accounts more difficult). Since Octagon, the issue has not
arisen in a reported case.
128. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 151 (arguing, in essence, that securitization reduces net
financing costs for debtor "[bly eliminating the risk of bankruptcy to (the bankruptcy-remote entity's]
investors"); see also Gregory R. Salath, Note, Reducing Health Care Costs Through Hospital Accounts
Receivable Securitization, 80 VA. L. REV. 549, 559-60 (1994) ("The savings available through
securitization depend on the insulation of the collateralized receivables from bankruptcy.").
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judgments for money damages.1 9 In addition to the types of assets
previously mentioned, federal law exempts a debtor's pension funds without
limitation as to dollar amount, and about twenty-three states recognize the
doctrine of tenancy by the entireties. When property is held by a husband and
wife in tenancy by the entireties, a judgment against only one of the spouses
cannot be enforced against the property.' Simply by holding their assets in
tenancy by the entireties, a married couple can defeat both their individual
liabilities. Thus, in most states, debtors can own millions of dollars worth of
unencumbered property but have no property their creditors can seize.
Employed in conjunction with secured debt strategies, exemption strategies
make it possible for individual debtors to retain any property against their
judgment creditors, regardless of its value. Consider two examples of such
structures. In the first, a debtor entitled to a $40,000 homestead exemption
owns a $100,000 homestead subject to a $60,000 mortgage. Judgment creditors
cannot reach this property. 3' In the second, a debtor is entitled to a $5000
"floating" exemption which the debtor can apply to any property of the
debtor's choosing. The debtor owns a $600,000 Learjet, subject to a $600,000
security interest in favor of a friendly creditor. The creditor can recover
nothing from the Learjet itself; moreover, with the exemption in place, the
creditor can no longer have the Learjet seized or sold.' "2 Once a debtor
becomes judgment proof through any of these techniques, the debtor can file
bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, the debtor can discharge his or her unsecured debt,
including most debt for liability, while keeping the exempt property.'"
Exemption law not only permits a debtor who owns exempt property to
keep it, but it also permits a debtor who owns nonexempt property to exchange
it for exempt property. In some jurisdictions, the debtor can make the exchange
even on the eve of bankruptcy. In at least one, the debtor can make the
exchange with the specific intent to defraud his or her creditors and it will still
withstand attack.' The system could respond to the strategy of investing in

129. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text
130. See, e.g., In re Huth, 122 B.R. 724, 726 (Bankr E D Mo 1988) ("A creditor
of only one ot
the debtors does not have a right to execute against property held as tenancy by the entireties ")
131. See, e.g.,
WARREN & WESTBROOK. supra note 35. at 132-33 (tOnly sshen the salue of the
[collateral]
exceeds the sum of theallowed secured claim and the debtor's exemption. uould the Itrustee

inbankruptcy] be able toreach any value from the property -'
132. For a typical statute so providing, see WiS. STAT A%'. § 815 18th) (West 1994) C"Eempt"
means freefrom any lien
obtained by judicial proceedings and is not liable to seizure or sale on execution

or on any provisional or final
process issued forany court, or any proceedings inaid of court process
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)-(c) (1994).
134. See In re Reed, 12 B.R. 41 (Bankr N D Tex 1981) (holding. based on comparison of language
used by Texas legislature
in personal property and homestead exemption statutes, that Texas legislature
intended to permit debtors who acquire homesteads through fraud to retain them) But see In reReed. 700
F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying Reed's discharge for fraud but still allowing him to retain fraudulently

acquired homestead).
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exempt property by enacting uniform federal exemptions capped as to dollar
amount and declaring eve-of-bankruptcy investments in such exemptions
fraudulent. The National Bankruptcy Commission recommended the first of
these reforms in the mid-1970s,' 35 but Congress declined to enact it.' 3 6 The
second change is unlikely because the eve-of-bankruptcy strategy is systemintended. Congress was concerned with equity between those already judgment
proof and those who sought to become so on the eve of bankruptcy: "As under
current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempted property into
exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition. The practice is not
fraudulent as to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the
exemptions to which he is entitled by law.' ' 37 At least in some states,
reformers who attempt to save the liability system will be up against a strong
populist tradition that opposes the involuntary collection of debts from the
homestead or personal property of individual debtors. 138 In the language of
strategic analysis, the exemption strategies used by individual debtors to defeat
the collection of unsecured liabilities are system-intended.' 39
D. Foreign Haven Strategies
Removal of one's assets from the jurisdiction of the court is a timehonored strategy for defeating one's liability. 14 Upon removal, the principle
of territoriality takes effect; to recover, the creditor must sue in the foreign
legal system where the assets are located.' 4 1 If the foreign legal system will
not enforce liability against the assets of the debtor, removal achieves more
than hindrance and delay; it bars recovery.
More than a half-dozen nations compete for foreign investment by refusing
comity with respect to the enforcement of judgments 42 and providing havens

135. See 3 COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S. REP. 55 (1973) ("[T~he panel is very

strongly agreed as to the desirability of making exemption rules uniform throughout the nation ... and of
doing this by establishing a national exemption law ....).
136. See II U.S.C. § 522(d) (establishing "federal exemption" applicable in bankruptcy cases); id. §
522(b) (giving debtors right to choose between federal exemption and exemption available to them under
state law).
137. S.REP. No. 95-989, at 4 (1978).
138. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 22, at 234-36 (explaining how Georgia attitudes that led to
abolition of debtors' prisons also led to protection of homesteads beginning in 1845).
139. See LoPucki, The Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 12, at 1522-24.
140. To counter this strategy, the system provides for prejudgment attachment as an exception to the
principle of enforcement only after judgment. The exception makes little practical difference, however,
because its use is highly restricted, and creditors are seldom able to anticipate the debtor's removal strategy.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
141. See supra text accompanying note 42.
142. See, e.g., PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING AND STRATEGIES (1993); Savanna

Mapelli, Judgment Proofing Your Wealthy Clients, N.J. L.J., Dec. 12, 1994, at 10, 32 ("The key is to
choose a foreign jurisdiction that does not recognize U.S. judgments under the doctrine of comity."). The
United States currently is not a party to any treaties for the enforcement of judgments. See supra note 42.
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for judgment debtors from their foreign creditors."' They implement the
latter policy principally by validating self-settled spendthrift trusts under which
the settlor is a beneficiary. In the United States, such a trust is ineffective

against creditors as against public policy.'" A self-settled spendthrift trust
amounts, in essence, to a declaration that one wishes to own one's assets free

of the claims of one's judgment creditors-that is, free of liability. One
commentator estimates that this offshore trust industry already administers a
145
trillion dollars in assets.

To understand the strategy of removing assets to a spendthrift trust

jurisdiction, consider the example of a medical doctor who lives and practices
medicine in the United States. Assume that the doctor owns a nonexempt
home, a medical practice, and liquid assets in a brokerage account. Each of the

three assets is worth approximately one million dollars, for a total of three
million dollars. All of the assets are located in the United States. The doctor

is a defendant in one malpractice case (the present creditor)'"' and expects
he might be sued by other patients he will injure in the future (the future
creditors). Through a U.S. lawyer who specializes in such transactions and
works with a trust company in the Cook Islands, the doctor establishes a
spendthrift trust there. The doctor is both the settlor and the sole beneficiary
of the trust. The trustee is a recognized international banking institution with
offices located in the Cook Islands.4 7 Cook Islands law permits the doctor
143. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs. Intenational Tates. Treasunr "Scramiblng' to Issue Internatioual
Regulations. Official Says, DAILY REP. FOR EXEcLvnVES. Jan 17. 1992. at G-6 t"ANcit-protection trusts
in such jurisdictions as the Bahamas. Gibraltar. and the Cayman Islands are being marketed. often on a
'cookie cutter' basis ....
); Mapelli, supra note 142. at 32 (naming Bahamas. Belize. Bernuda, Cay man
Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus. Gibraltar. and Turks and Caicos Islands as counies %%here "legislators
have drafted special asset-protection trust legislation in order to attract the offshore trust business" Gideon
Rothschild, Asset Preservation: Legal and Ethical Strategies. N Y L . Mar II. 1994, at I. 11 n 2 (naming

same countries as "having statutes favorable to asset protection trusts." and naming Bntish Virgin Islands.
Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, and Malta as "among the offshore financial centers
not usuall,
considered as desirable for asset protection trusts").
144. The Restatement reads:
(I) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust Nth a prosision restraining the
voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditors, can reach his.
interest.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a discretionars trust, his
transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the tertns
of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1957). For a more extensi.e discussion of U S policy agalnst
self-settled spendthrift trusts, see Elena Marty-Nelson. Offshore Asset Protecnon Trusts Hat ing )our Cake
and Eating It Too, 47 RuTGERs L. REV. 1I. 28-56 (1994)
145. See William J. Zink, Assets of Foreign Grantor Trust Nor hcldble itn Grantor i US Gross
Estate, TAX ADVISER, Feb. 1994, at 84.
146. Most lawyers who specialtze in offshore asset-protection planning discourage planning designed

to defeat present creditors. See. e.g.. Mapelli. supra note 142. at 32 ("[An attome should not assst a
client in transferring assets to a foreign situs trust if the client already is a judgment debtor or it litigation
is pending or a threat of suit has been made.").
147. See Thomas S. Caries, Asset Protection Trusts Potent Clanu Shields. N I L J . No% S. I993,
at 10 ("[Tlhe trustee usually is a recognized international banking institution "i To assure control oer the
trust, some lawyers recommend that the doctor name family members or associates as cotru-stees. shcn "a
threat of a claim appears on the honzon the foreign trustee has the poucr. pursuant to the trust agreement.
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to serve as a "protector" of the trust assets with the power to remove and
replace trustees and to veto investment decisions.1 8 Over one aspect of trust
management, the doctor retains no control or power of revocation: Whoever
is trustee may not expose trust assets to the claims of the doctor's creditors.
The standard trust documents also mandate that the trustee ignore instructions
made by the doctor under duress, such as an order from a U.S. court that the
doctor cause the trust to return assets so that they may be applied to the claim
of a creditor.

49

Once the trust has been established, the doctor deeds his home and
transfers ownership of his medical practice into it.' 50 Though both are now
foreign-owned, the home and the medical practice remain physically in the
United States. The trust will permit the doctor to use them without charge; the
structure functions as a form of distribution to the doctor as trust beneficiary.
The doctor also transfers the liquid assets in his brokerage account to the Cook
Islands trustee, who then proceeds to invest them in accord with nonbinding
instructions furnished by the doctor.' 5 ' The investments can be anywhere in

to remove the domestic trustee(s) (to protect them from any potential court order)." Rothschild, supra note
143, at 4.
148. See Cook Islands International Trusts Act 1984 § 2 (as amended 1991), reprinted in LEWIs D.
SOLOMON & LEWIS J. SARET, ASSET PROTECrION STRATEGIES 361 (1993) [hereinafter Cook Islands
International Trusts Act] (defining .'protector' in relation to international trust [to mean] person who is the
holder of power which when invoked is capable of directing trustee in matters relating to trust and in
respect of which matters trustee has discretion and includes person who is holder of power of appointment
or dismissal of trustees"); Rothschild, supra note 143, at 4 ("The Cook Islands, for example, has expanded
the traditional scope of a protector's power by providing that the settlor may be a protector and may have
certain powers over the trustees. These powers include the power to remove and replace trustees and veto
investment and distribution decisions .... ). An example of a "typical trust protector veto power
provision" appears in HOWARD D. ROSEN, ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING A-13-14 (1994).
149. See ROSEN, supra note 148, at A-12 (providing example of duress provision); Mapelli, supra note
142, at 10 ("The trust documents also must mandate that the trustee ignore instructions made under duress
so that if, for example, the U.S. settlor is court ordered to demand the return of assets protected by the
trust, the trustee must ignore the settlor's directions.").
150. Planners generally recommend that real estate be deeded to the trust in order to avoid adverse
tax consequences in the United States. See, e.g., Rothschild, supra note 143, at 4 (recommending
conveyance of family residence or vacation home to trust to maintain mortgage interest deduction). Planners
generally recommend that the doctor place the medical practice in a U.S. family limited partnership. As
limited partner, the trust holds 99% ownership but has no control except the power to dissolve the
partnership. As general partner, the doctor holds 1% ownership but has full control. When a claim
threatens, the trust will dissolve the family limited partnership, so that the practice is owned directly by the
trust. The family limited partnership is used because it maximizes the doctor's control over the assets and
has valuable judgment-proofing characteristics that are beyond the scope of this Article. See ROSEN, supra
note 148, at A-4--8 (discussing asset protection aspects of limited partnerships under Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act of 1976); Barry S. Engel & Ronald L. Rudman, Family Limited Partnerships: New
Meaning for "Limited", TR. & ESr., July 1993, at 46, 47 (noting that creditor's charging order remedy
against interests in limited partnership is much more limited than remedy creditor would have against
property that was contributed, but arguing that recent court decisions have eroded protection); Rothschild,
supra note 143, at 4.
15 1. Where the trustee fails to follow an instruction, the doctor could remove the trustee and substitute
another. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing powers of trust "protectors").
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the world, including the United States. 52 The transaction is tax neutral.'"
With his financial affairs so arranged, the doctor will be in a powerful
position to negotiate settlement with his present and future creditors. If a
significant case against him fails to settle, the doctor can respond at any of
three levels. Each increase in the level of the doctor's response increases the

doctor's likelihood of escaping liability, but each will also increase the doctor's
level of inconvenience. At the first level, the doctor can merely litigate the

effectiveness of the protections already in place. To the judgment creditor's
claim that the trust violates public policy of the United States, the doctor's

argument will be that under international law, the validity of a trust is
governed by the law chosen by the settlor,'" provided only that the trust has
sufficient contacts with that jurisdiction. The argument continues that the

trustee's location in the Cook Islands is a sufficient contact to make Cook
Islands law applicable, and that the trust is valid under Cook Islands law. To

the future (now judgment) creditor's claim that the transfer to the trust was in
fraud of creditors, the doctor has the additional argument that the transfer was

not fraudulent even under U.S. law because the doctor did not have the intent
to defraud specific creditors, present or future, but was merely "looking to his
future wellbeing."' 5 5 If the transfer is more than four years old by the time

a future creditor challenges it, the challenge will be barred by the statute of
56
limitations contained in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.'
152. Investment in the United States might give a U S court the excuse it needs to apply U-S law to
void the spendthrift aspect of the trust. But the trust could remove the assets from the United States before
the U.S. court could discover and attach them. rendenng the court's ruling ineffcii'c See. e g . Rothschild.
supra note 143, at 4 ("Assets may be more at riskof becoming subject to a court's jurnsdiction while
physically in the U.S. even though they are owned by the trust Hoeser. most individuals prefer not to
transfer them offshore until it becomes necessary.").
153. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-006 (Aug. 20. 1992). Zink. supra note 145. at 84 (summarizing ruling)
But see Elena Marty-Nelson. Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Tr ts Icing on tie Cake '. IS VA TAX
REv. 399 (1996) (arguing existence of minor tax advantages tooverseas asset-protection trusts)
154. See, e.g., Article 6 of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their
Recognition ("A trust shall be governed by the law chosen b) the seiilor ").reprinted in RoSE,. supra note
148, at B-701; Cook Islands International Trusts Act. supra note 148. § 13G(3) ("A term of an international
trust that the laws of the Cook Islands are to govern a particular aspect of the trust
is valid and
effective accordingly.").
155. Oberst v. Oberst, 91 B.R. 97. 101 (Bankr. C.D Cal. 1988) The full passage reads
While the Court finds it very difficult to locate the exact line between bankruptcy planning and
hindering creditors, Congress has decided that the key is the intent of the debtor If thedebtor
has a particular creditor or series of creditors in mind and is it)ing to remove his assets from
their reach, this would be grounds to deny the discharge If the debtor is merely looking to his
future wellbeing, the discharge will be granted. This is an uncomfortable test and does not seem
equitable, but it is the law.
Id. See also Hurlbert v. Shakleton. 560 So. 2d 1276. 1278 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1990) (remanding for finding
of specific intent case of medical doctor who transferred his business to make it unreachable by his
creditors because, as he explained, -I wasn't able to get malpractice insurance, and I wanted to cover all
the bases."'). But see Mapelli, supra note 142. at 10 ("JAI foreign situs trust should be a planning tool for
an individual fearing litigation but who is not currently invohed in litigation as a defendant or even about
to become a defendant.").
156. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9. 7A U L A 665 (1985) (fixing
statute of limitations as
four years from time transfer was made for most actions). If the plaintiff's action is based on actual intent
to defraud, the plaintiff may bring it "within one )ear after the transfer
uas or could reasonabl, hae
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At the second level, the trust, at the doctor's "suggestion," can remove the
value of his remaining assets from the United States before litigating the
validity of the trust. To remove the value of his home and practice, he would
liquidate that value, either by borrowing against the assets or selling them, and
transfer the proceeds to the Cook Islands. Once the trust has removed the last
of its assets from the United States, the principles of territoriality157 and
enforcement only against property 5 8 will combine to make enforcement in
the United States highly unlikely. No U.S. court is likely to attempt to
administer enforcement against assets located outside the United States., 59
Enforcement in the Cook Islands will be even less likely. The Cook Islands
will not recognize or enforce the judgment of the U.S. court invalidating the
trust.' 60 It will apply Cook Islands law to determine the validity of the
trust.' 61 In fact, it probably will not recognize even the judgment of the U.S.
court determining liability in the malpractice case against the doctor.' 62 The
plaintiff may have to relitigate both the validity of the trust and the doctor's
negligence in the Cook Islands. Even if the plaintiff were by some miracle to
win the case in the Cook Islands, the plaintiff probably still would be unable
to collect the judgment. The terms of the trust typically provide that the trust
may "flee" to another foreign jurisdiction if the trust or its assets are
attacked. 63 Once the plaintiff committed resources to attacking the trust in
the Cook Islands, the trustee could move the trust to another liability haven.
Absent a mistake on the part of the doctor or his lawyers, collection in the
Cook Islands would be impossible.
been discovered by the claimant." Id. An effective strategy for the doctor in this illustration would probably
be to notify a malpractice plaintiff of his transfers at the time of the filing of the malpractice action, or even
earlier. Plaintiff's counsel may not be aware that the statute of limitations will be running during the
malpractice action. Astute plaintiff's counsel should then file the fraudulent transfer action along with the
malpractice case, creating a complex litigation environment.
157. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing principle of territoriality).
158. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing principle of enforcement only against
property).
159. The U.S. court might, however, have the power to do so if the doctor were served in the main
action before leaving the United States. The initial pleading in an action for money damages typically states
only a cause of action for money damages. But where state statutes authorize enforcement of a judgment
without additional service of process, the courts hold such enforcement constitutional. See Threlkeld v.
Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974) (permitting enforcement of California judgment against defendant
who had consented to jurisdiction of California court, but removed himself from state prior to entry of
judgment); Smith v. O'Byrne, 831 P.2d 709 (Or. App. 1992) (holding that Oregon court could conduct sale
of intangible property of judgment debtor even though judgment debtor had removed himself from Oregon
prior to entry of judgment and property was not located in Oregon).
160. See Cook Islands International Trusts Act, supra note 148, § 13D.
161. Id. § 5 (providing that trust "registered under this Act shall be a valid trust notwithstanding that
it may be invalid according to the law of the settlor's domicile or residence or place of current
incorporation").
162. See Mapelli, supra note 142, at 32 (suggesting necessity of relitigation of underlying claim). But
see Rothschild, supra note 143, at 4 ("Even where a judgment is entered in a U.S. court, many trustfriendly jurisdictions do not honor U.S. judgments that are based on the application of laws contrary to their
own substantive laws.").
163. See Mapelli, supra note 142, at 10; see also ROSEN, supra note 148, at A-12-13 (describing flight
provisions and setting forth example).
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In response to the doctor's deployment of such strategies, it is possible to
imagine the U.S. judge abandoning on equitable grounds the principle of
enforcement only against property. The court might determine the trust to be

invalid and the doctor to be the owner of the assets, and then order the doctor
to surrender them to a sheriff within the jurisdiction of the court.'" Absent
compliance, the U.S. court might order the doctor imprisoned for contempt of
court.

65

The doctor's defense would be that he was not in contempt because

from the time he was served with the court's order, he lacked the ability to
comply with it.' 66 As previously noted, the typical asset-protection trust
contains a duress provision, barring the trustee from acceding to the settlor's

demands for distributions ordered by a court.

67

The Cook Islands trustee

would almost certainly comply with the trust document and refuse to surrender

the assets. 68 To continue to live and work in the United States, the doctor
ultimately would have to comply, to the best of his ability, with any orders
issued and upheld by courts in the United States. But it is far from clear that
the legal system in the United States would make full use of the contempt
power to preserve the liability system. To do so would require abandonment

of the principles of territoriality and enforcement only against property.
Abandoning these judicial self-restraints would test as-yet-unexplored limits of

judicial power and put the prestige and position of the judiciary at risk. In
deciding who can or cannot retrieve his assets, the courts would be working

with highly imperfect information; they would make mistakes. Imprisoning
debtors who could not pay, on the ground that they created the impossibility
164. See supra note 159.
165. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 482.080 (West 1979 & Supp 1996) (pro%iding for entr) ot
orders directing debtors to transfer property to levying officer and inclusion in such orders of notice that
failure to comply may subject defendant to punishment for contempt of court)
166. See, e.g., United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752. 757 (1983) (-In a ci il contempt proceeding
such as this, of course, a defendant may assert a present inabilt) to compl, sIth the order in question
Where compliance is impossible, neither the moving party nor the court has anN reason to proceed vtth
the civil contempt action."); United States v. Bryan. 339 U S 323. 330-31 ( 19501 t"OrdinanIl, one charged
with contempt of court for failure to comply with a court order makes a complete defense b, pro ing that
he is unable to comply. A court will not imprison a witness for failure to produce documents shtch he does
not have, unless he is responsible for their unavailability
"), FTC % Blame. 308 F Supp 932. 933
(N.D. Ga. 1970) (stating with respect to documents respondent failed to produce- "'Hoscser. the respondent
can not be said to be 'responsible for their unavailability' if prior to the time he %%as sered sith a
subpoena to produce the documents he had previously disposed of the same in good faith "1
167. While the settlor as protector has the authonty to seto decisions of the trustee, he or she has no
authority to take affirmative action. See Mapelli. supra note 142. at 10 ("lf. for example. the U S s etlor
is court ordered to demand the return of assets protected b) the trust, the trustee must ignore the settlor's
directions."); Rothschild, supra note 143. at 4 ("Since the protector's poucr is a negatise po%,cr tas
opposed to an affirmative power to initiate action) the protector cannot be compelled b. a court to take
action.").
168. To surrender assets in even a single case might damage the salabilit of Cook Islands trusts in
the United States. Given the importance of the asset-protection trust industr) to the Cook Islands. the Cook
Islands financial institution that served as trustee would expect to be protected bN the Cook Islands courts
if it refused to surrender, and punished if it did not. In a contest of wills between a U S court determined
to force the doctor to retrieve assets and a Cook Islands trustee determined to preserve its countr)"s
industry, the trustee clearly would win. The United States has a strong tradition against imprisonment for
debt, even when the debtor behaved stupidly in getting into the situation that precnted pa:,mcnt
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by their wrongful act of establishing an offshore asset-protection trust, would
open the courts to valid criticism from both sides. Opponents of this expansion
of judicial power would soon have examples of the folly of imprisonment for
debt that would rival those of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Proponents, on the other hand, would point out that most of the
approximately 900,000 Americans who file bankruptcy each year have
deliberately done some wrongful act that has made payment impossible-they
have bought something they could not afford, borrowed money they could not
repay, or made deliberate decisions to live beyond their means. The proponents
would want to know why the principle that justifies imprisoning debtors who
cannot retrieve assets from offshore asset-protection trusts does not also justify
imprisoning debtors who rendered themselves unable to pay by other
fraudulent or wrongful acts. The proponents' arguments might be sound, but
they would be arguments for widespread imprisonment of debtors who would
not "hold the keys to their own cells"169 -a drastic change in American legal
culture.
At the third level of defense, the doctor might choose to remove himself
from the United States to eliminate the possibility of being imprisoned for
contempt. From his safe haven, perhaps in the Cook Islands, the doctor could
negotiate to settle the U.S. action. Upon settlement, there would be no bar to
the doctor's return. The settlement could provide for the vacation of contempt
orders entered during the doctor's absence.
The essence of the offshore asset-protection trust problem is that the world
recognizes the right of an owner of liquid wealth to move it to any nation that
offers a better deal. A significant number of nations now offer to protect that
wealth against liability. 70 Unless the world community overrules those
nations by imposing some sort of sanctions, they will continue to provide
strategists with the means to defeat liability in individual cases, demoralize
nonstrategists, and thereby contribute to the ultimate demise of liability itself.
Ill. CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT PROOFING
Any debtor could become judgment proof using the strategies described
in the preceding Part. For a large, publicly held company, the most effective
strategy would be a combination of secured debt and ownership strategies. The
debtor would first reduce its assets through asset securitization, then
compartmentalize by incorporating subsidiaries and dividing its assets among
them. Finally, it would encumber the assets in those subsidiaries beyond their
remaining value. With such redundant judgment proofing in its structure, a
169. See, e.g., Linda S. Beres, Civil Contempt and the Rational Contemnor, 69 IND. L.J. 723, 742
(1994) (stating that disparate treatment of civil and criminal contemnors is based on view that civil
contemnors "hold the keys to their own cells").
170. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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company would be beyond the reach of liability. Problems such as those that
plagued Manville, Texaco, A.H. Robbins, Union Carbide, Dow Chemical,
Smith Manufacturing, and Exxon would no longer be of concern. Those
members of a corporate group that incurred large liabilities would file under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, stripping away the liabilities without
paying any significant portion of them. The investors who set up such
structures generally would not be able to retain interests in the operating
companies as they emerged from Chapter 11. But those investors already
would have profited by setting up the structures that externalized liability and
enabled them to pay less for their financing at the time they established their
enterprise.'
Anything the investors got from Chapter I1 would be
72
gravy.1
If judgment-proofing strategies insulate companies from the bane of
liability, why doesn't everyone use them? Among small- and medium-sized
companies, the answer is that the large majority enjoys most of the benefits of
being judgment proof already." 3 They have secured debt that exceeds the
liquidation value of their assets. Many carry liability insurance, but liability
insurance is nearly always subject to dollar limits, limits as to the types of risk
insured against, and contractual defenses. 174 The limits of the liability
insurance these companies carry is often quite low. 7 5 Their liability is
probably even more likely than that of large companies to exceed the limits of

171. This point is elaborated infra text accompanying notes 179-S1
172. In our study of the bankruptcy reorganizations of the 1980s. Whitford and I discoered the
existence of a settlement norm requinng that everybody at the bargaining table get sometling. en those
clearly lacking an entitlement in adjudication. See LoPucki & Whitford. supra note 110. at 158-60
(discussing norm).
173. For an explanation of how and why this occurs. see LoPucki. supra note 32. at 1903-06.
1931-36. The median firm in the American economy is surprisingl) small For e.ample. tiemedian tirm
proceeding under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code in the early 1980s had onl) about $250.000 in aswts
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. ExEcUTIVE OFFICE FOR U S TRI. ST .s. AN E\ALt Amo% oi. Tit. U S
TRUSTEE PILOT PROGRAM FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 47 (1983) This ,,ould suggest that, after
adjustment for inflation, the corresponding figure today sould be consitderabl) Ilss than $500.000 Escn
in the Central District of California, a district notorious for its large bankrupic) cases. approximatel) 45%
of the cases fall in the under SI million categories. See Lisa Hill Fennmg & Craig A Hart. Measurimn
Chapter 1): The Real World of 500 Cases. 4 A.B.I. L. RE%',119. 137 (1996)
174. Lack of adequate insurance at even the largest companies in America is commonplace Man%i1lc.
Texaco, A.H. Robbins, Union Carbide, Dow Chemical. Smith Manufacturing. and LTV sere all in
bankruptcy in part because they carried grossly inadequate liability insurance or because their carrier,,
denied liability. See also Youell v. Exxon Corp.. 74 F.3d 373 (1996) (describing litigation in ,,hich Exxon
Corporation's liability insurers seek declaratory judgment that the) are not liable for habilitt ansing out
of Exxon Valdez oil spill).
175. For example, Hansmann and Kraakman report. on the basis of an interN es.,that as of 1990
[O]f the roughly 350.000 insurance policies that Aetna ,,rites for the -'standard markeI"-,hich
includes all business firms except the Fortune 500--one-third hase coscrage limts ot about
$300,000 per accident, one-third have limits of about S500.000 per accident. and one-third have
limits of about SI million. In addition, 10% of all firms carrn additional "'umbrella" coserage
Of the latter firms, half carry SI million in umbrella coerage per accident. one-quarter carry
$2-3 million, and one-quarter--about 2.5% of all firms insured-cary S5 million or more
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76. at 1889 n.25.
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their policies. When that occurs, the excess liability is nearly always
76
uncollectible. 1
The mystery is why so few of the largest companies are judgment proof
at the time of their bankruptcy reorganizations. 177 Despite the critical
advantage that secured debt would have brought to companies such as
Manville in negotiating with asbestos claimants or Texaco in negotiating with
Pennzoil, the largest companies eschew secured financing. 7 8 The constraints
that might explain why large companies are seldom judgment proof are the
subject of the remainder of this Part.
A. The Self-Immolation Argument
Some commentators argue that shareholders have nothing to gain by
judgment proofing their companies. Bankruptcy sweeps away liability, but
when used by large, publicly held companies, it sweeps away shareholdings
as well. Thus, in the very situations where judgment proofing actually provides
benefits, the shareholders will no longer be around to share in them. One
might suppose this would leave shareholders with no incentive to judgment
proof their companies in the first place. Professor Stephen Presser used
essentially this argument to assert that unlimited shareholder liability was
unnecessary to discourage projects that externalize tort risk:
A shareholder does not invest to lose even the initial investment. One
invests in the belief that one will derive a profit, from appreciation of
shares, or from dividends. One selects one's investment after having
concluded that the investment is one that will make money, not lose
it. This is the same calculation that one would perform if there were
unlimited liability.... [I]t is the quality of the investment opportunity
itself, and not the elimination of possible personal
liability that leads
9
an investor to commit his or her capital.'
Professor Presser is correct in asserting that an investment with no
potential for profit cannot be rendered desirable by reduction in the potential

176. Small businesses tend to be owned by an individual or a family, and, as noted above, their assets
are usually fully encumbered. There is little reason to expect that judgments in excess of policy limits are
any more collectible from them than from automobile owners and drivers. One study indicated that only
about 1% of automobile accident tort liability payments came from uninsured sources. See ALFRED F
CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 48 (1964). The figure is particularly

striking when one considers that many drivers underinsure and an estimated 17.5% of drivers do not insure
at all. See infra note 360.
177. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note I10, at 142, 177 (showing substantial recoveries by
unsecured creditors of insolvent companies).
178. See LoPucki, supra note 32, at 1924-25 (describing findings from empirical study of large
companies in reorganization); Mann, supra note 75, at 60-61 (citing "the well known fact that the strongest
companies use secured debt with relative infrequency").
179. Presser, supra note 80. at 159.
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for loss. But he incorrectly asserts that the desirability of an investment that
does have potential for profit cannot be rendered more desirable by reduction
in the potential for loss. To calculate the value of an investment, one must take
account of its potential for profit, its potential for loss, and the likelihood of
each. Serious investment opportunities are not, as Professor Presser implies,
simply good or bad; most have the potential at the time of the investment
decision to be either. The risks of the investment are reflected in their value
ex ante. 80 If an investment is structured to externalize liability, it will have
a higher value ex ante than if it is not. Those who create and initially control
the investment opportunity may choose to take the role of shareholders, but
that choice does not require that they forgo the profit from defeating liability.
The profit is real and inherent in the value of their shares. Their shares are
worth more than they would be without judgment proofing because, with
judgment proofing, the company's financing is at a lower interest rate. The
financing is at a lower interest rate because the financier has priority over
future liability and therefore carries lower risk of nonpayment. The
shareholders can cash this value by selling their shares before the uncertainty
of the tort liability resolves.
To illustrate, assume a project that costs investors 40 and will be worth
100. There is a 50% chance the project will generate no liability and a 50%
chance that it will generate liability of 130. The potential gain to society from
this project is 60 (100 of value produced, less 40 of investment); the potential
loss is -70 (100 of value produced, less 40 of investment and 130 of liability).
Each of these outcomes are equally probable, so the social utility of the project
is the average of the two, -5. Society is better off without the project. But if
the project can be financed in a manner that externalizes liability-through a
corporation in which shareholders have limited liability--the promoters of the
project can reap a profit. The possible outcomes to the investors are a gain of
60 (100 of value produced, less 40 of investment) or a loss of 40 (investors
recover nothing because liability absorbs all assets). Each of these outcomes
are equally probable, so the profitability of the project is + 10 to the investors.
The investors could realize that profit by selling the right to do the project
before the liability is incurred.
The investors could increase the profitability of this project through further
judgment proofing. For example, if 30 of the 40 necessary to complete the
project comes from secured creditors or asset securitizers, that 30 will have
priority over liability claimants. Viewed from the perspective of the investors
as a group, the potential loss is reduced to -10 (the amount investors will lose
if the project is bankrupted by liability), giving the investment a positive value
of 25 (the sum of a 50% chance of gaining 60 (worth 30) and a 50% chance

180. That is. before the risk resolves into a favorable or unfavorable outcome
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of losing 10 (worth -5)). Again, these values exist in the hands of those
organizing the project before the liability is incurred.
Another way of viewing this transaction is that the organizers "sell" to
secured creditors or asset securitizers the opportunity to defeat liability,' 8'
reaping their profit in the enhanced value of their shares. Though the shares
may later become worthless, that is a risk that will be borne by those who own
the shares when and if the liability accrues. The value of the organizers' shares
reflects the organizers' profits even after they are discounted for the probability
of the future liability. Because the organizers have the opportunity to pull their
profits out of the business before the liability risk of the business resolves,
Professor Presser's self-immolation argument fails. Externalizing liability can
generate profits, not just control losses.
B. The PrecariousPosition of Managers
For large companies to remain perpetually judgment proof would put
managers in a precarious position. To reap the full benefit of judgment
proofing, the companies occasionally would have to sweep away their
liabilities in Chapter 11. The Chapter 11 reorganization of a large, publicly
held company almost inevitably results in a shift in control 8 2 and that shift
of control almost invariably sweeps top management from office.' 83
Economically minded writers generally consider this characteristic of
Chapter 11 to be positive. They tout high debt levels as an efficient means of
disciplining management. They argue that the inability of the company to meet
its debt obligations signals the failure of management to achieve expectations.
The Chapter 11 case provides the opportunity for the investors to
intervene. 84
'
The interests of the managers are exactly the opposite of those of the
investors. To the extent that the managers of large, publicly held companies
have power independent of their shareholders, they can benefit themselves by
operating their companies with substantial cushions of equity. Their purpose
in maintaining these cushions is to protect themselves against creditors and
shareholders; the incidental effect of doing so is to expose investments in their
181. See LoPucki, supra note 32, at 1899 ("Security is an agreement between A and B that C take
nothing.").
182. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 610-11, 618 (1993) (presenting data and
concluding that "it was rare for existing shareholders to retain a majority of the reorganization shares").
183. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356

(1990) (finding high CEO turnover during Chapter II reorganizations of large companies); LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 124, at 729 (stating that 95% of CEOs in office at time of business failure that led
to bankruptcy had lost their positions by confirmation of plan).
184. Debt has been described as a means of controlling managers. See Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in ConstrainingManagement, 85 AM. ECON.

REv. 567-68 (1995) (describing finance literature).
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companies to liability unnecessarily." 5 Even though their investors are better
off with judgment-proof structures that externalize the risk of liability,"
managers can be expected to resist them.
Once this conflict between the interests of owners and managers over the

judgment proofing of investments is generally recognized, it is likely to be
resolved in ways that promote judgment proofing. That solution maximizes

benefits to the alliance of owners and managers." 7 By contract, owners and
managers can then divide between them benefits gained by externalizing
liability. Managers might, for example, be given higher pay or collateralized
severance pay to compensate them for the additional risk of job loss in a
judgment-proof company.
C. The Marginality of Liability

To judgment proof a business, managers must finance it differently.
Specifically, they must change the source of the company's financing from
equity, in the form of public stock offerings and unsecured debt in the form
of commercial loans and public bond offerings, to a combination of asset
securitization and secured loans. The managers must be willing to take the
company through bankruptcy reorganization to sweep away liability that cannot
be settled. To justify the change in method of financing, the savings from the
elimination of liability must exceed the additional costs, if any, of the new
forms of financing and the occasional bankruptcy reorganizations. For many
businesses, judgment proofing is not cost effective for the simple reason that

185. As Easterbrook and Fischel have suggested:
Managers who have firm-specific investments of human capital cannot dicrsify the risk of
business failure.... The purchase of insurance in amounts greater than the amount of the firm's
capital is one method of reducing the amount that the firm must pay [managers for personal risk
taking]. A firm with insurance against tort claims is less likely to become bankrupt. and thus
less likely to impose costs on managers and other employees
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited LDabiht) and the Corporation. 52 U Cift L REV 89.
107-08 (1985); see LoPucki, supra note 32, at 1930-31 ("By borrow ing unsecured, the managers may be
sacrificing the best interests of their companies to render their own positions less precarious ")
186. See Thompson. supra note 78. at 2 (1994) ("If the liability is shifted to a tort ,ictim. the use of
the corporate form seems particularly troublesome, permitting the enterprise to exteralzc part of the cost
of doing business."); see also Easterbrook & Fischel. supra note 185. at 107 ("When corporations must pay
for the right to engage in risky activities, they will tend to undertake projects onl) %%here social benefits
equal social costs at the margin."); Kyle D. Logue. Solving the Judgment-Proof Problemn. 72 TEX L_REV
1375, 1375 (1994) ("Commentators have long recognized that the existence of judgment-proof tortfeasors
seriously undermines the deterrence and insurance goals of tort la, The deterrence goal is undermined
because, irrespective of the liability rule, judgment-proof tortfeasors v.ill not full) internalize the costs of
the accidents they cause." (footnote omitted)).
187. The assumption underlying this conclusion is that the gains from judgment proofing the
company--an average of about five million dollars per year. see mfra text accompanying note 190-.xcced
the value to managers of avoiding Chapter II and the accompanying probability that they will lose their
jobs. That is, the level of increased compensation the company would have to pay its top managers to
accept the higher risk of bankruptcy and job loss that accompanies judgment proofing whould be less than
five million dollars per year.
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the businesses generate little liability and thus have only low costs to
eliminate.
How great are the costs of liability? In a survey of 729 relatively large
U.S. and Canadian firms,' Tillinghast-Towers Perrin and the Risk Insurance
Management Society found that "total liability risk financing costs' ' 189
averaged about .255% of the companies' total revenues. 90 The average
revenues for respondent companies was $1.966 billion, so the average liability
risk-financing cost for one of these companies was about $5 million a year. To
a company of that size, $5 million would not be inconsequential. The $5
million a year savings available from judgment proofing would come with a
bonus: Immune from liability, the company could engage in higher risk
activities without increased costs. Whether such a company should attempt to
capture these savings will at least in part depend on what the company has to
do to get them. Large companies that do not consider the savings worth the
expense and hassle of judgment proofing themselves today may come to the
opposite conclusion once other large companies break the ice.
The basis for large companies' reluctance to use judgment-proofing
techniques today is similar to the basis for their reluctance to use bankruptcy
reorganization in the 1970s. In each case, the new strategy raised moral issues,
was untried and therefore uncertain, and threatened to bring with it public
relations problems capable of destroying the company. The flow of large
corporate bankruptcy cases began as a trickle in the early 1980s, and by 1990
had become a flood.' 9' For example, before Continental Airlines filed its first

petition in 1983, commentators speculated on whether the reorganization of an
airline was even possible.' 92 Once pioneers had shown the way, it was much
easier for other companies to follow. By 1992, at least seven major carriers
had filed for reorganization: Air Florida, Frontier, Eastern, Pan Am, Midway,
American West, and TWA. Bankruptcy had "lost [its] ...
become "an acceptable, trendy reorganizing tool."' 93

stigma" and had

Unfortunately for the liability system, total liability risk financing cost
differs widely with the size of the company,' 94 and also from industry to

188. See 1995 COST OF RISK SURVEY I.
189. Total liability risk financing costs are the sum of liability insurance premiums and retained
liability losses (uninsured losses). Id. at 21.
190. Id.
191. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., John Brecher, A Proud Bird Loses Its Wings, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1983, at 71 (quoting
airline analyst prediction that "[i]f Continental can operate in bankruptcy ... a lot of airlines are going to
go bankrupt to alter their labor agreements") (alteration in original).
193. Fred Faust, Retailers Tighten Their Belts for a Lean '96. ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Jan. 16.

1996, at 6C (quoting consultant on mergers, acquisitions, and restructurings).
194. See 1995 COST OF RISK SURVEY, supra note 188, at 46 (showing ratios of liability premiums to
company revenues to be about eight times as high for $100 million companies (.75%) as for $5 billion
companies (.096%)).
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industry.'95 In some industries, the costs of liability are clearly high enough
to drive company strategy.'96 In those kinds of industries, judgment proofing

flourishes.' 97 Once the techniques have been developed, they are transported
to other industries where the risks are only marginally lower. As was
demonstrated in the toxic waste treatment, storage, and disposal industry, the
system can, through a concerted effort, prevent judgment proofing in a single,
highly visible industry, at least temporarily.9' " But as the number of
industries in which judgment proofing is cost effective increases, the system's
battle becomes increasingly hopeless.
Companies that judgment proof will be able to capture three kinds of
savings. First, through bankruptcy reorganization they will be able to discharge
liability to suppliers, employees, taxing authorities, and other creditors who
deliberately assumed the role of unsecured creditor. Until these kinds of
creditors adjust to the new environment in which judgment proofing is
common, judgment-proof debtors will profit greatly from the discharge of this
kind of liability. Eventually, most of those who can adjust to the new
environment will. Suppliers and employees can withhold their goods and
services unless they are admitted to the privileged circle of the secured
creditors. Taxing authorities have the power to grant themselves liens. I have
argued elsewhere, however, that the reaction of these creditors will be
incomplete; some will be slow to understand the change or will lack the
liquidity or flexibility to change their ways. They will provide a permanent
subsidy to judgment-proof debtors."9
The second kind of cost savings available to a judgment-proof debtor is
the reduction of recurring, predictable liability to "'involuntary creditors."
Involuntary creditors are creditors who do not contract for their status as
creditors but are thrust into it by the wrongful act of their debtor. Most tort
creditors are involuntary. Some-but far from all-involuntary claims can be
insured. But when involuntary creditors' claims are recurring and predictable,
insurance does not necessarily result in any savings. Insurance companies
195. Id. at 49 (showing liability premiums as percent of re'enue to be about 60 times as high for
finance banks, savings & loans, and holding companies (.011%) as for real estate, and securities and
commodities brokers (.656%)).
196. See Charles Robert Tremper. Compensation for Harm fromn
Chantable Actniit. 76 COR'ELL L
REv. 401, 420 & n.97 (1991) (observing that during 1987-88 average insurance cpencns of Uniied Way
agencies and other sources available for property and liability coverages (other than motor %chiclet reached
between two and three percent of total operating expenses); Lee Berton. Ledgerdemam ' Coopers &
Lybrand Revised Notes of Audit a Year After the Fact. WALL ST J . No% 2. 1995. at AI "Settlements of
[malpractice] suits now devour an astonishing 12% of accounting and auditing resenue at the Big Siv
accounting firms."): Policing Cabs. SACRAMiENTO BEE. Dec 2. 1994. at B8 (noting that insurance for cab

drivers can run as high as S9000 per year).
197. See. e.g., William J. Cook, An Easy Wa. our of this Mess. U S NEWS & WORLD REP. June 25.
1990, at 14 (reporting decision by Royal Dutch/Shell Oil Company to ship oil to United States on
independent tankers "[rlather than risk being stuck for [liabilities for cleaning up an) possible spillsl")
198. See infra note 298.
199. See LoPucki. supra note 32. at 1954-58
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incorporate the cost of paying the predictable claims into the premiums they
charge debtors. If debtors choose to pay the premiums, it is not to reduce risk,
but only to gain the insurers' loyalty and expertise in claims administration 2°°
or to comply with laws requiring financial responsibility.2"' Solvent debtors
must pay the full costs of recurring and predictable liability, whether insured
or not.
By contrast, debtors who are both uninsured and judgment proof cannot
be compelled to pay even their recurring and predictable liabilities. Instead, a
standoff ensues. The creditor cannot forcibly obtain payment, but it might be
able to disrupt the debtor's business. The debtor can extinguish the claim
through bankruptcy reorganization, but that would be costly and disruptive.
Most of these standoffs are resolved through compromise. Claims of
particularly obstreperous involuntary creditors can either be discharged by the
running of the relevant statutes of limitations, or, if the plaintiffs can find
attorneys willing to invest in them, be reduced to judgments. Judgments
obtained remain effective until discharged in bankruptcy reorganization or paid
as a result of some fluke that renders the company no longer judgment proof.
Overall, the savings to judgment-proof debtors from dealing with recurring,
predictable liability in this manner probably are substantial. But for a large
company to operate this way in a world where others do not might be a public
relations disaster. This last consideration is discussed in the next subsection.
The third kind of cost savings available to a judgment-proof debtor is the
elimination of unpredictable catastrophic liability. This category includes the
kinds of liability resulting to Manville from its asbestos manufacturing, to
Texaco from the Pennzoil verdict, or to Dow Chemical from the breast implant
litigation. Some of this liability is insured against, but much is in excess of
policy limits or outside policy coverage entirely.2 2 As should be apparent
from the number of large companies that have filed for bankruptcy, bankruptcy
already is the standard method of dealing with liability of this magnitude. The
companies that use this method can be thought of as engaging in a "soft" kind
200. See MARK R. GREENE ET AL., RISK AND INSURANCE 541, 543 (8th ed. 1992) (explaining that
"[ilf each small group were ... required to pay for its own losses, risk transfer would not be achieved,"
but also focusing on claims management as another key function of insurers).
201. See Robert J. Gilbert, Playing It Safe in Today's Real Estate Market with Environmental
Insurance, MASS. LAW. WKLY., SUPP.: REAL EST., Dec. 5, 1994, at 1, 8 n.2 ("Many companies offer
'insurance' that essentially constitutes a surety bond; the insurer merely guarantees that the handler or
transporter will be able to pay damages to third parties up to the amounts required in the financial
responsibility law: the handler or transporter typically is obligated to repay the insurer for any amounts paid
under the policy.").
202. Even large companies carry relatively low levels of insurance. See 1995 COST OF RISK SURVEY,
supra note 188, at 69 (showing mode umbrella/excess liability limits carried by firms with revenues of $100
million to $500 million to be only $31 million to $50 million). In mass tort cases where the liability is in
the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, the insurers commonly deny coverage and litigate. See, e.g.,
Andrew Blum, Dow Coming Gets Some Cash, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 1996, at A6 (describing litigation
between Dow Coming and its insurers over insurers' attempt to void policies for Dow Corning's failure
to disclose information about dangers of breast implants).
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of judgment proofing: one that contemplates payment of judgments in
relatively small amounts but discharge of judgments in relatively large
amounts.20 3 Any company that becomes "lean" through the reduction in its
capital to the levels for which there is a "reasonably foreseeable" need has
accomplished this kind of judgment proofing. Soft judgment proofing
externalizes the cost of a company's economic activity no less certainly than
the kind of "hard" judgment proofing that aims at denying all recovery to
2 °4
every plaintiff.
The absence of hard judgment proofing from the largest companies in the
U.S. economy may signal any of three things. First, the benefits of such
judgment proofing may not be sufficient to exceed the added costs of secured
° Second, hard
or asset-securitized financing and the occasional bankruptcy. ' O
judgment proofing may be cost effective for investors in the business, but it
may be artificially constrained by managers' conflicts of interest. ' 6 The third
and most likely possibility is that hard judgment proofing is not cost effective
for large companies, but only because of cultural and political constraints.
Those limitations are discussed in Section E.
D. Legal and Clerical Costs
Liability is a form of government regulation; that is, the government
mandates particular behavior through the rule of law and creates private rights
of action as the means of enforcing the mandate. Corporate financiers routinely
employ strategies to escape limitations imposed by regulation."' For
example, stockbrokers invented cash management accounts as a strategy to
escape regulations limiting the amount of interest that could be paid on a bank
account, and investment bankers invented asset securitization as a strategy to
escape involvement in the debtor's bankruptcy. Strategies such as these depend
heavily on computerized recordkeeping and were simply not possible at earlier
208
levels of technology
203. "Soft" and "hard" judgment proofing are defined at supra note 107
204. See, e.g., William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt. Buismess Form. Limited Liabdhtt. and Tac Regimes
Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome7. 66 COLO. L. REv 1001. 1036 (1995) ("llt is clear that the rule
of limited liability allows incorporated firms to shift to others some of the cost of their economic

activity ....

).

205. See supra note 196 (estimating costs of liability insurance)
206. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text (explaining conflict) Ultimately, managers may

have no choice. The losses from failure to judgment proof a large debtor will fall on consensual unsccured
creditors and shareholders. The impetus to judgment proof them can be expected to come from those
groups. Unsecured lenders should demand security: the market for corporate equities should demand
securities that evidence direct ownership of the corporation's assets as well as ownership of its operations
207. See, e.g., Merton H. Miller, FinancialInnovation" The Last Twennt Years and the Next. 21 J FI'.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 459 (1986) (arguing that "(tlhe major impulses to successful financial

innovations have come from regulations and taxes" and discussing numerous example-)208. For discussions of the role of computer technology in recent financial innovation. see Tim S
Campbell, Innovations in FinancialIntermediation.32 Bus. HORIZONS 70. 70 (1989) ("Much of the actual

work in financial services involves recording and communicating transactions The cost of these services
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Regulations rarely prohibit the accomplishment of particular objectives. To
prevent strategists from achieving a particular objective, regulators bar use of
the form ordinarily used to achieve it. Strategies designed to defeat regulation
are generally of a single basic structure. The strategist devises and adopts some
combination of permissible forms ("the new form") that achieves the objective.
To devise the new form may require considerable cleverness. Had the regulator
been able to anticipate the combination of permissible forms capable of
defeating the regulation, the regulator probably would have barred the
combination as well.
The new form typically is more complex than the old form. To make the
new form understandable to users accustomed to the old, the strategist may
provide for a translation between the two forms. To the regulator, the strategist
documents the transaction in the new form permitted by law; to the customer,
the strategist documents the transaction in the familiar form prohibited by law.
For example, consider the modem technique by which cash is managed
within a corporate group. To minimize its cost of capital, the corporate group
must minimize the amount of cash it keeps on hand. To minimize the amount
of cash it must keep on hand, the group maintains only a single fund of cash
that it employs wherever it may be needed within the group. Thus described,
the technique constitutes a disregard of corporate formalities and provides the
basis for substantive consolidation of the group should the group enter
bankruptcy. To be entitled to treatment as separate entities, corporations must
operate as separate entities. In the language employed here, the single fund is
a prohibited form.
There exists a permissible form for accomplishing the same objective.
Each member of the corporate group maintains its own fund of cash.
Whenever cash is needed by another member of the group, the member with
the cash lends it to the member with the need. Provided that such a loan is
properly documented and repaid when due, the making of the loan provides no
basis for disregard of the corporate entity of lender or borrower. Using the
permissible intragroup loans form, payment of the obligations of all members
of a corporate group by a single member of the group can be reinterpreted as
a series of transactions in which the single member lends money to the other
members, to be repaid at a future date. When the group receives cash from
operations, the cash goes into the single fund. The deposit can be reinterpreted
as a series of transactions in which the single member receives repayment of
the loans from the particular group members who earned the funds deposited.
is largely a function of the level of computer and communications technology. With the increasing
refinement of the microchip, more sophisticated systems for managing financial transactions have become
practical."); John D. Finnerty, FinancialEngineering in CorporateFinance:An Overview, 17 FIN. MGMT.
14, 29 (1988) ("The innovative financial processes [described in the article] reflect three basic causal
factors: ...(iii) the availability of relatively inexpensive computer technology to facilitate quicker financial
transactions.").
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The attribution of the funds to the efforts of various members of the group can
be made on any basis the regulator prefers because the loan and repayment
accounts within the corporate group need never balance. For loans to be due
only when the "debtor" and "creditor" agree that they are due is a permissible
2 °9

form.

To do business in this manner requires a great deal of recordkeeping.
Before the development of computerized systems for funds transfers, the
necessity of such formality and documentation may have been sufficiently
burdensome to slow the proliferation of corporations within a group. But
today, corporate groups manage their cash as a single fund. while the computer
documents the movement as a symphony of loans and repayments, complete
with interest at rates that fluctuate daily if desired.' 0 The computer
composes two translations of the complex movement of funds. The manager
of the cash sees it on the computer screen as a single fund, from which
payments are made and into which receipts are deposited. For the court that
may later determine whether the separate identities of members of the group
have been respected, the computer documents each movement of cash as a set
of intercompany loans or loan repayments.-"
Asset securitization also depends heavily on computer translation. To
qualify the transaction as bankruptcy remote, it must be a sale of assets to the
investors. But the investors do not want to own assets; typically they want the
kind of guaranteed, stable cash flow that results from loan repayment. To
structure the transaction, one must first convert ownership into a cash flow.
With some kinds of assets this might be accomplished through a sale and lease
back. The lease payments become the cash flow. With accounts, the problem
is considerably more complex. For the investors to "own" the accounts,
fluctuations in the value of the accounts must accrue to them. But both parties
want the fluctuations to accrue to the debtor. The solution is a complex
arrangement in which the turnover of the accounts produces the cash flow, the
debtor is constantly swapping new accounts into the pool owned by the

209. For example, a debtor and creditor can agree that the loan be repa)able "on demand " Until a
demand is made, the loan is not overdue. Such a loan can remain outstanding for )ear See U C C § 1-208
cmt. (referring to "demand instruments .. whose very nature permits call at an) time Ith or %,Ithout
reason").
210. See In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp.. 166 BR 461. 465-66 tBankr M D Fla 1994)
(describing complex cash management system in which each corporate subsidiain had its o%sn checking
account and had discretion to pay its own expenses, but checking accounts balance-, %cre maintained at
zero by transferring group funds into accounts on daily basis)
211. See, e.g., Southmark Corp. v. Grosz (In re Southmark). 49 F3d III1. 1114 t5th Cir 1995)
("Although each company's receipts and disbursements are commingled in the Icash management s steml
for cash management purposes, they are segregated for record keeping purposes and can be readiI)
identified."); In re Cardinal Indus. Inc., 116 B.R. 964. 967 (Bankr S D Ohio 19901 ("Funds from dilerent
segments of the organization were routinely used to support other operations of the organization On

occasion, funds from cash-rich partnerships were used to support underperforming or immature propertnes
of other partnerships. These intereompany transfers were reflected in the cash management system as
advances and reimbursements.").
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investors in a manner regulated by contract, and the investors have a razor-thin
"equity" in the accounts which is generally regarded as a deadweight
transaction cost because the investors do not really want it.2" 2
Transactions such as these are cost effective only because of computers.
In this sense, they are a direct product of computer technology. Computer
technology is generally acknowledged to be a driving force behind assetsecuritization and debtor-haven strategies." 3 Not surprisingly, these are the
two fastest growing strategies for judgment proofing.
Despite the already high level of computerization in the private sector,
judgment-proofing strategies continue to be constrained by transaction costs.
This results primarily from the failure of the public sector to organize,
computerize, and provide an efficient interface with the private sector. For
example, computerization of the Article 9 filing system has lagged badly, not
only because government filing offices have been slow to computerize their
systems,2 14 but also because the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
have been slow to redesign the system so that computerization could be
effective within it.21 5 Commentators generally agree that the transaction costs
involved in the simple task of filing a one-page document and searching to see
who else has done the same can be sufficiently high in some circumstances as
to constrain significantly the taking of security.216 The somewhat more
formidable-but hardly gargantuan-task of restructuring a debtor's finances
under Chapter 11 today generates direct costs, ranging from a low of about
three percent of the entire value of the debtor's assets for large companies, to
a high of over twenty-one percent for small companies. 2 7 The indirect costs
212. See Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 141-42 ("To achieve a true sale, an originator must limit, if not
forego, its right to the residual value of the receivables sold to the SPV.... Because the amount of
receivables sold may turn out to be greater than what was needed to pay the SPy's securities, the
overpayment represents an indirect, but real, cost to the originator,"); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are
Greater than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance
and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 153-54
(referring to equity as "over-collateralization" and "cumbersome and expensive solution").
213. See, e.g., Asset Protection Planning: Expert Outlines Advantages of Offshore Trusts to Preserve
Assets, 6 INSIGHTS & STRATEGIES, July 23, 1993, at 1, 2 (quoting Ronald L. Rudman that "[w]ith advanced
telecommunications and international banking facilities, it is just as easy to hold accounts and assets
overseas as it is in another U.S. city").
214. See Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Filing
System Task Force to the Permanent EditorialBoard'sArticle 9 Study Committee 19-25 (199 1) (discussing
lag in implementation of new technologies in statewide Article 9 filing systems).
215. See id. at 20-21 (noting technological superiority of British Columbia filing system).
216. See Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 679, 689-93 (1995)
(presenting empirical evidence of high cost of filing and searching). But see Mann, supra note 75, at 45-49
(discussing information costs of secured lending); id. at 51-53 (expressing doubt that filing fees alone could
be sufficient to alter decision to lend secured or unsecured).
217. See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39
J. FIN. 1067, 1076-78 (1984) (finding direct costs of large reorganization cases to average 6.0% of total
assets); Daryl M. Guffey & William T. Moore, Direct Bankruptcy Costs: Evidence from the Trucking
Industry, 26 FIN. REV. 223, 231 (1991) (finding direct costs of trucking industry reorganizations to average
9.12% of total assets); Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs
in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 847, 868 (finding in study of Chapter I I cases in
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are generally conceded to be much greater.21 8
Help is on the way. The co-reporters of the current Article 9 revision
process have resolved to make the granting of secured credit easier and more
efficient. 2"9 Given the continuing controversy over costs and delays in
bankruptcy reorganization, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission can
be expected to exhibit the same concerns regarding Chapter 11. These systems
cannot be fixed overnight, but they can become progressively more efficient.
As they do, the transaction costs of judgment-proofing strategies will continue
to decline.
The marginal cost of a fully computerized judgment-proofing transaction
approaches zero. Even if the savings resulting from judgment proofing a firm
are small, they can easily exceed the costs in a fully computerized
environment. The attraction of asset securitization is that it provides a cheaper
source of financing than traditional lending. This suggests that for many
businesses, computerization has already tipped the balance between the costs
of soft judgment proofing and the benefits that the business can gain from it.
E. Culture and Politics
For Americans to accept the hard judgment proofing of the nation's largest
companies would require substantial cultural and political change. Rights
enforced through liability are among the most precious we hold. These include
the civil rights of minorities, the rights of access of the disabled, and the right
to be compensated for the infliction of injury to one's person, property, or
reputation. The successful implementation of important social policies-such
as those relating to the environment, product safety, pensions, and health
care-depend upon liability. If a major American company were caught
attempting to deliberately deploy the strategies I described in the preceding
Part in order to defeat liability and eliminate the need to pay liability insurance
premiums, all hell would break loose.

Memphis, Tennessee division of bankruptcy court that direct costs of bankruptc) a~eraged 21 55% of
debtors' total assets as reported in petition); Jerold B. Warner. Bankruptcy Costs Some Etidence. 32 J Fi.
337, 343 (1977) (finding direct costs of large reorganization cases to average 4 0% of market .alue of
assets); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and %olation of Prioritv Clanu. 27 J

FIN. ECON. 285, 290 (1990) (finding direct costs in large reorganizations to ascrage 3 1% of total assets).
Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code. 38 J Fim 477. 484 (1983) (finding
direct costs of large reorganization cases to average 6.0% of disbursements to all creditors)
218. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig. The Untenable Case for Chapter II. 101 YALE LJ

1043, 1068 (1992) (attributing putative S14 billion loss in stockholder wealth in listed firms to change in
bankruptcy law); Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson. Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency
Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295. 297 (1989) (attnbuting S3 4 billion decline in
combined trading values of Texaco and Pennzoil stock to threat of bankruptcy by Texaco and tesulting
costs).
219. See supranote 73 and accompanying text; Hams & Mooney. supra note 72, at 2021 t"*Wle think
the transfer of an effective security interest ought to be as easy. inexpensive, and reliable as pomiblc -)
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Judgment-proofing strategists would feel a variety of effects. Adverse
publicity might chill the market for the company's products or the company's
appeal in the employment market. Judges, juries, legislators, and regulators
might retaliate against the company. Activists might boycott a company that
seemed to be evading environmental or civil rights liability, even if such
liability was not the main target of the strategies being employed. Concern
about all these effects might discourage investment in the company. In short,
the company might develop a reputation for sleaze."'
The Exxon Valdez oil spill provides a good illustration. Exxon Corporation
has been assessed about nine billion dollars in liability.2 Z' Exxon Shipping
Company, a $100 million subsidiary of Exxon USA, owned and operated the
Exxon Valdez. Exxon USA was in turn a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon
Corporation. Theoretically, liability for the Exxon Valdez spill might have been
confined to Exxon Shipping Company. As a practical matter, no one seriously
thought that it would be so limited. Within twenty-four hours after the spill,
Exxon Corporation made a public statement assuming "responsibility" for it.
Two weeks later, Exxon CEO L.G. Rawl was grilled about the extent of this
assumption of responsibility by skeptical members of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 222 For Exxon to
attempt to confine liability to the subsidiary not only would have been futile,
but in all probability would have been counterproductive. 23
On the other hand, most American businesses already are judgment proof
outside of narrowly drawn, dollar-limited liability insurance coverage. Credit
managers, tax collectors, environmental regulators, and tort lawyers are already
accustomed to the reality that, upon the failure of the typical business with
220. Recent events involving Marriott Corporation illustrate the depth and sensitivity of contemporary
cultural and political attitudes toward judgment proofing. See Pauline Yoshihashi, For Bill MarriottJr., The
Hospitality Trade Turns Inhospitable, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1992, at Al. In October of 1992, Marriott
announced a plan to split the $8.3 billion dollar company in two. One of the emerging companies would
own the most promising assets, and the other would take "virtually all of Marriott's debt" and "scads of
unsold land and hotels." Id.
Even though this soft judgment proofing was directed at consensual bond investors rather than
involuntary creditors and presumably did not violate their legal rights, in reporting on it the Wall Street
Journal used the words "sleaze" and "sleazy" and spoke of "angry" institutional investors, the company
"get[ting] a lot of heat," and "sullyfing] their reputation." Id.
221. See, e.g., Scott Kerin, Alaska Sport Fishing Association v. Exxon Corporation Highlights the
Need to Take a Hard Look at the Doctrine of Parens PatriaeWhen Applied in Natural Resource Damage
Litigation, 25 ENvTL. L. 897, 902 n.30 (1995) (listing payments made by, and liability assessed against,
Exxon).
222. See Exxon Oil Spill: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp.,
101st Cong. 47, 52-53, 56-61 (1989) (statement of L.G. Rawl, Chairman of Board and Chief Executive
Officer, Exxon Corp.).
223. See Exxon "Strictly Liable", NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 1990, at 6 (reporting that, in In re Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill Litigation, Alaska Superior Court Judge Brian Shortell ruled that Exxon Corporation and Exxon
Shipping were strictly liable for all damages proximately caused by Exxon Valdez oil spill); Roverto Imola,
Criminal Liability of a Parent Company for the Conduct of Its Subsidiary: The Spillover of the Exxon
Valdez, 31 CRiM. L. BULL. 3, 7-9 (1995) (describing basis for U.S. district court ruling that Exxon
Corporation was criminally liable for conduct of its subsidiary, Exxon Shipping, which operated Exxon
Valdez).
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assets worth $500,000 to $1 million, the secured banks and finance companies
will take everything, and their own claims will be discharged without payment.
"The company went bankrupt" is considered an adequate explanation. Could
Americans come to see the judgment proofing of the largest companies in the
224
same way?
Attempting to predict whether cultural and political constraints will
dissipate is a highly speculative undertaking. However, events that began in the
1980s are perhaps already showing us the answer. In the 1980s, the bankruptcy
reorganization of large publicly held companies became a common feature of
the economic landscape. 2 In our study of the 1980s bankruptcy
reorganization of publicly held companies with $100 million or more in assets
at the time of filing, William Whitford and I found considerable evidence of
soft judgment proofing. Some firms were highly leveraged, while others were
divided into numerous entities in ways that potentially disadvantaged various
classes of unsecured creditors.22 6 In the five most egregious cases, companies
with scheduled assets of $2.5 billion paid unsecured creditors a total of $46.3
million, an average of 1.8 cents on the dollar.2 7 Shocking as these
bankruptcies were to the American public, they resulted in no reevaluation of
any of the principles that made such judgment proofing possible. "The
company went bankrupt" was considered an adequate explanation.
Asset securitization was in its infancy at the time of our study and was not
evident in any of our cases.-- Today, asset securitization is employed
principally in companies the size of those we studied, 2"9 suggesting that soft
judgment proofing through asset securitization may have contributed to the
increase in large bankruptcy reorganizations since our study. Nevertheless,
when the assets and insurance of a large, publicly held company are
224. See. e.g., MICHAEL MORITZ&

BARRETT SEAMAN. GOING FOR BROKE 316-17 11981) (describing

incident in which debtor Chrysler Corporation managed to cast small Rockford. Illinois bank as %
Illain for
refusing to sign workout agreement that unilaterally reduced amount Chr)sler oud bank)
225. Of the 40 largest bankruptcy reorganizations. 38 occurred after 1979 See BAKR~tr rt.
YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 63 (Christopher M. McHugh ed. 3d ed 1993)
226. The numbers of corporations in groups ranged from 2 to 352. most groups had bctsccn 3 and
26. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Fonn Shopping it the Banirupici
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies. 1991 WiS L RE, II. 21 treporting data and noting

that in some cases, all entities were components of single enterprise) Blumberg reports that the 1000
largest companies in the United States have an average of approximatel) 48 subsidianes See PHiILLIP I
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBt.EMS IN TiHE LAN%01

PARENT AND

SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 465-68 (1983) (tbl.).
227. The five are Seatrain Lines. MGF. Towner Petroleum. Air Florida. and Braniff Airline- This
statistic is calculated from previously published data. See LoPucki & Whitford. supru note 110. at 142
(providing data on distributions to unsecured creditors): LoPucki & Whitford. supra note 182. at 614

(providing appendix listing value of assets of companies studied)
228. Sales and leasebacks were. The bankrupt airlines in our study uere lessees
of most of the fleels.
so that the aircraft were not part of the bankruptcy estate The effect of such a transaction is functionally

similar to asset securitization.
229. See Schwarcz, supra note 90. at 139 ("[Plublic secuntit.ation is rarely cost effectie for
transactions of less than S50 million and is more common for transactions in the S100 million or higher

range.").
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insufficient to pay its liabilities, most commentators still consider it the result
of financial reversals rather than of strategic preparation for the possibility of
financial reversals.
To be culturally and politically acceptable, the process of judgment
proofing must appear to be something other than what it is. There is every
reason to believe that it will. The reality of asset securitization is that it
reduces the financial responsibility of the company while leaving the
company's level of liability-generating financial activity constant. The public
image of asset securitization is that of the invisible hand of the market, aided
by modern technology, generating wealth by forging increasingly sophisticated
financial structures. Eventually it will become obvious that the invisible hand
is not an efficient allocator of resources, because it is moved only by the
interests of contract creditors. But so long as the companies march into this
new world in tandem, each objecting that it is forced into its course of action
by competitive pressures, 23 it will be difficult for indignation to take
hold.23' The problem will be seen, not entirely incorrectly, as systemic rather
than moral. Attention will turn to proposals for reform, which are discussed in
Part IV.
IV.

RADICAL SYSTEM RESPONSES

As the transaction costs of judgment-proofing strategies decline, the
fundamental contradiction of the current system for enforcing liability will
become increasingly apparent. Liability adheres only to the unencumbered
property that happens to be owned by the debtor entity. Except in highly
regulated industries, such as banking and insurance, the owners of those
entities control how much unencumbered property they own. As the system
currently operates, liability is, for wrongdoers, a voluntary system.232
To save liability as an involuntary system that implements a wide range
of public policy,2 33 the system's designers will have to make radical changes
in it. The available options fall into three categories. First, if the system
designers are willing to abandon the principle of enforcement only against
property of the debtor, they can extend liability to the shareholders, affiliates,
trading partners, and asset providers of those currently liable. If the net of
230. A judgment-proof company has lower costs than a vulnerable company in three respects. First,
financing is available to the judgment-proof company at lower rtes because the financiers are insulated
from liability. Second, the judgment-proof company need not purchase liability insurance. Third, the
judgment-proof company can settle litigation against it more cheaply because judgments obtained will be
uncollectible.
231. This is essentially the formulation successfully employed by many of the same companies during
the 1980s when they were criticized for actions that reduced their labor costs.
232. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1920 ("[L]imited liability in tort permits the
firm's owners to determine unilaterally how much of their property will be exposed to potential tort claims,
thereby inviting opportunism and inefficiency.").
233. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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liability can be cast broadly enough, parties potentially liable may find it more
cost effective to contract among themselves to assure that the liability is paid

than to judgment proof the numerous entities that might be sued.21'
Second, the designers could subordinate the claims of secured creditors to

those of involuntary creditors. Third, the designers could condition the right
to do business in the United States on demonstrating financial responsibility.
That might be accomplished through maintenance of a specified level of
liability insurance, posting a bond, or furnishing proof of solvency. The next
Section will assess the effectiveness of these system strategies by analyzing the
strategies likely to be employed in response.
A. Shareholder Unlimited Liability

In recent years, corporate law scholars have vigorously debated a proposal
by Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman that shareholders have
liability for torts committed by their corporations. - 5 That is, if the assets of
a corporation are insufficient to satisfy its liabilities, involuntary creditors
should be entitled to enforce their judgments against the assets of individual
shareholders.
Proponents of shareholder liability hope that shareholders will respond by
compelling the corporations in which they invest to purchase insurance against
liability and, when liability is nevertheless uninsured, to pay it.:'
None of
the proponents argue that that will happen in all or substantially all cases.?"'
234. The contracts contemplated will place the liability on the losuest cost asoider, sho sill hase the
incentive to take all cost-effective safety and compliance measures See Susan Block-Licb. The Unse urred
Creditors Bargain: A Reply, 80 VA. L. REv. 1989. 1997-2000 (1994) (explaining means by %%hich
"second-best actors" return liability to lowest cost avoider). Professor Reimer Kraakman has described this
system strategy as "third-party enforcement." See Reimer H Krakman. Gatekeepers he Anatoms of it
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG 53.53 (1986) (describing "'gatckeCpIng habilit)"
as liability imposed on private persons such as accountants and lawyers "to present misconduct by
withholding support").
235. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander. Unlimited Shareholder Labltts Through a Procedural Lens. 106
HARV. L. REv. 387 (1992); Grnindfest, supra note 117: Henry Hansmann & Reimer Kraakman. Do the
Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability? A Response to Professor Grindfest. 102 YAL L J 427 (1992)
[hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, A Response to Professor Grundfestl. Henry Hansmann & Reimer
Kraakman. A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder lrabhtt. 106 HARV L RE. 446 (1992).
Hansmann & Kraakman. supra note 76.at 1880 (arguing weakness of existing justifications for shareholder
limited liability and asserting that burden is now on proponents of limited liability to pros ide per,,uasise
exposition); Leebron, supra note 76, at 1650 ("With [certain] exceptions. limited hability of shareholders
seems on balance to be justified."); Thompson. supra note 78
236. See. e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76. at 1890 ('"hus sse hase good reason to belese
that a shift to unlimited liability would be less likely to greatly increase nsk-beanng by shareholders of
small corlorations than to induce those shareholders to purchase adequate insurance ")
237. One indicator of the proponents' expectations is their unanimous preference for pro rata liability
rather than joint and several liability among shareholders. One sho expected all liability to be paid ssould
prefer a system based on joint and several liability among shareholders If the system designer v ere
confident that the loss could be transferred to any equity holders, it is a short. easy step to transfer it to the
appropriate equity holders. None of the commentators advocate joint and seseral liability. suggesting that
they doubt that deep pocket shareholders would be able to obtain contributions from other shareholders
See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 117, at 388 ("[A] search for alternatise hability regimes
seems to have
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They realize that many shareholders will do neither, that the liability system
will then have to attempt to compel payments, and that it will often,23 if not
usually, 239 be unsuccessful.
Under the rules of the liability system, modified only by extending liability
to shareholders, shareholders who choose to defeat that liability would have
little difficulty doing so. The following subsections provide just a sampling of
the strategies that might be employed.
1. Passive Strategies

Liability is enforced only through cumbersome civil procedure. If a
shareholder with liability does not pay, someone must sue the shareholder,
obtain service of process, litigate to judgment, discover property of the
shareholder, and enforce the judgment against that property. 240 Many of the
debts will be tiny. The person bringing these actions will have to decide, on
the basis of scanty information, who is worth suing and who is not. Potential
settled on proportionate liability as the most plausible substitute for the traditional limited liability rule.");
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1894 ("[The pro rata rule is clearly the superior alternative for
publicly-held corporations. The advantage of promulgating a single rule for all corporations makes the case
for the pro rata rule compelling for closely-held firms as well."); Leebron, supra note 76, at 1649.
238. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1901 (arguing that "the collection effort would
not need to reach every shareholder to serve its purpose. So long as it could succeed against most
shareholders, including the largest shareholders, it would force public corporations to bear the bulk of their
expected liability costs.").
239. As Leebron has suggested:
The costs of locating, suing, and enforcing what will probably be small judgments against a
large number of shareholders would be large compared to the amount of such judgments. The
amount collected, unless unlimited liability were extended to the costs of collection, would be
substantially diminished. This would be another reason to expect shareholders and financial
creditors to contract around such unlimited liability.
Leebron, supra note 76, at 1611.
240. In addressing this problem, Hansmann and Kraakman make the simplifying assumption that all
shareholder liability accrues to the owners of stock on a single "liability date" for "a particular action or
pattern of conduct [that] was expected to give rise to tort claims that might exceed the net value of the
firm." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1898. This unrealistic assumption is the basis for further
assumptions that it will be easy to identify the liable shareholders and determine the amounts of their
liabilities, that only a single action will be necessary against each shareholder, and that the action will
therefore be analogous to the action by a bankruptcy trustee to collect "accounts receivable from hundreds
or thousands of debtors." Id. at 1900. The assumption is unrealistic because much mass tort and
environmental liability accrues over long periods of time as a result of numerous, successive acts. Setting
a liability date before the course of conduct is complete makes shareholders liable for management
decisions that have not yet taken place. For example, by setting liability dates today, the tobacco industry
could place liability on today's shareholders for a pattern of action that is not yet complete, and, at the
same time, exempt future shareholders from liability for that pattern of action. Yet if Hansmann and
Kraakman modify their proposal to permit successive actions against shareholders as a liability situation
deteriorated, or to permit management to wait to sue until the "pattern of conduct" was complete, solvent
shareholders would have time to dump their shares before liability attached to them.
Hansmann and Kraakman would use management's announcement that "a particular action or pattern
of conduct was expected to give rise to tort claims that might exceed the net value of the firm" as the
trigger for shareholder liability. Id. at 1898. But in an insolvent company, every tortious act gives rise to
liability expected to exceed the value of the company. Management would have to make another
announcement every time a company truck hit a pedestrian, imposing a new flood of liability in petty
amounts on shareholders who might number in the tens of thousands.
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defendants can simply wait and see whether the system can enforce against
them. Even Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge that some of that liability
will be unenforceable because the judicial enforcement machinery is antiquated
and inefficient.24'
The system could respond to this passive strategy in either of two ways.
First, the civil court system could be redesigned to make it more efficient. To
do that, however, Americans would have to confront their own ambivalence
toward the enforcement of liability. A system that could obtain and enforce
$100 judgments against tens of thousands of shareholders might be dangerous.
Second, the system might impose collection costs, including attorneys' fees,
on losing shareholders. 42 If proponents were successful in winning the
adoption of such a controversial rule, the effect would be to force shareholders
who choose to rely on a judgment-proofing strategy to do so early and
decisively. Imposition of fees and costs would increase the risk of such a

strategy to the shareholder and therefore might decrease the frequency of use
somewhat. But shareholders using a sound judgment-proofing strategy would

not be deterred because they could avoid the collection costs along with the
principal amount of the debt. 43
2.

Pass-Through Strategies

Hansmann and Kraakman's optimism regarding collection of assessments
for shareholder liability is based largely on estimates that institutional investors
own almost half the equity of the largest public companies. 2' Hansmann and
Kraakman, along with others, assume that those holdings will be easy targets
for enforcers of shareholder liability. ' 5 Probably most of those institutional
investors, however, are securities brokers and dealers, mutual funds, or pension

241. See id. at 1901 ("[T]he collection effort would not need to reach every shareholder to serve its
purpose. So long as it could succeed against most shareholders, including the largest shareholders, it would
force public corporations to bear the bulk of their expected liability costs."). Bur see LOPUCKI & WARREN.
supra note 8,at 5-20 (describing difficulty of collecting small unsecured debts through judicial process)
242. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76. at 1900 ("Moreoser. even small shareholders might
be induced to cooperate simply by adding collection costs to the assessment bill of shareholders who
unsuccessfully sought to contest their assessments.").
243. See Leebron, supra note 76, at 1612 ("[The transaction costs of collecting from small
shareholders would significantly blunt its effect."); Thompson. supra note 78. at 20 ("Yet as Lcebron
recognizes, the costs would consume the benefit of collecting from many small shareholdings so that
enforcement is likely only to be feasible for entities such as parent-subsidiary groups "')
244. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1900 n.57; see also Carolyn Kay Brancato. The
Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets 19-20 (1990) (Columbia Law School mimeo)
(paper presented at the Salomon Brothers Center's and Rutgers Center's Conference on the Fiduciary
Responsibilities of Institutional Investors) (estimating that "institutional investors now hold 45% of total
U.S. equities and 48.1% of the equity in the 1,000 largest U.S corporations")
245. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1899-901 ; Thompson. supra note 78. at 31 ("[Plro
rata liability of shareholders for torts of their corporations.,. would discourage mutual funds from holding
large blocks of stock since a large, well-financed shareholder would be a much more attractive defendant
than would many dispersed shareholders.").
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funds that hold the equity for others. To the extent that they do, they can pass
that liability through to the true owners simply by clarifying their role. For
example, they could modify their computerized recordkeeping systems to show
the beneficial owners of securities as the record owners. The investor who
today holds a 1/1000th interest in a mutual fund will tomorrow hold a 1/1000th
interest in each share of stock in the mutual fund. The broker or dealer who
manages the fund would no longer be liable as a shareholder for 246
the simple
reason that the broker or dealer would no longer be a shareholder.
To the extent that enforcement is sought against the assets of pension
plans, the new policy in favor of shareholder unlimited liability will clash
directly with current policy under ERISA. Congress has specifically barred
enforcement of money judgments against the debtor's interest in a pension
fund.247 To permit invasion of a pensioner's nest egg because a corporation
in which the pension-fund-held stock committed a tort, but not to permit
invasion when the pensioner committed the tort personally, would be as ironic
as it would be unlikely.
3.

248

Trust Strategies

Generally speaking, trusts are limited liability entities. If a trust is operated
in such a manner as to injure third parties, those third parties can obtain and
enforce a judgment against the person committing the tort and against the trust
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but not against the separate property
of either the trustee 249 or the beneficiary25 0 If the system stripped
246. In dealing with pass-through strategies, the system will be hampered by its focus on ownership.
"Ownership" is merely a form. Strategists can avoid it by using other forms that accomplish their purposes
equally well.
247. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994) (providing that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated"); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992)
(holding that debtors' interests in ERISA pension plans are excluded from debtors' bankruptcy estates).
248. Grundfest describes a strategy for replicating equity returns while avoiding a proposed
proportionate liability by placing the equity in trust and having the trust issue debt securities. See Grundfest,
supra note 117, at 409. His strategy seems to be in no way dependent on use of a trust as its vehicle and
in no way related to the strategies presented in this subsection.
249. See Cook v. Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468, 475 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) ("[Sections 7-306 and 3-808 of
the Uniform Probate Code] were designed to make the trust estate a 'quasi-corporation' for the purposes
of tort liability. The ...trustee is treated as though he were an agent for a corporation."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 265 (1959) ("Where a liability to third persons is imposed upon a person, not as
a result of a contract made by him ...but because he is the holder of the title to property, a trustee as
holder of the title to the trust property is subject to personal liability, but only to the extent to which the
trust estate is sufficient to indemnify him."); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-306(b), 8 U.L.A. 560 (1983) ("A
trustee is personally liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of property of the trust estate
or for torts committed in the course of administration of the trust estate only if he is personally at fault.").
250. See Just Pants v. Bank of Ravenswood, 483 N.E.2d 331, 335 (III. App. Ct. 1985) ("Where the
trustee is given full control in the management of the business of the trust, the beneficiaries have no
personal liability."); Cook, 575 S.W.2d at 476 ("The beneficiaries have no personal liability for [the trust
employee's] negligence."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 276 (1959) ("The beneficiary as such
is not personally liable to third persons for torts committed by the trustee in the course of the administration
of the trust.").
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corporations but not trusts of limited liability, those who invest in businesses
could retain limited liability either by insisting that the businesses in which
they invest operate as trusts2' or by the much simpler expedient of keeping
each of their corporate stockholdings in a separate trust.
The system could respond to the first of those strategies by stripping
business trusts of limited liability. But stripping all the beneficiaries of trusts
of protection against liability for trust activity would be a difficult step for the
system to take. Unlike the shareholders of corporations, the beneficiaries of
trusts often have no right of control over the trusts' investments and are often
persons of diminished capacity, such as minors and incompetents. To hold the
minors and incompetents, not just the assets of the trust, liable for the torts of
a corporation in which the trust held shares would be a harsh result. Probably
the best strategic response the system could make would be to exempt minors
and incompetents from liability, but that might lead to the use of the trusts of
minors and incompetents as liability shields. To trace all the possible reforms
and strategies that might be used in response to them is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it should be apparent that the system would be locked in a
difficult battle which it might well lose.
4. Foreign Investment Strategies

Professor Joseph Grundfest has described a foreign investment strategy
capable of defeating shareholder unlimited liability.252 With apologies to
Professor Grundfest, I restate his argument here in systems/strategic terms. The
argument begins with the quite reasonable assumption that even if the United
States changes its rule to make shareholders liable for the debts of their
corporations, at least some other countries would decline to do so. Assuming
that some country, for example, Germany, retained shareholder limited liability,
strategic investors in that country could invest in U.S. companies without
exposing their assets to tort liability. The German investor who held the assets
would form a German corporation, and transfer the funds to be invested to it.
The German corporation would use the entire amount to purchase shares in a
single U.S. corporation. When the U.S. corporation incurred liability beyond
its ability to pay, that liability would attach to the German corporation as
shareholder. The U.S. courts probably would not have jurisdiction over the
German corporation to enforce its shareholder liability.2" Even if the U.S.
courts did, the action would reach only the assets of the German corporation,
251. See. e.g.. Inside Scoop. Inc. v. Curry. 755 F. Supp. 426. 430 (D.DC 1989) (discwming use of
Massachusetts Business Trusts and noting that they have limited liability); Robcn M Lloyd. Article 9 and
Real Estate Law: PracticalSolutions for Some Bothersome Probl s. 29 IDAItO L RE% 583. 623-26

(1993) (discussing use of Illinois Land Trusts).
252. See Grundfest. supra note 117. at 395-99

253. See Alexander, supra note 235. at 394-404.
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which at that point would already be worthless. German law would control the
relationship between the German corporation and the German investor, and that
law would not impose shareholder liability.
This strategy would create a class of foreign investors in U.S. corporations
who would not be subject to shareholder liability. Grundfest demonstrates that
in modem capital markets, those investors could outbid U.S. investors for the
shares of U.S. corporations 5 4 He predicts that the change in stock prices
would be de minimis.255 The necessary implication is that shareholders would
not pay significant amounts of corporate liability because they overwhelmingly
would be judgment proof-principally by reason of their foreign location. The
effect of the U.S. rule of unlimited shareholder liability would not be to force
shareholders to pay the debts of U.S. corporations, but only to substitute
German investors for U.S. investors.s Substitution of foreign investors
would be more difficult for closely held companies, but perhaps not
impossible. U.S. investors could own a German corporation that owned their
American corporation.5 7 Once revealed, such a simple structure might not
withstand legal attack, but the need for attack and revelation might be enough
to deter many plaintiffs.
Hansmann and Kraakman respond to Grundfest with a proposal that
amounts, in essence, to a limit on the proportion of investment in U.S.
58
corporations that can come from poorly capitalized foreign investors.
Grundfest counters that poorly capitalized foreign investors could evade such
a restriction by investing in poorly capitalized domestic investment
intermediaries that in turn invest in the U.S. corporation. 2 9 Hansmann and
Kraakman respond with a supplementary proposal that poorly capitalized U.S.

254. See Grundfest, supra note 117, at 399 (noting that existence of attachment-proof foreign investors
means that introduction of proportionate liability may not change equity prices at all).
255. See id. at 390 ("The stock price effect of a proportionate liability rule can therefore never be
greater than the transaction cost of the cheapest arbitrage that avoids liability generated by the rule."); id.
at 399 ("Simply put, the presence of these [remote] investors means that the introduction of proportionate
liability may not change equity prices at all.").
256. The funds invested by German corporations probably would be American. That is, Americans
would buy stock in German limited liability corporations which would then invest the funds in American
unlimited liability corporations. The United States could not prevent such investment because: (I) it would
be incapable of tracing the funds through Germany; and (2) prevention probably would close the investment
door to American funds without ending the German domination-the money would come from elsewhere.
257. See Grundfest, supra note 117, at 399 ("Foreign capital would be able to enter U.S. markets
quickly and easily to take advantage of any opportunities created by the adoption of proportionate liability,
and domestic capital would be invested in foreign vehicles that purchase domestic U.S. securities or are
otherwise immune to proportionate liability judgments .... ).
258. See Hansmann & Kraakman, A Response to Professor Grundfest, supra note 235, at 433.
Hansmann and Kraakman wisely refrain from proposing either minimum capital requirements for investors
or minimum capital requirements for businesses. The former probably would substantially reduce the
amounts of capital available for investment in U.S. corporations and also would close the U.S. markets to
ordinary Americans. The latter would reduce business opportunities for the least-advantaged Americans.
See infra Section IV.G.
259. See Grundfest, supra note 117, at 424 n.149.
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investment intermediaries with foreign investors be considered poorly
capitalized foreign investors. 26
Hansmann and Kraakman's supplementary proposal is unworkable. They
would limit the amount of foreign investment in advance of the liabilitygenerating incident; it follows that their regime would have to know the source
of the funds in advance. In fact, they specifically acknowledge that "a
proportionate liability regime must see through intermediary ownership
structures to prevent opportunistic evasions of tort liability."2 6' "Seeing
through intermediary ownership structures" is nothing short of knowing the
ultimate source of all money invested in U.S. corporations. That they could
propose such a regime suggests that Hansmann and Kraakman grossly
underestimate the difficulty of tracing funds. For example, assume that I have
invested $50,000 in Dow Chemical Company; aside from my investment, I am
judgment proof. Among my debts are $30,000 I borrowed from a German
investor and $40,000 I borrowed from a U.S. bank. Am I an "investment
intermediary" for the German investor? Would I be if I specifically borrowed
the money to invest in Dow Chemical and agreed to pay interest based on the
success of my investment? If I already owned the Dow Chemical shares before
I accepted the German investment? Such tracing of funds requires elaborate
and often arbitrary rules of attribution. A scheme of regulation that would vet
millions of investors in U.S. corporations as to the ultimate "source" of their
funds would be massively expensive. Yet strategists could easily defeat it
simply by furnishing false information.
B. Involuntary Creditor Priority

I have argued elsewhere that economic efficiency is best served when
creditors who did not intend to become creditors of a debtor (involuntary
creditors) have priority over those who did (consensual creditors).2 2 The
argument is simple. As the system currently operates, consensual creditors can
contract for security. Once they have done so, they have priority over
involuntary creditors. Knowing that they themselves will be paid in any event,
the secured creditors have grossly inadequate incentives to limit the debtor's
liability-generating activity. As a result of the encumbrance, equity holders
may also have grossly inadequate incentives to limit the debtor's liabilitygenerating activity. Given that there is no one else with adequate incentives,
it should be apparent that firms whose assets are encumbered will tend to
generate too much liability. 263 As a result, secured credit has become a
260. See Hansmann & Kraakman. A Response To Professor Gnundfest. supra note 235. at 433 n IS

261. Id.
262. See LoPucki. supra note 32. at 1907-16.
263. For an analysis of the problem in the language of economics, see Bebchuk & Fried. supra note

74, at 895-903 (demonstrating that full priority for secured creditors is 'meffictent")
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fundamental building block of strategies for the defeat of liability to
involuntary creditors. 264 The immediate solution is to give involuntary
265
creditors priority over consensual creditors, including secured creditors.
That rule maximizes the probability that debtors will be forced to pay their
involuntary creditors and thus be unable to externalize the risks of their
business. Consensual creditors will not be prejudiced. Knowing that they will
be subordinate, consensual creditors can protect themselves by selecting and
monitoring their debtors and charging a premium for those risks that they
cannot eliminate cost effectively.
Large, publicly held companies would probably rely heavily on asset
securitization as the means for evading the new rule establishing involuntary
creditor priority. The bankruptcy-remote entity used in an asset-securitization
transaction is in genuinely separate ownership from the debtor. It is neither a
creditor nor an owner of the business. To consolidate it with the debtor would
require the disregard of a sale transacted at arms length for market value. Yet
through a series of securitizations, a business could divest itself of substantially
all of its assets, rendering it judgment proof.
Smaller companies could evade involuntary creditor priority by leasing real
property, equipment, and intangibles used in the business, accepting their
inventories on consignment, and selling their accounts receivable as they are
generated. All of these techniques are used by small businesses today. Today,
they are relatively expensive ways of doing business. Those who can borrow
money at the rates charged by commercial banks and own their own assets
generally prefer to do so. But the mere fact that borrowing and owning are
cost effective in the current, secured-first regime does not establish that they
would remain cost effective under a tort-first regime. The tort-first regime
would impose liability on borrow-and-own small businesses that those
businesses externalized under the old, secured-first regime, without imposing
that liability on businesses that did not own the assets they used. By doing so,
they would alter the relative costs of the two ways of doing business. Under
264. See supra Section II.A.
265. Fittingly, the solution was first proposed by students. See Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort
Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1045, 1080-83 (1984) ("Tort-claim superiority over secured creditors is, therefore, the most efficient and
equitable solution."); Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1594-1601 (1986) (advocating exemption of government regulation of toxic wastes from automatic stay
and advocating priority for tort claims by victims of hazardous wastes); see also Kathryn R. Heidt,
Cleaning Up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the Debtor's Assets in Toxic Waste
Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 819, 849 (1988) (advocating priority for costs of toxic waste cleanup);
Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 100-01
(advocating priority for claims of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation over secured creditors).
In a variant of this solution, Bebchuk and Fried have recently proposed limiting the priority given to
secured creditors to 75% of their secured claims. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 74, at 909-1I. Elizabeth
Warren has proposed an amendment to U.C.C. § 9-301 to "carve out" 20% of secured creditors' collateral
for unsecured creditors. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gotlieb Professor of Law, Harvard
University, to Geoffrey Hazard, Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 25, 1996) (on
file with author).
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the tort-first regime, small businesses might well find that leasing,
consignment, and factoring, which would render them judgment proof, would
be more effective than secured borrowing.
It is difficult even to guess what proportion of businesses would attempt
to judgment proof themselves in a tort-first regime. Certainly those engaged
in businesses with high risks of liability would still find it advantageous to do
so. Their use of judgment-proofing strategies would generate pressures for their
competitors to use them, resulting in a domino effect. Once particular
judgment-proofing techniques are proven effective, their use can be expected
to spread to the businesses for which they are already cost effective. That
spread creates higher volumes for vendors of the technique, enabling them to
spread their fixed costs, including product development costs, over larger
numbers of transactions. Larger product development expenditures improve the
product and lower the transactions costs of use. At the same time, the business
and legal worlds become accustomed to the techniques, and the stigma
attached to using them declines. In a world where most businesses operated
without assets, the average costs of doing so should approach the average costs
of operating businesses with assets. In such a world, the ability to defeat
liability can be expected to render the form without assets more cost effective.
The system might go even further, imposing liability on the consensual
creditors of a corporation to pay liabilities to involuntary creditors. 26' In an
unlimited shareholder liability regime, this rule would have the virtue of
providing parallel treatment of debt and equity investments. 6 7 That, in turn,
would prevent the market from "arbitraging around" shareholder unlimited
liability by transforming equity into debt.z2 But even those drastic
steps-making both shareholders and consensual creditors liable to involuntary
creditors-would not be sufficient to save liability. Businesses could still
defeat liability by avoiding the ownership of assets altogether.2'

266. Arguably, the system has already adopted this strategy with regard to secured creditors that ha.c
the capability to influence their debtors' decisions regarding hazardous waste- See United States v Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that secured creditor participating in management
of facility containing hazardous waste could be liable under 42 U S C § 9607(a)(2) (1993). e'en though
secured creditor's involvement was insufficient to render it "operator" of facility)
267. See Note, Investor Liabilitv Financial Innovations ti thre Regulatorn State and the Coming
Revolution in CorporateLaw, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1941 (1994) (advocating parallel treatment of debt and

equity investments in order to avoid arbitrage potential described by Grundfest). cf Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1919-20 (arguing against unlimited liability for contract creditors)
268. See Grundfest, supra note 117. Based largely on putative strategies that would concrt iabilit)-

encumbered equity into liability-free debt, see id. at 408-10. Professor Grundfst concludes that shareholder
unlimited liability of the kind currently under consideration "isnot a practical altemattc to limited

liability-at least for corporations with liquid, actively traded equity ""Id. at 420
269. Commentators have falsely assumed that all investments in a business are in the form of debt or
equity. See, e.g., Note, supra note 267. at 1956 (making assumption that parallel treatment of debt and
equity was parallel treatment of "all forms of investment"). Ownership of the assets used in a business

constitutes a third form.
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C. Asset-ProviderLiability
The previous Section argued that in a world with unlimited shareholder
liability and involuntary creditor priority, strategists could still judgment proof
their businesses and defeat liability by operating with assets belonging to
others. The system could respond to that strategy either by: (1) giving
involuntary creditors priority in the assets used in the business regardless of
whether the assets were owned by the business; or (2) imposing liability on the
owners of those assets. Under such rules, it would not matter how a business
acquired its assets or who owned them; all assets used in the business would
be available for the enforcement of judgments for liability. True lessors to the
debtor would be treated the same as secured creditors 270 and assetsecuritization transactions would no longer be bankruptcy remote.
Even these drastic steps would not provide the system with a permanent
victory over strategists seeking to externalize the liability generated by their
businesses. Probably the strategists' most effective response would be what
Hansmann and Kraakman call "disaggregation." Large businesses would spin
off smaller ones and reestablish their structure through contract:
Thus, a large oil company, rather than continuing to ship its oil in
tankers that it owns and operates through subsidiary corporations,
might sell each of its tankers to a separate individual who would then
contract with the company to ship its oil. Similarly, small firms with
only one or a few high-rolling shareholders might replace large drug
companies in the development and initial marketing of
pharmaceuticals; these small firms would then sell a product line to
a large company for mass production and marketing only when it
proved safe.
Implicit in Hansmann and Kraakman's argument is the fact that small firms are
much easier to judgment proof than large ones. Even though the aggregate
level of wealth deployed in these businesses might remain constant, all of the
entities that engaged in liability-generating activities would be judgment proof.
Hansmann and Kraakman assumed in the foregoing passage that large
firms would continue to exist. Given the computerization of contracting and
recordkeeping, even that assumption may be unwarranted. Finance theorists
270. Professor Ayer has argued persuasively that there is no real distinction between the lender who
finances the debtor's purchase of an asset and the owner who leases the assets, but merely a continuum
of possible transactions. See John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IowA L. REV.
667 (1983); John D. Ayer, An Unrepentant View of the Sale-Lease Distinction, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
291 (1995).
271. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 1913-14. Disaggregation did not distress Hnnsmann
and Kraakman because their focus was on economic efficiency rather than the future of liability. They saw
disaggregation as a possible offset to excessive incentives for aggregation. To the extent they were
concerned with liability, they saw the solution to disaggregation as lying in the more extreme measures
discussed in the next two sections. See infra Sections IV.D-E.
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long ago reconceptualized the corporation as a web of contracts among
participants in the firm. 72 With computerization, the web of contracts may

move from concept to reality. A plant where 10,000 people work might
become a society of 10,000 "independent" businesses, bound together only by
contract-just as the department store became the mall and the restaurant in
the mall became the food court.273 In the most extreme form of

disaggregation, each human participant would be a separate business that
owned only the assets that that human participant used. If three mechanics on

the shop floor shared the use of a monkey wrench, for example, each might
own a one-third time share. One might suppose that the problems of
contracting among so many participants would be prohibitive. But once

standardized contracts evolved, the problem would be merely one of
recordkeeping. Building construction, where hundreds or even thousands of

independent contractors come together for brief times on a project-by-project
basis, demonstrates the potential.
In high risk industries such as taxicabs, small firms have long
predominated.274 When the tobacco industry's legal defenses began to appear
shaky in the early 1990s, disaggregation came swiftly to that industry as
well. 27 5 Data on the numbers and sizes of firms in the American economy
272. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance. 18 HAR\V J L & PL U POLL'Y
671, 681-82 (1995) (describing "a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts" theor) as 'pre saling
theory of the firm"); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm. 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) tcharacterizing
bounds of firm as that range of exchanges over which market system was suppressed and resurce
allocation was accomplished instead by authonty and direction), Michael C Jensen & William H
Meckling, Theory of the Firn: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. 3 J F%
ECON. 305, 311 (1976) ("The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction shich series
as a nexus for contracting relationships .... [lit makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things
which are 'inside' the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are 'outside' of it ")
273. Franchising is another example of disaggregated enterprse. Franchisors seek to profit from huge.
far-flung operations while isolating themselves from the liability generated by those operations The s,)stem
has responded predictably, seeking to impose vicarious liability on franchisors in some situations It is a
half-hearted response, however, usually limited to those situations where the franchisor controls the
liability-generating conduct. See, e.g., David A. Beyer. Franchise I carious Labiltr% in Florida. 69 FLA
BAR J. 62, 65 (1995) (comparing grounds for holding franchisors liable)
274. See Goldberg v. Lee Express Cab Corp.. 634 N.Y.S.2d 337. 338 n I (Sup Ct 19951 (noting that
"'what appears to be a rather common practice in the taxicab indusitr of %esting the osnership of a taxi
fleet in many corporations, each owning only one or two cabs'
remains a common practice in the
taxicab industry to this day." (quoting Valkovszky v. Carlton. 223 N E.2d 6. 7 tN Y 19661)). \Valko szky
v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6,7 (N.Y. 1966) (descnbing group of corporations engaged in taxicab business in
New York City, each with minimal assets); Bill Gifford. Zoned Out. WASii PoST, No" 6. 1994.,
(Magazine), at WIO (describing largest Washington D.C. taxicab business. %%hich four coos ners hase
divided into eleven taxicab operating companies along with other supporting corporationsi
275. See. e.g., Glenn Collins, Hungry Shareholders vs. Wary Managers. N Y TisEa. No% 4. 1995.
§ 1,at 37 (describing shareholders' efforts to force RJR Nabisco to spin off tobacco operations and noting
that another tobacco company. Liggett Group. Inc., had already completed spinoffs). Glenn Collins. New
Pressures on Philip Morris, N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 21. 1994. at DI (descnbing pres ures on Philip Morrs to
spin off tobacco operations "'to wall off the tobacco business from Philip Moms's food and beer
business ... as investors see the troublesome potential for legal liability and higher ta-es on cigarettes").
Glenn Collins, Paper Maker to Spin off Tobacco Units. N.Y TiMES. May 10. 1995. at DI (describing
announcement by Kimberly-Clark Corporation that its tobacco operations sould produce $100 million in
cash in coming months, and that Kimberly-Clark would use cash to purchase its osn shares, that KimberlyClark would then spin off its tobacco operations as separate corporation. and noting that 'analy sts said [the
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26
suggests that a powerful general trend toward disaggregation is under way 1
and that disaggregation now can be prompted by much subtler incentives."
Computerization of the kind that will facilitate the intensive contracting
necessary to permit disaggregation to flourish remains in its infancy. But the
potential should be clear. Only the traditional conceptualization of economic
theory has prevented us from grasping the possibilities.27 8
If the strategy of disaggregation is successful, it will bring the system full
circle to where it was before respondeat superior and other forms of vicarious
liability evolved. Every person will be liable for his or her own acts. No entity,
however, will be liable for the acts of any other, because all relationships will
be among "independent contractors"-a relationship that would not transmit
liability in the world under consideration in this section, just as it does not
2 79
under current law.
In a world of unlimited shareholder liability, the existence of artificial
entities would not protect the owner-operator of the entity from liability for his
or her own acts. In such a world, artificial entities would no longer serve a
liability-limiting function. They may cease to exist, 280 a possibility that I will
refer to as "de-entification. '28'

spin off] had been prompted by shareholders' concern over the legal liabilities of cigarettes"); Eben
Shapiro, Philip Morris May Be Vulnerable over Tobacco Even if Firm Splits, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1994,
at B3 (speculating about possible spin off to separate company's food and tobacco operations and noting
they already are separately incorporated).
276. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS AND COMPETITION

36 (1995) (reporting that number of businesses with employees "has grown at a rate just under 2 percent
a year. about equal to the rate of growth of the general population and of the work force" while rate of
growth in number of business filing tax returns has grown at compound rate of 3.9% per year over most
recent 12-year span). That the number of businesses filing tax returns has grown so much faster than the
number of businesses with employees suggests that persons formerly "employees" have instead become
"independent contractors." The change may have the effect of insulating the employers from liability for
their acts. The SBA also reports a growth in small business's share of total employment, but (for reasons
not stated in the report) attributes the increase "more to the growth of industries in which small businesses
have been leaders than to any current economic advantage of small operations." Id. at 43.
277. See Alan Murray, Mom, Apple Pie and Small Business, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1994, at AI
(speculating that low wage businesses will disaggregate to take advantage of 25-worker exemption from
Democratic health care proposal).
278. The traditional conceptualization holds that the forms in which business is conducted-department
store, mall, or food court-are the products of efficiencies of scale inherent in the nature of the tasks being
performed. Because the nature of the task cannot change, the traditional conceptualization is static, changes
in economies of scale are described as changes in task and each new task comes as a surprise. The
conceptualization I advocate is one in which computerization has freed the form of organization from the
task. Any task can be accomplished through any organization. The costs of all sizes of organization are
potentially the same because the computer can translate one size of organization to another at a cost that
can be negligible. The concept of economy of scale should be recognized as unrelated to firm size.
279. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding
that under New Jersey law, persons hiring financially irresponsible independent contractors are not liable
for torts those contractors commit).
280. They may continue to exist for tax or other purposes.
281. Klein and Zolt's proposal that every sole proprietor and partner enjoy limited liability without
having to endure the formalities of incorporation may prove to have been the first shot in the battle for deentification. See Klein & Zolt, supra note 204, at 1037 (referring to their new default provision regarding
limited liability as "opt out" rather than "opt in" provision); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and
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D. Enterprise Liability

To determine what wealth can be applied to the satisfaction of a money
judgment, the liability system looks first to the entity structure established by
the strategist. The system can disregard entities only in extreme
circumstances.282 As entities proliferate in response to the lowered costs of
separate incorporation and the wealth available to satisfy particular judgments
shrinks correspondingly, the system will be pressed to respond. One response
that has already been suggested is to attach liability to enterprises rather than
entities.283 In its more conservative version, enterprise liability is virtually
indistinguishable from liberal piercing of the corporate veils within corporate
groups. In its more radical version, it calls for the complete disregard of
entities, leaving it to the courts to determine the scope of the enterprise. 2'
Whether this approach could be viable depends on whether there are in
fact identifiable, stable boundaries between enterprises. If there are, the courts
could discover them on a case-by-case basis. If there are not, the courts would
be assigning liability arbitrarily and generating probably intolerable uncertainty
for investors.
Blumberg has attempted to specify the boundaries of the firm based on
"the degree of economic integration [within the corporate] group." 2 But he
assumes throughout his discussion that liability should attach to entities and
that the issue is which entities should be considered part of the enterprise.2'
Ultimately, he fails to specify what constitutes "economic integration" or to
address the issue of whether enterprises are in fact separable from one
2 87
another.
Strategists would find it difficult to construct judgment-proof structures in
a world where the standard for consolidation of entities into enterprises was
vague and uncertain. But such a standard would produce intolerable uncertainty
for other system participants as well. Judgment creditors would have to litigate
the boundaries of the enterprise to know which assets they could enforce
against. Insurers would be uncertain which risks they assumed when they
issued a policy. Business investors would have no way of knowing in advance
the scope of the enterprise whose tort risk they were assuming. Trading
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80. 129 (1991) ("[Llimited ton liability should be aailable

without formal incorporation.").
282. See supra Subsection ILB.I.
283.

See PHILLIP 1. BLUMBERG, THE LAw OF CORPORATE GRO PS

BA;KRLPTCcy LA%%§ 18 02, it

699-704 (1985) (advocating expansion of enterprise liability in place of entity liability)
284. To my knowledge, no one has seriously proposed this radical form of enterpns liability
285. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS PROCEDL RAL PROBLEtS 1% THE LAW
OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 22.03.2. at 431 (1983)

286. See. e.g., id. at 435 ("In the strongly integrated group, the parent and subsidiarnes compns

single business enterprise ....

a

).

287. See BLUMBERG, supra note 283. § 10.10 I. at 417-18 (discussing substantie consolidation of

corporate groups in bankruptcy).
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partners would find it difficult to assess the financial conditions of the firms
with which they dealt, because the boundaries of the firms would remain
uncertain until the courts ruled. 28" These are the very kinds of pressure that
prevent courts from wantonly disregarding corporate entities in sympathetic
cases today. The great virtue of the principle of enforcement against only the
property of the debtor is that it yields a reasonably predictable result; the
systems issue is whether sufficient predictability could be achieved under some
competing system.
Finance theory offers an alternative basis for determining the boundaries
of the firm. It conceives of the firm as a "command structure" that operates by
fiat from the top, and it contrasts that with the contacts by which one firm
relates to another. At any given time, the extent of a command structure might
provide an adequate basis for fixing the extent of liability. But there are two
serious problems with attempting to make the command structure the basis for
assigning liability. First, the command structure ties people and activities
together, but it may be only loosely related to the assets, which are the target
of the liability system as currently conceived. To illustrate the nature of the
problem, assume that an airline is run by a command structure that extends
from the board of directors to the pilots and crews, but the firm contracts for
maintenance of the leased aircraft and for landing rights at the municipal
airport. 289 Should the aircraft or the city-owned airport be available to satisfy
liability arising out of the wrongful act of a pilot? Of a mechanic? Our natural
inclination is to revert to an ownership analysis, which is, at bottom, an entity
based analysis. Nothing about a command structure tells us what property
should be available to satisfy a judgment rendered on the basis of that
structure's misconduct. The second problem with using command structure as
the basis for determining the boundaries of the firm is that command structures
are unstable. The firm that contracts for maintenance one day may hire
employees to perform it the next, and vice versa. Through such changes, the
firm seeks efficiency in its operations. If liability depended on these decisions,
288. Financial statements would be of little use because they pertain only to the entity structure the
debtor sought to create; no one would have the incentives or the ability to prepare meaningful financial
statements for the "enterprise" that would later be declared by the court.
289. Current law can be read to respond to situations such as this with the doctrine of nondelegable
duty:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize
as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of harm to others unless special precautions
are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor
to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965); see Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577,
1583 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("Under Florida law, if the work contracted for is an inherently dangerous activity,
the employer has a nondelegable duty of reasonable care to take precautions ensuring that the independent
contractor carries out the task in a non-negligent manner."). But this doctrine presupposes a delegator who
is not judgment proof. The strategist can frustrate the doctrine by identifying the entity the court will regard
as delegator and rendering that entity judgment proof. The doctrine is ineffective against the strategist
because the doctrine is rooted in entity rather than enterprise theory. Any attempt to shift it to enterprise
theory encounters the problem discussed here: inability to define the enterprise.
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the decisions could be expected to react to liability. Command structures would
truncate in order to externalize liability and contracting out would extend well
beyond the realm in which it was efficient.
Enterprise liability, whether based on "economic integration" or "'command
structure," does not provide a workable alternative to a system based on
entities that the courts occasionally disregard. The most basic problem is that
the relationship between liability and entity is so deeply ingrained in our
thinking that it is virtually impossible to exorcise. De-entification will deprive
the system of a fundamental concept for ordering and specifying liability.
E. Trading PartnerLiabilit.

In a brief passage in their initial article, Hansmann and Kraakman suggest
what may be the strongest response that the system can make to the judgmentproofing strategies discussed in this Article. They posit that "in the case of the
oil tankers, for instance, making companies that produce, own, or intend to
receive the oil jointly and severally liable for spills may well remove any
incentive for inefficient disaggregation." 290 Once liability has been extended
in this manner, disaggregation presumably will no longer defeat it. Every
fragment of the divided firm will bear the total liability of the unified firm,
jointly and severally, with every other fragment. Because disaggregation will
not defeat liability, Hansmann and Kraakman posit, participants in the shipping
of oil instead will provide for its payment.29
It is worth noting that this suggestion is contrary to current legislative and
academic trends that call for reductions in joint and several liability. State
legislatures are relieving wholesalers and retailers of liability for the products
they do not manufacture but merely sell.292 The argument is that the
wholesalers and retailers do not have the ability to evaluate the products they

290. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76. at 1915
291. As an embellishment on their proposal. Hansmann and Kraakman propose the imposition of
mandatory insurance on those engaged in high risk
industries The. acknow ledge that mandator, insurance

will not itself work to assure payment of liabilities. But they theonze that the cost of the insurance ma,
be sufficient to offset the incentives toward disaggregatton See id at 1915 n 96 ('7hat is. one would not
rely on the insurance requirement to solve the externality problem itself. but onl% to discourage ineficient
disaggregation."). Their embellishment is difficult to evaluate because they do not indicate which fragments
of a disaggregated firm would be required to carry the insurance
292. See Status of States, 81 A.B.A. J..Aug. 1995. at 59 (asserting that 41 states hale modified or
abolished joint and several liability since 1986); e.g.. 1995 NJ Sess Law, Set" 141 t\'est) (relieving
sellers of defective products of strict liability claims except where manufacturer "has no known agents.

facility, or other presence within the United States- or "has no attachable assets or has been adjudicated
bankrupt and a judgment is not otherwise recoverable from the assets of the bankruptc) estate") While this
wording theoretically leaves open the possibility of suing the seller after pursuing to judgment the action
against the manufacturer, the practical effect will be to deprive the plaintiff of an> remed at all in cases
where the manufacturer is in business at the time the plaintiff commences the action, but not at the time

the plaintiff seeks to collect the judgment.
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sell or to control their manufacture. 93 In the field of securities fraud, leading
academics propose to fix the liability system by relieving the enterprises that
employ the wrongdoers from liability, leaving only the wrongdoers liable.294
In the field of medical malpractice, leading academics propose to fix the
liability system by relieving negligent physicians of their liability, leaving only
the enterprises with which they associate liable.295 In the field of
corporations, leading academics propose to extend limited liability to sole
proprietors so that "no person is vicariously liable beyond the assets committed
to the business activity giving rise to the liability. 2 96 The principal relevance
of this trend toward narrowing liability is not that it demonstrates the worth of
the ideas behind it, but that it demonstrates how difficult it will be to persuade
the body politic to pursue the opposite course. The real issue is whether, if the
system holds everybody liable, anybody will pay.
The trend does help illustrate the fundamental theoretical problem with the
system strategy of casting the net of liability widely. The problem is simply
to define its boundary. To whom, precisely, will this expanded liability
extend? 297 The trend suggests that the body politic will not easily accept
arbitrary boundaries. 298 But even if that problem is overcome, there remains
293. The underlying premise is that parties should not be liable for what they cannot control. Trading
partner liability almost inevitably violates this premise.
294. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5 (proposing to hold liable particular agents who commit fraud
on securities markets and to excuse their employers from vicarious liability unless employer is in bad faith).
295. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, EnterpriseMedical Liability and the Evolution of
the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994) (proposing to excuse doctors from
liability for medical malpractice and instead hold enterprises with which they are associated vicariously
liable). The Abraham-Weiler proposal is not entirely a reduction in liability; it provides for some expansion
of liability to enterprises that would not have liability under current law.
296. Klein & Zolt, supra note 204, at 1040. But see Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 868-76 (1984) (advocating manager and
director liability for torts of corporations as means of protecting against "asset insufficiency").
297. The Third Circuit has wrestled with this issue of definition. In Becker v. Interstate Properties,
569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977), the court held an employer liable for the tort of its independent contractor
because the independent contractor was only minimally insured and not otherwise financially responsible.
Sixteen years later, in Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1993), the court
retreated from Becker, noting that the New Jersey Courts had, in the interim, declined to follow it. Quoting
the dissent in Becker, the Robinson court opined that holding employers liable for the torts of their
financially irresponsible independent contractors would "cause uncertainty and doubt for every financial
strata and every court, as well as hinder the employment opportunities of an independent contractor trying
to enter the market place but lacking much in the way of start-up capital." Id. at 242. The court also
asserted that the rule would "impose prohibitive obligations [of investigation) on employers of independent
contractors." Id. at 242-43. In reversing its position, the Third Circuit retreated to the basic system principle
of collection only from the property of the debtor.
298. The difficulty of defining boundaries is evident with regard to liability for the treatment, storage,
and disposal of hazardous waste (TSD). See Michael Lange, Corporate Strategies for Evading
Environmental and Tort Liability (Mar. 8, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The TSD
industry arguably came into existence as a disaggregation response to the imposition of liability for the
handling of toxic wastes. That is, the generators of waste, many of whom were large, solvent companies,
responded to the imposition of liability by contracting the work out to small TSD companies that could
externalize the risk of liability. See William Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENVTL. L. 645, 658-60
(1977); Debra K. Rubin, Cleanup Firms Cover Their Assets, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Mar. 6, 1986.
at 50 (describing strategic formation by engineering firms of "independent" entities to do hazardous waste
consulting). The system responded by imposing liability on the generator of toxic waste for acts committed
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the systemic problem of fixing and communicating the boundaries to
participants in the system. Hansmann and Kraakman propose liability for spills
such as the Exxon Valdez on those who "intend to receive the oil."" Surely
they do not include me, even if I regularly fill up at the Exxon station. Yet
they must include someone beyond the first entity that intends to take the oil

from the Exxon Valdez, or the strategist will defeat the extended liability by
receiving it in a shell corporation. I can imagine no logical stopping point in
between. 3

°

System designers could arbitrarily define a stopping point for oil spill
liability. Liability, however, arises in an almost infinite number of contexts.

Each would present the same problem of definition. For the system to
accomplish its goal of enforcing liability, those who have it would have to

know they have it. Only then could they insure against it, or protect against the
acts of others that might impose it on them. Unless the stopping points were

fixed on the basis of some generalizable principle rather than on ad hoc,
industry-specific determinations, the problem of communication would be

overwhelming. For participants in the system, liability would seem to strike out
of nowhere, and there would be little they could do about it except to harden
their own judgment-proof structures. Without a generalizable principle for
determining its stopping point, expanded liability might lead to chaos.
F. Liability Insurance
Arguments that the liability system will remain viable into the foreseeable

future usually rely heavily on the continued existence, if not the expansion, of
liability insurance. Typically, the arguments falsely assume that: (1)nearly all

liability is of an insurable nature, making liability insurance a functional

7

by others in the treatment, storage, or disposal of the generator's %%
aste See 42 U S C A § 960 (a)(3)
(West 1995). The gambit was a success in that it elicited the desired respone from the industry TSD
companies increased their capital. See Lange, supra. at 54. Itis. howecr. no coincidence that the system's
success has come in a field that has generated tremendous controsersy oser the imposition of liability on
innocent parties who have no means of avoiding it.
See. e.g..
Michael I Greenberg & Da%id Nt Shas,. To
Lend or Not to Lend-That Should Not Be the Question: The Uncertainies of Lender Liabilas Under
CERCLA, 41 DuKE LJ. 1211. 1211 (1992) ("Uncefainty and confusion pervade cnsironmental liability
standards ....").The system successfully expanded liabilit) but is no%% locked in controsersy oser what
is necessarily an arbitrary boundary.
299. Hansmann & Kraakman. supra note 76. at 1915
300. When faced with this problem in an analogous context. Hansmann and Kraakman chose to make
the stopping point the first "well-capitalized" institution. See Hansmann & Kraakman. A Response to
Professor Grundfest, supra note 235, at 433 (fixing stopping point by inquirng into sshcther imestor in
shares is liability-evading foreigner). While that method of fixing a stopping point might at first
Seem
principled, it ultimately proves tautological. The problem they were addressing skas todtcrmine the 'alue
that should be available to involuntary creditors. Yet to define "%ell-capitalhzed" requires the same
determination. In attempting to answer the second question. Hansmann and Kraakman willhase to define
"well-capitalized," and, perhaps more problematically, they %%ill hase to provide some means for s)stem
participants, such as the customer who pulls up to the Exxon pump. to kno% the capitaliation of those
through whom they are receiving the product.
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substitute for solvent debtors; (2) debtors will continue to purchase liability
insurance because they have economic incentives to do so; and (3) when
economic incentives are insufficient to cause debtors to purchase liability
insurance voluntarily, the system can achieve the same result by requiring the
purchase of liability insurance. In fact, much, if not most, liability is of an
uninsurable nature. The incentives to purchase liability insurance are
principally social and cultural rather than economic, and the effectiveness of
liability insurance is sharply diminished when the insurance is compulsory.
Liability insurance is a valuable adjunct to the working of an otherwise sound
liability system, but it can neither save nor replace an unsound one.
1. The Limitations of Liability Insurance
Liability insurance cannot substitute for a liability system in which actors
have their own assets at risk. The primary reason is that many liabilitygenerating occurrences are not of an insurable nature. 3° ' To understand this
limitation, consider the kinds of events that generate liability as lying along a
continuum. At one end of the continuum are events over which the insured has
complete control ("intended events"); at the other end are events entirely
beyond the debtor's control ("accidental events"). 302 By definition, purely
accidental events cannot be deterred. The insured has no intention to cause the
event in the first place. With respect to them, the system can only compensate
the injured party and spread the resulting loss. Because the losses are
unintentional from the standpoint of both the insured and the victim,
compensating the losses does not cause them to increase. Insurance does not
lead to an increase in the conduct insured against.
On the other hand, purely intended events are completely deterrable.
Threaten the debtor with a sufficiently large penalty and the probability of the
event occurring will approach zero. Absent insurance, the liability system
discourages debtors from imposing unreasonable risks of loss on third parties
by threatening to return the losses to the debtor through litigation. The
response of the liability system to risk-generating activity is a measured one.
It recognizes that some conduct that imposes risk on third parties, such as
driving a car or building a skyscraper, is nevertheless economically desirable
because it generates an even greater benefit for the debtor. By allowing the
debtor to engage in the activity, but by compelling the debtor to pay losses
thereby inflicted, a well-functioning liability system could provide appropriate
levels of incentives for conduct.
301. The argument presented here is an elaboration of an argument I have made elsewhere. See
LoPucki, supra note 32, at 1906-07.
302. For an elaboration of the idea presented here, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the
Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 313, 347 (1990) (arguing that "there is a range
of inadvertent negligent conduct that is imperfectly controllable").
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Liability insurance tends to upset this delicate balance by reimbursing
debtors for the consequences of their wrongful acts, while permitting them to

retain the benefits of their liability-generating activity. 3 In this regard, the
liability insurance system works in opposition to the liability system." In
recognition of the moral hazard involved in insuring against liability for certain
kinds of intentional harm, courts void such coverage as contrary to public
policy. 30 5 This is a realm where liability is appropriate, but insurance is not.
Liability-producing events are rarely either purely intended or purely
accidental. Whether such a mixed event is insurable depends on the degree to
which the risk of its occurrence is likely to increase once the risk is insured
against. The tendency of risks to increase when insured against is referred to
as "reactivity" of the risk.3°6

The fact that risk is reactive does not alone make it inappropriate for
insurance. Debtors often buy insurance so that they will be free to engage in
activities they consider too risky without it. If the level of reactivity is
predictable and not too high, the insurer can adjust for it by increasing the
premium. Such premium adjustments are of essentially two types. "Feature"

rating takes account of various characteristics of the insured or the situation,
such as the type of business in which the insured is engaged and the kind of
safety precautions the insured is taking. It discourages dangerous activities and
methods by charging higher premiums while they are in use. "Experience"
rating takes account of the insured's loss history. It encourages the debtor to

avoid liability now so that future premiums will be lower."'
A liability insurance system in which the premium rating system took
perfect account of the risk-generating conduct of the insured would provide the
insured with essentially the same economic incentives as a liability system that
303. See. e.g., Schwartz, supra note 302. at 313 (noting that "many scholars share in the viev. that tort
law's deterrence objective is 'severely. perhaps fatally undermined" bN the presalcncc of insurance"
(citations omitted)).
304. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Loguc. The First-Parrv Insurance Externalir An Economic
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNEL.L L. REv 129. 131 (1990) ("That insurance can blunt the
deterrence effects of a liability rule is uncontroversial." (footnotes omitted)) The problem is sometimes
discussed as one of "moral hazard." That is. the insurance creates a moral hazard because once the
premium for the year is fixed, the insured may be able to profit by increasing the risk to others. sitth no
additional cost to the insured, The problem is considered "moral" because the insured can take advantage
at the cost of others.
305. See, e.g., Sean W. Gallagher, Note. The Public Policv Exclusion and Insurance for Intentional
Employment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1256. 1322 (1994) (arguing that "the primar) reason that
courts impose a public policy exclusion to void coserge for intentional emplo)ment discrimination is to
maintain the deterrent effect of discrimination liability")
306. The same concept is sometimes captured in the phrase "elasticit) of risk" or in the economist's
term, "moral hazard." See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIB.VING RIsK INSL RANC. LEGAL THEORY. AND
PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986) (discussing insurers' controls over moral hazard). GREENE Er AL. supra note
200, at II (explaining moral hazard); Schwartz. supra note 302. at 343 ('The unavailability of
insurance ... may verify that [the system] ... is targeting for liability precisely those forms of conduct
that are so readily controllable by defendants as to render unacceptable to insurers the moral-hazard
prospect of insurance policies.").
307. See ABRAHAM, supra note 306. at 71-74 (discussing feature rating and experience rating)
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perfectly shifted losses from third parties to the debtors in the absence of
insurance."' The insured would pay for the level of risk it generated, and the
insurer, for an additional fee, would absorb the variance in that risk that
resulted from chance and was therefore outside the control of the insured. 309
When they insure solvent debtors, insurers have additional means for
reducing the tendency of risk to react to the insurance. Coinsurance is a
contract under which the insurer pays a percentage of the loss and the insured
is responsible for the balance. Similarly, deductibles and policy limits both
leave the insured responsible for portions of any loss the insured itself inflicts.
These means reduce inappropriate incentives and moral hazard, though they do
not eliminate them. But given the remote nature of many of the risks insured
against and the insureds' other incentives to avoid activity that inflicts loss on
others, 310 reduction of inappropriate incentives is often enough to alter
insureds' conduct. At the extreme, some insurance contracts seek to transfer
all risk of loss to the insured. They do so either by subrogating the insurer to
the rights of the injured third party to the extent the insurer pays the claim, or,
more commonly, by retroactively adjusting the premium to an amount equal
to the insurers' payouts over the policy period. 311 Assuming that the insurer
can actually collect, these devices perfectly align the interests of insurer and
insured. 1 2
In a system where insurance is voluntary, insurers can protect themselves
against unanticipated risks through provisions in the policy that entitle them
to deny coverage even for losses already incurred. For example, the insurer can

308. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 210-11 (1987) (assuming

"insurers can determine injurers' levels of care, their liability insurance policies will supply them with full
coverage and will have provisions inducing them to take optimal care"); Logue, supra note 186, at 1375-76
(arguing that liability insurance can ameliorate judgment-proof problem through feature and experience
rating and by making insurance proceeds available along with debtor's own assets). But see Steven A.
Kunzman, The Insureras SurrogateRegulator of the Hazardous Waste Industry: Solution or Perversion?,
20 FORUM 469,481-88 (1985) (challenging assertion that insurance premiums can force firms to internalize
costs).
309. See ABRAHAM, supra note 306, at 77 ("Because the members of each [risk] class are charged in
accord with [the insurers'] expected costs, total premiums are designed to cover the aggregate losses of the
class. No subsidies run from one risk class to another. The only subsidy under this ideal flows from the
lucky to the unlucky.").
310. The primary incentive not to drive carelessly may be to avoid injury to one's self in an accident,
not to avoid liability to another. Conduct that results in civil liability may also result in criminal liability
or action against the wrongdoer.
311. Insureds might purchase such a policy to gain the insurer's expertise in claims administration,
see supra note 200, or as a means of complying with financial responsibility laws, see supra note 201. See
also Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942,
980-85 (1988) (arguing that retroactive indexing of premiums might ease environmental liability crisis but
noting that bankruptcy of insured would thwart technique).
312. See ABRAHAM, supra note 306, at 18 ("The law governing the devices that are used in
combination with differential pricing to mitigate moral hazard in insurance-exceptions to coverage.
coinsurance, and application screening, among others-should take the function of these devices into
account if the effects of civil liability and insurance law are to work in tandem and not at cross purposes.").
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eliminate the risk that it will not learn of a third party's claim in time to

prepare and present a defense. The insurer accomplishes this by adding a
policy provision requiring the insured to notify the insurer of the claim and
entitling the insurer to refuse coverage if the insured does not. The insurer that
reserves the right to deny coverage for fraud in the application for insurance
can also count on some cooperation from the insurance applicant in the

determination of an appropriate premium.13
In combination, these techniques enable liability insurers to write profitable
policies that insure even those risks over which the insured has a significant
measure of control. However, even with the benefits of feature and experience
rating, provisions that require the insured to bear a portion of the insured
losses, and the right to deny coverage after loss for misconduct of the insured,
there remains a vast realm of uninsurable liability. Most intentional torts fall

into this category; 314 so do many new, apparently risky kinds of activities,
for which insurance companies lack sufficient rating data. I5

313. Compulsory liability insurance, by contrast, is for the benefit of the injured third party With
respect to compulsory liability insurance, it makes no sense to permit insurers to deny coverage for fraud
in the insurance application. Current law reflects this distinction See. e g. Pekin Ins Co v Super. 912 F
Supp. 409,413 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (holding that "when a third party is injured by an insured ssho gained their
[sic] policy by fraud, an insurer may assert the common law defense of material misrpresentation so as
to avoid coverage in excess of the levels required by Indiana's Financial Responsibility Law., but that an
insurer may not avoid coverage up to that amount in any circumstance"); Omaha Property & Casualty Co
v. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (D. Mont. 1990) ("When a state compulsory insurance statute exists.
courts have 'universally held or recognized that an insurer cannot, on the ground of fraud or
misrepresentations relating to the inception of the policy, retrospectively avoid coserage
so as to escape
liability to a third party."' (citations omitted)).
314. See. e.g., GREENE ET' AL., supra note 200. at 45 ("From the standpoint of the insurer, there are
several requisites of insurable risks that must be met . . The loss. should it occur, must be accidental and
unintentional in nature from the viewpoint of the insured."); INSURANCE SERV ORG. Commercial General
Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 11 88), reprinted in KENNEni S. ABRAHAM. INs5LRASC.E LAW AND
REGULAION: CASES AND MATERIALS 442, para. 2.a (2d ed. 1995) ("This insurance does not apply to
'[b]odily injury' or 'property damage' expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured "). Abraham.
supra note 311, at 952 ("[T]here is no coverage against liability for harm that is caused intentionally or
nearly intentionally."); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation. Constructon and Application of Provision of
Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injturies Itended or Etpected bls lIsured. 31 A LR 41i
957 (1984). Even though no exclusion of punitive damages appears in the commercial general liability
policy, a substantial minority of courts refuse to permit coverage on public policy grounds See Gary S
Franklin, Comment, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart Out of "Smart
Money", 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 979, 1000-01 n.84 (1986) (citing cases permitting and denying coverage
on public policy grounds).
315. See Gary Marchant, Modified Rules for Modified Bugs Balancing Safe- and Effictenc-, in the
Regulation of Deliberate Release of Genetically EngineeredMicroorganisms. I HARV J L & TECSi 163,
192 (1988) ("Many biotechnology companies are new, and relatively small, and may not hase sufficient
assets to withstand a large damage claim. The problem of judgment-proof firms is exacerbated by the
unavailability of liability insurance for companies undertaking releases of genetically engineered
microorganisms into the environment."). But see Product & Professional Dabilirs Insurance for
Biotechnology Products Now Available, 6 BIoTECH L. REP 404 (1987) ("The Association of Biotechnology
Companies has announced that it has secured, after lengthy negotiations, product and professional liability
insurance for biotechnology products, including those released into the env ironment "1

The Yale Law Journal

(Vol. 106: 1

2. The Lack of Economic Incentives to PurchaseLiability Insurance
Writers who approach the subject of insurance from a purely economic
perspective sometimes mistakenly conclude that the only reason to purchase
liability insurance is to protect one's assets from the liability system.3t 6 Were
that so, we would expect liability insurance to disappear along with liability.
But it is not so. Even a judgment-proof debtor may purchase liability insurance
in the hopes of avoiding the necessity to file under Chapter Il to deal with its
obligations, 317 to satisfy contracting parties who require them to carry
insurance,18 to avoid the adverse publicity that may accompany financial
irresponsibility, 3 9 or merely to satisfy a felt moral obligation. Minimal levels
of liability insurance coverage might well persist in a world where judgments
could not be enforced.
The basic point of the economists is, nevertheless, well taken. As Chapter
11 is improved to make it more efficient, it will provide a more cost-effective
substitute for insurance. As Chapter I1 cases become more common, the
publicity individual cases receive can be expected to decline. Debtors will tend
to find it cheaper and less stigmatizing to deal with their liability through
Chapter 11 than through liability insurance.
Initially, debtors who wish to drop their liability insurance coverage may
not be able to do so. Those who contract with debtors today often require that
the debtors carry insurance to protect third parties.320 Whether contracting
parties will continue to do so once they are under competitive pressure is
another matter. The contract between A and B that B carry insurance to pay
liability to C is in part for the benefit of A as well as C. Liability can disrupt
the business relationship between A and B, as, for example, where B is unable
to perform its building construction contract with A because B's assets have
316. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 185, at 107 ("[lInvestors should not be willing to
pay insurers to reduce risk. Why buy something you already have for free?"); Alan 0. Sykes, Judicial
Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 T1EX. L.
REV. 1345, 1361 (1994) ("Individuals who are entirely judgment proof, for example, have no reason to
purchase insurance at all-it is irrational to insure against loss if you have nothing to lose.").
317. It is not entirely clear that liability insurance will help. On the one hand, a policy of liability
insurance may pay an obligation that otherwise would push the debtor into bankruptcy. On the other, the
existence of the policy may attract litigation that otherwise would not be filed; the resulting judgments may
exceed the policy limit, pushing the debtor into bankruptcy. Which tendency would predominate probably
is a question that can be answered only empirically, if at all.
318. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 201, at I ("[W]ith 'lender liability' under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA) still a source of potential exposure.
lenders may require borrowers to obtain [environmental impairment] insurance .... (footnote omitted)).
319. See, e.g., Stephen Keating, Taxis Still on the Road Strapped Yellow Cab Pays Liability Insurance,
DENVER Posr, May 11,1994, at Cl (describing incident in which Colorado Department of Revenue
attempted to shut down self-insured Yellow Cab Company for inability to pay tort claims and Yellow Cab
executive responded by displaying check that would pay for insurance and asserting that "[e]veryone that
travels in a Yellow Cab is protected").
320. For example, building contractors sometimes require that subcontractors working on the job carry
liability insurance and hospitals sometimes require that affiliated doctors carry medical malpractice
insurance.
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been seized by C for a tort judgment. Liability can also embarrass a
contracting partner and indirectly harm the contracting partner's business. For
example, a hospital may lose patients when an affiliated doctor is featured in
newspaper stories as practicing "bare." From the viewpoint of A, however,
both of these problems may be resolved without the purchase of insurance.
Provided that the building construction contract is well drafted, B can
discharge its liability to C in bankruptcy without B losing a day's work on A's
construction site.32' Affiliation with an uninsured doctor is embarrassing only
when one's competitors are not themselves affiliated with uninsured doctors.
If there is money to be saved by doctors going bare, the solution from the
standpoint of the hospitals as a group is for none of them to require insurance
beyond that necessary to protect themselves. Nothing prevents the market from
reaching that result. Malpractice insurance costs money, and ultimately that
cost is passed along to a patient who probably does not want it because he or
she can purchase first-party insurance more economically. Hospitals can better
compete for patients by assuring them quality medical care than by assuring
them compensation for bad medical care. All that really prevents doctors from
going bare is our cultural preference for financial responsibility.32 Considering that cultural preference ultimately may serve neither the financial
interests of the hospital nor the patient, there is little reason to expect it to
survive. Once liability insurance is no longer the norm, even those who would
like to carry it to protect the public may find that competitive pressures from
uninsured firms make the cost prohibitive.
The controversy over "occurrence" and "claims-made" insurance provides
an excellent example of economic incentives riding roughshod over cultural
preferences for the payment of liabilities. Prior to 1984, commercial general
liability insurance was written only on an "occurrence" basis. That is, the
insurer agreed to pay claims, whenever made, if they arose from an occurrence
during the policy period. Beginning in 1984, insurers began offering
commercial general liability insurance on a "claims-made" basis.323 That is,

321.

During Chapter II bankruptcy, the debtor can choose w.hich of its contracts it wishes to perform

See 11U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994). It can affirm those contracts and reject the rest. conseting the latter to
liability for breach which will, in all likelihood. be dischargeable See id §§ 365(g). 502t1) The drafting

problem is merely to make sure that the debtor has sufficient incenties to choose to perform the
construction contract.
322. Illustrating this cultural preference. Professor James J White wrote in response to an earlier draft
of this Article that "no one will do surgery with your physician who has taken all his assets offshore and
who has 'gone naked.' In fact, a surgeon without insurance will probably not be allowed to operate " Letter

from James J. White, Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, Uni'.ersitt of Michigan La
M. LoPucki 3 (Nov. 10, 1995) (on file with author).

School. to Lynn

323. See Eugene R. Anderson et al.. Diab.in Insurance A Pritner for Corporate Counlsel. 49 BLS
LAW. 259, 265 (1993) (describing how old "occurrence" polhcN
as effecti'ely ,ithdrawn from U S
market and replaced with new policy offered in tvo mutually "'exclusive forms"--"occurrencc-" and

"claims-made").
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the insurer agreed to pay only claims made during the policy period. 24
The practical difference between occurrence and claims-made policies
shows up in delayed disaster situations such as asbestos, toxic waste, or
cigarettes. Under an occurrence policy, the insurer pays for the disaster when
the claims are finally made. Under a claims-made policy, as soon as the insurer
sees that massive numbers of claims will be filed over the coming years, the
insurer declines to write the next year's policy, 325 the debtor discharges its
liability in bankruptcy, and the losses are externalized to the tort victims. The
debtor actually profits along with the insurer, because, as one might expect,
claims-made insurance is cheaper than occurrence insurance.
Despite its economic advantage to both seller and buyer, claims-made
insurance was slow to catch on.3 26 The managers who purchased insurance
preferred a liability policy that would actually pay the claims. But the
insurance industry was persistent and claims-made policies now dominate the
327
fields of environmental and professional liability.
As the levels of voluntary insurance in various industries decline, there
will be increasing pressure to make insurance compulsory.328 Insurance is
324. See Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins., 22 F.3d 339 (Ist Cir. 1994) (upholding
insurer's denial of coverage under "claims-made" pollution liability policy because government did not
initiate environmental enforcement action during policy period even though insured notified insurer of
environmental damage during policy period). See generally In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919,
923 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding primary insurers and reinsurers may have violated antitrust laws in pressuring
Insurance Service Office to eliminate accidental pollution coverage from its market dominant Commercial
General Liability Insurance form and to issue second, "claims-made," form), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds and remanded sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
325. See Abraham, supra note 311, at 980 (noting that, with reference to claims-made coverage, "only
liabilities developing during the first few years after the policy is sold need to be predicted"); Andrew
Reidy & Robert Carter, Insurance Helps Breathe Life into Tobacco Litigation, CONN. L. TRiW., Apr. 17,
1995, at 24 (reporting that tobacco industry insurers are expected to raise "trigger of coverage" issue
created by issuance of claims-made policies with respect to cigarette litigation).
326. See, e.g., DONALD S. MALECKI & ARTHUR L. FLITNER, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 3
(1994) ("Contrary to expectations, the claims-made form has seen only limited use since its introduction,
due perhaps to the 'soft market' conditions that set in during the late-1980s."); Abraham, supra note 311.
at 965 n.73 ('The effort to introduce a claims-made [commercial general liability], however, has not met
with success. Some state regulators have been reluctant to approve the new policy for general use, and the
consuming public has not reacted favorably to its introduction.").
327. See, e.g., Leslie Cheek III, Risk-Spreaders or Risk Eliminators?An Insurer's Perspective on the
Liability and FinancialResponsibilityProvisionsof RCRA and CERCLA, 2 VA. J. NAT'L RES. L. 149, 159
(1982) (quoting "basic principle developed by the American Insurance Association that '[c]laims-madc
insurance policies should be acceptable alternatives to the standard occurrence-based contracts"' (citation
omitted)); Gilbert, supra note 201, at 6 ("Regardless of the specific coverage provided, today's
[environmental impairment] insurance nearly always is written on a 'claims-made' or 'discovery' basis ....
[lit is nearly impossible to find [environmental impairment] coverage on an 'occurrence' basis."); John
Sherlock, Legal Malpractice Insurance Competitive; A Guide to Choosing a Carrierin a Crowded
Marketplace, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 2, 1995, at 3 ("All lawyers' professional liability policies are
written on 'claims-made' policy forms. This means coverage under the policy does not trigger until the
claim is made.").
328. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Judgment ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 54 (1986)
(suggesting compulsory insurance as possible response to problem of judgment-proof tortfeasors); Note,
Designer Genes that Don't Fit: A Tort Regime for Commercial Releases of Genetic Engineering Products,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1099-100 (1987) (advocating financial responsibility requirements such as
mandatory insurance to deal with problem of judgment-proof firms).
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already compulsory in many sectors of the U.S. economy. Laws in most states
require owners and drivers of automobiles to carry some minimal amount of
liability insurance. 2 9 Laws in all states require employers of more than some
minimal numbers of workers to carry workers' compensation insurance."'
The federal government requires the purchase of liability insurance as a
prerequisite to engage in the operation of a nuclear facility,33' a commercial

airline, 332 a hazardous waste disposal facility, 33 and a variety of other
commercial enterprises. 3 ' Laws providing for limited liability sometimes
couple the privilege with the obligation to insure or maintain reserves.33 5 As
voluntary insurance declines in other high risk industries, the government can
require insurance as a condition of doing business in those industries as well.
The next Subsection explains why that strategy nevertheless will be inadequate

to save liability.

329. Liability insurance is compulsory in about 40 American junsdictions. See 1992 SuM'tARY OF
SELECTED STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 18-27 (1992) (showing

that 39 states have "'compulsory liability insurance"); ROBERT H. JOOST. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NOFAULT LAW 2D § 1:8 (Supp. 1995) ("In 1995, 40 American junsdictions required all motorists to maintain
BI liability insurance or its equivalent."). According to Joost. 11 other American junsdictions hase
"'financial responsibility" laws that give drivers the option of buying insurance or otherwise providing for
their own financial responsibility. See id. But the limits of insurance or financial responsibility are modestOnly three states require insurance in an amount greater than S25.000 for one victim. and only three require
insurance in an amount greater than S50,000 for all victims in a single accident. See id at §§ 4 34. 5 IS
& 6:31 (1992) (containing tables from which this conclusion can be denved). In states %here liability
insurance is compulsory, a substantial portion of all dnvers do not carry insurance. See mfra note 360
330. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1995 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATIO% LAWS I. 3-5
(1995) (showing workers' compensation statutes of all 50 states as "compulsory" with insurance
"required"); Worker's Comp. L. Rep. (CCH) 5011-14 (1993) (showing state-by-state requirements for
workers' compensation insurance).
331. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring. as condition of licensing nuclear
power plant, that operator prove financial responsiblity in amount set by Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
As of 1989, the Commission had set the amount at approximately seven billion dollars See John F
McNett, Nuclear Indemnity for Government Contractors Under the Price.Anderson Amendments. 19 PUB
CONT. LJ. I (1989).
332. See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542. revised. codified and reenacted without
substantive change at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101-41741 (West Supp. 1995). Section 41112 specifically addresses
financial responsibility requirements, and regulations have been promulgated pursuant thereto See 14 C FR
§ 205.5(b) (1995) (requiring that commercial airlines mamitam liability insurance totaling S20 million plus
S300,000 times 75% of number of passenger seats installed in aircraft)
333. See Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 3004. 42 U S C § 6924(a) (1988)
(mandating promulgation of regulations for financial responsibility requirements for operators of facilities
for treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste); Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
§ 205, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(t) (listing insurance coverage as one means of satisfying financial responsibility
requirements).
334. E.g., 49 U.S.C.A. § 31138 (1994), amended by ICC Termination Act of 1995. Pub L No 10488, §104(d), 109 Stat. 803, 919 (1995) (commercial transportation of passengers by motor sehicle). 49
U.S.C.A. § 31139, amended by ICC Termination Act of 1995. Pub. L.No 104-88. § 104(e). 109 Stat 803.
919 (1995) (same); 49 U.S.C.A. § 70112 (commercial space launch acli'.ties)
335. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6. § 1546 (1993) (requiring S1.000.000 in liability insurance or
reserves for limited liability partnership).
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The Limitations of Compulsory Liability Insurance

Consider now a world of the future in which all persons and firms are
judgment proof except insurers,336 firms in other industries where financial
responsibility is required by regulation,337 and firms in the business of
providing guarantees. 338 Protected by their judgment-proof status, other firms
would have only one direct economic incentive to purchase liability
insurance-to avoid whatever penalties the system imposed on the uninsured.
Insureds would tend to seek the lowest cost policy that would enable them to
do business. Insurers, seeking to compete on the basis of price, would tend to
offer the minimum coverage permitted by law. Insurer and insured would have
a common interest in reducing the recoveries of injured third parties. The less
injured persons recovered from insurers, the lower the insurance premiums.
In those parts of the economy where insurance is compulsory today,
insurer and judgment-proof insureds already have this common interest to
varying degrees. The interest manifests itself in a number of strategies pursued
by insurers and insureds, and in strategic responses by the compulsory liability
insurance system. The net result has been a sharp increase in the burden of
regulation and a diminution of the effectiveness of liability insurance. Four
strategies pursued by insurers and insureds suggest the nature and magnitude
of the problem.
First, in a compulsory liability insurance system, competition will focus on
price. The optimal strategy for insurers to reduce their prices may be to reduce
their costs by externalizing the risk they contract to assume. They would
accomplish this by operating with the minimum assets at the maximum risk of
bankruptcy permitted by the state insurance regulator. Unscrupulous insurers
might trade off enforcement of expensive loss prevention rules for minor
increases in the premium; 339 it would be up to the insurance regulators to
336. I assume that insurance commissioners will continue to require that insurance companies
demonstrate their solvency in order to continue to be licensed to write policies. But see Gilbert, supra note
201, at 7 (referring to existence in private insurance market of "'cut through' endorsements, which require
an insurer's parent company to guarantee the coverage in the event of the insurer's insolvency"). The
existence of these endorsements suggests that: (1)insurance companies are compartmentalizing their
operations in separate corporations to limit their liability (that is, soft-judgment proofing); and (2) the
impact is great enough that sophisticated persons who deal with insurers insist on nullifying the strategy
by requiring that the parent company guarantee payment.
337. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
338. The ability to assure a third party of the payment of a debt is itself a valuable asset. The debtor
would not want to own sufficient assets for its own assurance to be adequate; that would expose the assets
to the liability system. Instead, the debtor would itself remain judgment proof, but purchase a third-party
guarantee of obligations for which it chose to assure payment. The technique is no different than that
employed by many, if not most, owners of small businesses today. They incorporate their business so that
they will not be personally liable for tort claims, and they induce banks to lend to their corporations by
personally guaranteeing corporate repayment of the loans. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT AND CREDIT
SYSTEMS Assignment 24 (1996).
339. See Cheek, supra note 327, at 175 ("Just as an automobile owner can find a mechanic willing
to dismantle the vehicle's air pollution control equipment, so a hazardous waste facility operator would be
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catch them. In a system of voluntary insurance where insureds count on their

insurers to protect them by paying losses, insureds must concern themselves
with the solvency of their insurers. In a system of compulsory insurance and

judgment-proof insureds, insureds have no economic incentive to concern
themselves with whether their insurers will pay claims. The market no longer
assists in assuring the solvency of insurers, so the entire burden of doing so
falls on regulators.?
Second, today's market-generated3" insurance policy forms contain
numerous exclusions and exceptions from coverage.- 2 Insurers do not offer,
and businesses do not demand, types of coverages that the insurers cannot
provide on a cost-effective basis. The result is a market-generated pattern of

exclusions and exceptions in the insurance policy that in at least a rough sense
reflects the strengths and weaknesses of insurance. One such exclusion, that
for intentional torts, has already been discussed. 3 3 In a compulsory insurance
system with judgment-proof insureds, it is in the common interests of insurers
and insureds to minimize coverage to the extent permitted by law. That is, both
insurer and insured would prefer completely ineffective coverage if it would
satisfy the requirement to have insurance, because such insurance would be
very cheap. As a result, in a compulsory insurance system with judgment-proof
insureds, the market for insurance coverage would no longer function to

identify the coverages insurers can provide on a cost-effective basis. The
insurance regulatory system would have to determine the minimum terms of

coverage, as it does where insurance is compulsory today."
able to find an insurer willing to waive enforcement of expensive loss prevention rules for a minor increase
in the premium.").
340. See, e.g., P.R. Newswire Ass'n. Inc., Uninsured Taxicabs Ma) Put Public At Risk. "Plas It
Straight,' Long Warns Insurance Agents, Dec. 16, 1993 (reporting possibly widespread practice of selling
taxicab drivers inexpensive personal automobile policies rather than much more expnsic commercial
coverage required by law).
341. The market in which the commercial liability insurance forms are generated is not entirely freeSee Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (holding that pnmary insurers and reinsurers
may have violated antitrust laws in compelling Insurance Service Office to eliminate accidental pollution
coverage from its market dominant Commercial General Liability Insurance form and to compel issuance
of second, "claims-made" form); see also In reInsurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F2d 919, 923 i9th Cir
1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded sub nora Hanford Fire Ins v Califorma.

509 U.S. 764 (1993). Nevertheless, there is a market process atwork that produces an evolution in policy
provisions.
342. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 323, at 280 (-In addition to the 'expected or intended'
exclusion, Coverage A [of the commercial general liability policy] contains tiselve other exclusions ").
Gilbert, supra note 201, at 6 (describing numerous exclusions contained in environmental impairment
insurance policies); Kirk A. Pasich, The Breadth ofInsuranceCoveragefor Environmental Claims. 52 Otio
ST. L.J. 1131, 1131-32 (1991) ("Most insurance carriers ... deny that they have any duty to pay the costs
of cleaning up the environment or to pay damage claims against their insureds Thus. insureds and
insurance carriers are now litigating over myriad issues with respect to insurance carriers' obligations to
defend and indemnify their insureds against claims relating to environmental contamination "1. Reidy &
Carter, supra note 325, at 24 (suggesting that "[the main defense the insurance industr, is likely to litigate
is whether the tobacco-related suits constitute an 'accident' or 'occurrence' so as to be cosered under
liability insurance" and that other likely issues include tngger date for coverage and pollution exclusion)
343. See supra notes 301-15 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text
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Third, in a system of voluntary insurance and solvent insureds, the process
of determining insurability and rating the risk is greatly facilitated by
information supplied by the applicant. Fear that at the time of loss the insurer
will deny coverage for fraud in the insurance application or for failure to
comply with conditions of coverage is an important incentive for the applicant
to cooperate. 345 In a compulsory insurance system with judgment-proof
insureds, this incentive disappears because the insured no longer cares whether
the insurer pays the loss. Some insureds will find it to their advantage to
defraud their insurers, even if they are certain to be caught later. The system
cannot permit insurers to deny coverage for fraud in the insurance application,
or the insurer would have an interest in being defrauded that would coincide
dangerously with the interest of insureds in defrauding. That is, both would
benefit from the issuance of a policy that the insurer could void for fraud when
a claim was finally made. The insurance regulatory system has already
responded to this problem in other contexts by limiting the ability of insurers
to void compulsory coverage for fraud. That is, coverage obtained by fraud is
enforceable.346 The net effect is that in a compulsory system, insurers are no
longer assured of the cooperation of their insureds in determining insurability
and rating the risk.
Fourth, liability insurers need the cooperation of their insureds in
processing claims and defending litigation. In a system of voluntary insurance
and solvent insureds, the threat that the insurer will deny coverage pursuant to
policy provisions provides an important incentive to cooperate. 347 In a
compulsory insurance system with judgment-proof insureds, this incentive also
disappears, and insureds may be reluctant to cooperate.'38 This problem has

345. See ABRAHAM, supra note 306, at 60 ("Once coverage has been provided ... policy defenses
are perhaps the most workable tool for enforcing compliance with the insurer's risk management
standards."); L. William Caraccio, Comment, Void Ab Initio: Application Fraud as Grounds for Avoiding
Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Coverage, 74 CAL. L. REV. 929, 991-98 (1986) (discussing
alternatives to insurers' current use of preexisting knowledge clause as basis for coverage).
346. See supra note 313.
347. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(c) (McKinney 1985) (providing that burden of proof shall be
on insurer when insurer defends against liability on ground that insured failed or refused to cooperate with
insurer in violation of any provision in policy); see also Cohen & Co. v. North River Ins. Co., No. 93-1680.
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3646 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1994) (holding that failure of accounting firm, sued by writ
of summons, to notify its insurer of claim within one-year duration of "claims-made" policy or within 60
days thereafter resulted in forfeiture of insurance), aff'd, 39 F.3d 1168 (3d Cir. 1994). But see Bousquet,
supra note 5, at 17 ("[Mlany lawyers know of a potential claim but fail to disclose it because of their
reluctance to accept responsibility for their acts-thereby creating another potential roadblock to
compensation for clients who are harmed.").
348. See Cheek, supra note 327, at 159; Steven A. Kunzman, The Insurer as Surrogate Regulator of
the Hazardous Waste Industry: Solution or Perversion?,20 FORuM 469, 483-84 (1985) (arguing that direct
liability under CERCLA effectively strips insurer of its ability to deny coverage for failure to comply with
terms of policy and thereby strips insurer of much of its control over insured's conduct). Kunzman bases
his arguments on those developed by Cheek, supra note 327. See also ABRAHAM, supra note 306, at 61-62
(suggesting that insurers in compulsory liability insurance system control policy holders by compelling them
to indemnify insurers against their own wrongdoing). Of course, the technique no longer works when
insureds are judgment proof.
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been severe enough in the current system to prompt courts and legislatures in
most states to adopt "reach and apply" rules to prevent post-loss actions of
insureds from voiding coverage or preventing recovery from insurers. 9 The
reach and apply problem would be magnified in a system of compulsory
insurance with judgment-proof insureds.
4. Designing a Compulsory Liability Insurance System

The liability system attempts to provide injured persons with remedies
across the entire spectrum of wrongful acts, from the purely accidental to the
deliberate infliction of injury. For compulsory liability insurance to be a
complete substitute, itwould have to do the same.
Such a system is not inconceivable. It would, however, give insurance
companies a very different role from the one they play today. The primary
function of the liability insurance system as it operates today is to reduce total
risk through transfer and offset of risks against other similar risks.""
Insurance companies deal with the risks of deliberate infliction of injury
principally by excluding them from coverage. 35i Insurance companies do
sometimes monitor the activities of insureds for the purpose of controlling
losses, but only in a manner ancillary to the insurance companies' primary
function. They do so in cooperation with an insured whose interest in
controlling losses largely coincides with their own.
Making compulsory liability insurance a complete substitute for liability
would require that liability insurers take on a much broader role than the one
they now play. Insurers would not be able to rely on the cooperation of their
insureds in attempting to control the risk that the insured will deliberately
inflict losses; insurers will have to control those risks through some kind of
monitoring or deterrence. The monitor's task will be to prevent assault and
349. See. e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.195 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that no contract of liability
insurance shall be "cancelled or annulled by any agreement between the insurance company and the assured
after the said assured has become responsible for such loss or damage"): PA_ STAT A 'N tit40. § 117
(West 1988) (requiring that policies provide that insolvency or bankruptcy of insured shall not release
insurer and permitting direct actions against insurers); Mandeville v Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Casualty
Co., 5 Conn. Supp. 306, 309 (C.P. 1937) ("The statute, to effectuate its manifest purpose to safeguard the
rights of the injured person, prohibits any cancellation or annulment of the policy by any agreement
between the insurance company and the assured after the injury " (quoting Guenn v Indemnity Ins Co.
107 Conn. 649, 653 (1928))); Storm v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 97 S E.2d 759. 762 (Va 1957) (finding
that "an injured party is a beneficiary under the policy from the moment of injury" regardless of subsequent
judgments, agreements, or releases between the policy holder and the insurer). But see MacArthur Co v
Johns-Manville Corp., 837 R2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding Manvile's ability to settle with its insurer
during bankruptcy case and thereby cut off rights of subsequent injured panics).

350. The system permits liability insurance, nevertheless, because liability insurance does more than
simply transfer risk; liability insurance reduces total nsk by offsetting particular nsks against similar ones-

The reduction of total risk by aggregation in the hands of an insurance company creates net wealth
351.

That is,
where losses are most difficult to control because they arelargely within the control of

the insured, insurers refuse coverage because such risks arenot "insurable." See GREE.,E Er AL. supra note
200, at 45.
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battery; patent infringement; race, sex, or religious discrimination;352 or the
midnight dumping of toxic waste-all by people with little to lose and perhaps
much to gain by their wrongful acts. To have any hope of success at all, the
insurer will need agents or employees on the shop floor, in the board room, on
the bridge of the Exxon Valdez, and perhaps even in the bedroom. 53 The
insurer will be cast in the unaccustomed role of surrogate regulator,354 with
the conduct to be regulated the vast array currently affected by civil liability.
By choosing to issue or refuse to issue policies, insurers in a compulsory
liability insurance system would decide who could or could not go into
business.
An alternative way for compulsory liability insurers to deal with highly
reactive risk would be to insure only those who demonstrate financial
responsibility. Presumably, any system of compulsory insurance would provide
for policy limits. 355 By requiring financial responsibility, perhaps in the form
of a bank letter of credit for the policy limits, and contracting for subrogation
against its own policy holder for all sums the insurer may be required to pay,
an insurer would completely eliminate moral hazard and, with it, reactivity of
risk. By so limiting its insureds, insurers would in essence reconstruct tort
liability by contract. The new system would have far greater capacity for
356
deterrence than any system existing today.

352. See, e.g., Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D. Mass. 1992)
(explaining that Massachusetts public policy bars insurance coverage for indemnity and defense where
policyholder intentionally committed racial discrimination in housing); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Ilarbour
Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989), aff'd, 570 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding lorida
public policy prohibits indemnification for loss resulting from intentional act of religious discrimination).
353. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 306, at 62 ("[Alppointing the [insurance] industry as a frontline
risk manager would require it to play an authoritative role-perhaps even an authoritarian one-in making
decisions about the way other businesses conduct their operations.").
354. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 311, at 954-55 (describing "surrogate regulation" by insurance
companies as device for controlling incentives of insureds). But see ABRAHAM, supra note 306, at 57
(noting that compensation funds would make insurers "surrogate regulators," that role "would be a new one
and would place unconventional demands on insurers," and that he was "not necessarily advocating such
a role"); id. at 62-63 (referring to surrogate regulator as "insurer's new role" and arguing that direct
regulation would be preferable). Cheek has argued that:
Insurers can function as an important adjunct to public regulation of safety if they are left free
to do what they are in business to do: spread the economic consequences of the risks they have
contracted to assume. Any attempt to enlist insurers to control or eliminate these risks will
inevitably impair their willingness and ability to perform their appropriate function in society
and undermine the efficacy of public safety regulation.
Cheek, supra note 327, at 177-78.
355. All existing systems do. See, e.g., supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text. Whether they
should is an issue that goes beyond the scope of this Article. Theory as to the reasons for the existence of
policy limits is sparse. For some speculation as to the reasons for the existence of policy limits, see Alan
0. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof
Problem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 86 (1994) ("[Tjhe fact that insureds have finite assets affords a standard
explanation."). Other possible explanations include adverse selection, moral hazard, and the pricing of
insurance higher than is "actuarially fair." Id. at 86 n.25.
356. The system would have a greater capacity for deterrence because no participant would be
judgment proof. Today, most individuals and small businesses are judgment proof or capable of becoming
so before a judgment could be entered against them. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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The obvious problem with this alternative is that it would provide
insurance only to those with the financial capacity to pay claims in the full
amount of the policy limits. If the compulsory policy limits were set high, few
businesses could qualify for insurance. If, as seems more likely, the policy
limits were set low enough that most businesses could prove financial
responsibility,357 the great bulk of liability would be in excess of policy
limits. Debtors would externalize that great bulk to tort victims, and deterrence
would fail. The system would have sacrificed adequate coverage of risks to
obtain universal coverage of risks.
More likely, in a world where everyone was judgment proof, designers of
a compulsory insurance system intended to substitute for liability would elect
to cover fewer kinds of risks. Risks of intentional wrongdoing would be
excluded from coverage; the system would rely on direct regulation backed by
the threat of incarceration to control them. In a world where everyone was
judgment proof, the liability system might remain in place with respect to
intentional torts-just as it remains in place today with regard to violent
crimes-symbolically active, but ineffective in transferring economic losses.
Across a wide spectrum of civil wrongs, the liability system would be dead.
5.

The PoliticalLimits of Compulsorn Liability Insurance

Compulsory liability insurance will raise political as well as economic
issues. The purpose of compulsory liability insurance would be to assure
compensation and loss spreading. To achieve that purpose, uninsured persons
would be barred from engaging in the activity."'8 Compulsory insurance laws
stand as an economic barrier to entry into a few businesses today; the
compulsory insurance contemplated here would expand that barrier to
substantially all businesses. Denial of insurance would be denial of the
opportunity to go into business. The barrier would be greatest in newly
developing industries such as biotechnology where the risks are both high and
difficult for insurers to assess. 359 The system also would strike particularly
hard at professional persons whose human capital could not be easily
transferred to another business for which they could get insurance. Efforts at
evasion would be persistent and frequently successful.6
357. See infra note 365 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., Patricia D. Gugin, Note, Condinoning Access to the Public Forum on the Purcha.e of

Insurance, 17 GA. L. REV. 815, 836 (1983) (suggesting that "mandatory insurance may function as a form
of censorship").
359. See JOEL S. MOSKOWITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY TRASAc

OS 338

(2d ed. 1995) ("Although a limited market exists now for environmental liability coverage. premiums and
deductibles are high, and coverage is restricted."): supra note 315 (discussing asailability of insurance in

biotechnology field).
360. The Califomia Department of Insurance has reported
Experience under other financial responsibility and compulsory insurance systems suggests that

the socially irresponsible will remain financially irresponsible with or without a financial
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Conditioning business opportunity on insurance is somewhat analogous to
conditioning the right to drive a car on insurance. Both are essential elements
of individual autonomy in modem society, the denial of which are not easily
accepted. Eleven American jurisdictions have declined to make auto insurance
compulsory, instead enacting "financial responsibility" laws that require a
driver to purchase insurance only after the driver has a specified accident or
violation. 36' Even in the majority of states where the law requires the
purchase of insurance, the system may not provide effective means for
enforcement. At least in some states, this failure of the legislature to provide
effective means of enforcement is actually intended by the legislature to enable
people of moderate means to drive without insurance.362 Also to minimize
the number of people denied the right to drive, these laws establish "assigned
risk" plans requiring insurance companies to write policies for high risk drivers
at regulated rates lower than the market rates. The effect is to subsidize the
highest risk drivers.363 All companies writing insurance in the state are
required to insure their proportion of assigned risks, so the companies can pass
responsibility law. Evasion of compulsory automobile insurance requirements is widespread in
the twenty-six states that replaced their [financial responsibility] statutes with such requirements,
and the percentage of insured motorists in these jurisdictions has stabilized at levels prevalent
before these laws were enacted.
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF INS., REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE (1995) (reporting that 27.5%

of California drivers do not have insurance as required by state law); see also OIO DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY,
1994 OHIO TRAFFIC CRASH FACTS 34 (reporting that 83% of drivers involved in automobile accidents in
Ohio in 1994 were insured, 6% were uninsured, and for 11% insurance status was not stated); STANFORD
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATION IN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE:

FINAL REPORT 27 (1976) (estimating that 17.5% of all drivers in United States have no automobile
insurance); Brian Ford, Lawmakers Consider No-Fault Insurance, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 25, 1995, at B I
("The state Department of Public Safety estimates that between 15 percent and 17 percent of accidents
involve uninsured motorists."); Fannie Weinstein, Bane of the Highways: UninsuredMotorists, INS. REV.,
Nov. 1991, at 32 (estimating number of uninsured motorists nationwide at 17 million in 1991).
361. See JOOST, supra note 329, at § 1:8 (Supp. 1995).
362. In California, for example, approximately 30% of all drivers are uninsured. CALIFORNIA DEP'T
OF INS., COMMISSIONER'S REPORT ON UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES at ca-I (1995) (describing large

number of uninsured motorists as indicative of failure of system to serve poor). In April, 1996, California
voters defeated Proposition 200, which aimed at combatting high rates of uninsurance, by a three to two
margin. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Tort Revision 'Lost Cause' in California?,NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 1996, at
B I. The proposition would have established a no-fault automobile insurance system and required owners
to show proof of insurance when they registered their cars. See Proposition 200 § 12801 (1996) ("No motor
vehicle registration shall be issued or renewed unless the owner of that vehicle furnishes proof, in a form
satisfactory to the Department of Motor Vehicles, that the vehicle is insured as required by this chapter.").
In 1990 a California vehicle code requiring drivers to provide evidence of financial responsibility on traffic
stops and in accident investigation was repealed. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16028 (West Supp. 1996)
(repealed 1990).
363. See Cheek, supra note 327, at 153 (arguing that states undermine financial responsibility laws
by requiring insurers to provide coverage to any licensed driver and requiring good drivers to subsidize
those in high risk pool). As Keeton and Kwerel point out:
[Assigned-risk] rates must be approved by the state insurance commission before they can go
into effect and are often held below break-even levels. The resulting losses are then spread
among insurance companies in proportion to the volume of voluntary business they do in the
state, so that drivers who buy insurance in the voluntary market end up paying prices above
expected cost.
William R. Keeton & Evan Kwerel, Externalities in Automobile Insurance and the UnderinsuredDriver
Problem, 27 J.L. & ECON. 149, 171 (1984).
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the cost of the subsidy along in the form of higher premiums for lower risk
drivers. For the state to operate an assigned risk plan rather than permitting
those drivers to drive uninsured is nevertheless economically efficient; the plan

enables them to externalize some of the risk they generate, but driving without
insurance would enable them to externalize all of the risk they generate.6'
The problems of implementation of compulsory automobile liability
insurance are likely to be repeated in the context of compulsory business
liability insurance. We can expect that a compulsory business liability
insurance system would require insurance only to low policy limits,6 would
demand that insurance companies write policies for assigned risks in at least

some circumstances, would force other policy holders to subsidize the assigned
risks, and would engage only in lax enforcement.?

All but the last of these

characteristics will render the system more effective in compensating injured
persons and spreading losses, but all four will render it even less effective in
deterring wrongful conduct.367
Fixing the limits of compulsory general liability insurance would be a
complex undertaking. Some businesses generate risks of high losses,
necessitating coverage in amounts not necessary for others. Political pressures
to establish separate classifications and different insurance based on the type

364. See Keeton & Kwerel, supra note 363 (arguing that subsidizng liability insurance for financially
irresponsible drivers is Pareto superior when those providing subsidy benefit from increased coveragc of
low-asset drivers); see also GUIDO CALABRESI. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECOOiiC
ANALYSIS 59 (1970) (suggesting compulsory insurance to correct distortion in decisions to bear risk)
365. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance.Ba5ed lncenttle
Financial Responsibilityfor Hazardous Wastes. 96 YALE L.J.
403. 417 (1986) ("lR]equired lccls of
coverage [under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976) fall far short of potential third-party
damages. Current regulations also allow facilities to operate with third-party liability coscrage that applies
only to claims filed during a specified policy period--ypically one year." (footnote omitted))
Furthermore, "[i]n
1982, twenty-eight states had compulsory liability insurance laws Hobever. none
of these states required more than $25,000 coverage per person injured, and sixteen required $15,000 or
less." Keeton & Kwerel, supra note 363, at 151: see. e.g.. ALA. CODE § 32-7-6 (1975) (rcquinng
automobile liability insurance to limit of not less than S20.000 because of bodily injury to or death to one
person in any one accident, and $40,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in
any one accident); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 211 8(a)(2)(b) (1995) (requirng liability insurance coverage
of not less than $15,000 for one person and S30.000 for all persons injured in any one accident)
366. Experience in the enforcement of California's mandatory automobile liabilt) insurance la%%
demonstrates that it is a political hot potato. About 30% of California's drivers violate the law b) driving
without insurance. The state could drastically reduce that number by requirng proof of insurance to register
an automobile, as some other states do. Instead, the California Insurance Commissioner reports data
showing that it is minorities and poor who drive without insurance. The report refers to the communities
in which they live as "underserved" by the insurance industry, implying that itis the insurance industry
rather than the uninsured drivers who are to blame. See CAIFORNIA DEP'T OF INS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
BUREAU, COMMISSIONER'S REPORT ON UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES (Feb

1995)

367. See Cheek, supra note 327. at 159 ('To the extent that the states give guaranteed insurance
availability a higher priority than loss prevention through active regulation. theability of (financial
responsibility] insurers to advance the public interest in environmental safety will be diminished "). d at
159-60 (quoting "basic principle" developed by American Insurance Association that "Imlandator> residual
markets (i.e., assigned risk plans) should be avoided, in order toprevent subsersion of safety regulation
and subsidization of uninsurable facilities by the owners of responsibly managed risks") But see Keeton
& Kwerel, supra note 363, at 151 (arguing that subsidizing liability insurance for financially irresponsible
drivers may be Pareto optimal when those providing subsidy would otherwise go uncompensated)
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of business, 368 the size of the business, and the wealth or poverty of the
owners would be pervasive. The resulting system of regulation probably would
rival in complexity the systems recently proposed to deal with health care.369
It is conceivable that a liability insurance system based on the model
presented here might preserve the liability system. But it is clear that it would,
in the process, transform the liability system almost beyond recognition.
G. FinancialResponsibility Requirements
As an alternative to mandatory insurance, the system might permit wouldbe entrepreneurs to demonstrate financial responsibility either by posting a
bond or by proving their financial condition. The bond probably would be
required in the same amount as the limits of the liability insurance policy for
which it would substitute. A debtor who had the money could post it in cash.
As an alternative, debtors would be permitted to purchase a bond from an
insurance company. A bond is a commitment to pay a fixed amount of money
in a specified circumstance. Here, that circumstance probably would be the
entry and nonpayment of a money judgment against the debtor. Insurers who
sell financial responsibility bonds today generally do so in return for a
minimal-risk premium of one percent of the bond. The insurer's obligation
carries minimal risk because the insurer: (1) requires that the applicant agree
to indemnify the insurer against any payment the insurer must make; and (2)
requires that the applicant either prove that its financial condition is adequate
to assure payment of the indemnity obligation or provide the insurance
company with collateral. In other words, only a well-capitalized debtor can
obtain a bond.
The third alternative for demonstrating financial responsibility would be
to prove one's financial condition directly to the regulator. A variety of
regulatory systems would be possible, ranging from the elaborate examination
currently used to determine the financial condition of banks and insurance
companies, to the mere requirement that debtors file and swear to the truth of
financial statements showing some specified net worth. The cost of the
premiums payable and the regulation required in such a system would be
substantial.
Whatever the method of enforcement, if the system worked, it would bar
persons not wealthy enough to demonstrate financial responsibility by any of
these three means from engaging in liability-generating economic activity. To
return to the metaphor with which this Article began, those without the means
to ante up could not stay in the game. This frames a central tension in the
368. For a frightening analogy, see 13 C.F.R. § 121.601 (1995), which classifies businesses into about
800 SIC categories as part of an effort to define a "small business."
369. See, e.g., Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993) (totalling 1342 printed pages in
length).
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struggle over liability: Americans do not want judgment-proof businesses to
be able to operate, but neither do they want to exclude persons of moderate
means from participation in the economy. The system currently accommodates
that conflict by permitting persons who cannot demonstrate financial
responsibility to participate in all but a few industries, and by excusing
nonpayment of liabilities when they exceed the debtor's ability to pay.
To limit participation in the economy to those who could prove financial
responsibility adequate for the role they chose would drastically reduce
economic opportunity for all but the wealthiest segment of society. Not only
would the reduction injure those barred from businesses and occupations
because they could not demonstrate financial responsibility, but their absence
would also reduce competition in the businesses and occupations that they
could not enter. Economic activity would slow, prices would increase, and the
gap between rich and poor would widen.
If an economy-wide requirement of financial responsibility were adopted,
there would be strong pressures to relax the standards for persons of modest
means. The issue would be how to separate the wealthy from the not-sowealthy so that the system could favor the latter. But that brings the inquiry
full circle. The liability system, as currently conceived, is a system for
determining "what wealth particular judgment creditors should be able to
reach. '370 The problem is that the system's schemes for making that
determination have consistently been defeated by strategy. What we need, and
currently do not have, are meaningful definitions of a "'wealthy person" and of
that person's "wealth."
V. CONCLUSION

Strategies for defeating liability are readily available. Among individuals
and small firms, they already protect the vast bulk of all assets against liability.
Not all individuals and small firms are currently judgment proof, but that may
be only because they do not need to be. They are close enough to being
judgment proof that, if a sizable lawsuit were filed against them, they could
become judgment proof before any judgment could be enforced against them.
Large firms have only begun to tap the judgment-proofing strategies available
to them. For most large firms, the costs of judgment proofing still exceed the
benefits. But computerization already has reduced the clerical costs sharply,
and cultural deterrents are in decline as well. The publication of strategies for
"asset protection"-a euphemism for judgment proofing--already has become
a cottage industry.371 Trends already established soon will tip the balance of

370. See supra text accompanying notes 10. 20-36
371.

See, e.g., SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 148; SPERO. supra note 142
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costs in favor of judgment proofing for most large firms and pull down the
remaining cultural barriers.
Judgment proofing need not spread to every industry to kill the liability
system. Once substantial numbers of large companies judgment proof
substantial portions of their operations, the inequity of the system will be
apparent. The system will force businesses that expose themselves to liability
to pay large judgments, but will be unable to reach those who resist. Such
glaring inequity will lead to action. Unless the resisters can be brought under
control, it is likely that the system will be dismantled.
Strategies by which the system can attempt to postpone liability's day of
reckoning are plentiful. But they are drastic measures that would require
traumatic change. Ultimately, nearly all are vulnerable to counterstrategies.
General financial responsibility requirements could provide a long term
solution, but only at a political cost that the system may be unwilling to pay.
Given a choice between having to be financially responsible to participate in
the economy and the death of liability, the American people may well choose
the latter.
Throughout this Article, the assumption has been made that the system can
make whatever rules it chooses. In fact, the system has far less flexibility than
has been assumed. Participants in the liability system, including large
corporations and insurance companies, undoubtedly exert enormous political
influence over proposed changes in the system. Even if the system had ways
of saving itself, those in charge might not allow the system to pursue them.
Returning to the assumption of complete system flexibility on which this
Article is based, the question remains why a system with such power would
still be unable to defeat the strategists. Part of the answer is that the system
must coordinate the actions of millions of participants. The rules by which the
system operates 3 2 must be widely known, easy to understand, and stable
over time. For the liability system to survive, it must command players to risk
whatever wealth they have by putting it into the pot. But the system has no
words with which to say that. In both the popular and the legal culture, the
words we use to describe the system relate only to form. We take concepts
such as "ownership," "entity," "property," and "secured creditor" seriously. We
assume they identify real things of importance, when they do not. The
judgment-proof debtor who still sails on the yacht, drives the Mercedes, and
lives in the house on the hill remains wealthy, whether those items are fully
encumbered, owned by the debtor's spouse, or titled to a Cook Islands trust.
But neither popular nor legal language describes such a debtor as "wealthy."
There may be viable stopping points for enterprise or trading partner liability,
372. The rules expressed in written law can be almost infinitely complex. But, as I have explained
elsewhere, the rules expressed in written law are not the rules by which the system operates. See LoPucki,
The Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 12, at 1517-21.
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but we have neither the vocabulary nor the public consciousness necessary to
make those stopping points the foundation for a modified system. Our legal
culture is failing us, and, for liability at least, there probably is not time to
develop a new one.373

If we had such a culture, how might it define "wealth?" One possibility
would be to define a person's wealth as the resources that person could
commit to the payment of a debt if the person wished to pay it. That would
include the money the person could borrow from friends and relatives, money
the person could earn in the future, nonproperty assets such as celebrity or
education that the person could exploit, or job perks the person might reassign.
These concepts are, of course, not well defined, but that can be said of any
system that has not yet been implemented and therefore has not generated
practices. It is the practice which completes a legal culture and gives meaning
to its rules.374 Whether wealth could be redefined meaningfully and a viable
liability system built on that new definition is purely academic. For the liability
system to pursue such a fundamental redefinition is unthinkable. The choice
the system makes will be evolutionary, not revolutionary.
Legal culture is not the only limit on the system. The United States must
compete with nations whose liability systems are less ambitious. If the U.S.
system manages to save liability, but other nations do not, economic actors in
those other nations may have a competitive advantage over those in the United
States. Liability-generating economic activity (is there any other kind?) may
move to those nations, with the products being shipped back into the U.S.
markets; 375 or the assets of U.S. generators of liability may flee to nations
6
that will protect them against U.S. liability."1
One more possibility is worthy of mention. It is that the death of liability
might not be such a bad thing. Scholars have argued, with some persuasive
force, that liability has had minimal deterrent effect." Possibly some more
373. For a description of a nation's conscious effort to create a legal culture. see Frances H Foster.
Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the Development of Russian Legal Culture: Russian Judicial Chamber
Discourse and Narrative, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1997) (describing efforts to create a legal
culture in post-Soviet Russia).
374. See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss. 36 STAN. L. REv 1325. 1327-30 (1984) (attributing agreement
on what a rule "is" to constraints of context in which it is applied because knowledge "informs rules rather
than follows from them").
375. See generally Richard B. Stewart, EnvironmentalRegulation and lnternationalCompettziveness.
102 YALE LJ. 2039 (1993) (arguing that U.S. environmental liability may put U S producers at
disadvantage in international trade).
376. See supra Section lI.D.
377. See generally GEORGE EADS & PETER RErrER. DESIGNING SAFER PRODc-rs- CORPORATE
RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION vii (1983) (arguing that product liability sends

"indistinct signal"); Gary T. Schwartz. Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law" Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (examining empirical evidence from variety of sourees and
concluding that tort law probably provides sufficient deterrent to warrant cost of system). John A- Siliciano.
Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law. 85 MiCH L. REV. 1820. 1864 (1987) (arguing
that "tort law does not necessarily push producers towards a socially efficient leel of product safety");
Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV 558. 559-609 (1985) (arguing that tort
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direct form of coercion could provide the basis for a system that would replace
liability after it is gone.
Sophisticated information systems seem the most likely substitute for
liability.3 7 It is not difficult to imagine a world in which the only deterrent
to nonpayment of debt is a bad credit rating and the only deterrent to medical
malpractice is the publication of notice of its occurrence. Systems that deliver
these kinds of information already exist, and their deterrent effect supplements
that of liability. Because these systems act against persons rather than property,
they do not suffer the metaphysical difficulties that plague the future of
liability. In part because these system are potentially so powerful, they are
tightly constrained by a web of legal and quasi-legal burdens. 3 79 But in the
post-liability world, we might choose to unleash their power. It is not too soon
to start thinking about it.

law has failed to deter wrongful conduct, failed to compensate at acceptable costs, and failed to do
meaningful justice).
378. Theoretically, sophisticated information systems might rescue the liability system by advising the
public of companies' judgment proofing efforts and thus raising the publicity cost of those efforts. In
practice, however, the pubic would be better served by information about the risks of loss companies are
imposing on them than by information about the public's ability to recover damages in the unlikely event
losses occur.
379. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1994) (restricting reasons for which credit reports may be issued); Joel
Brinkley, The Furor Over Data on Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1994, § 4, at 4 (reporting that, in
response to complaints from American Medical Association, federal government declined to offer public
access to its database of 62,183 doctors, dentists, nurses and other medical professionals who have been
sued, sanctioned, or otherwise penalized for crimes, mistakes, or incompetence); Amy Stevens, A List of
Bad Lawyers to Go On Line, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1994, at B I (reporting that American Bar Association's
National Discipline Data Bank, listing "names, addresses, aliases and violations" of 25,000 lawyers, will
be made available on Westlaw, but only to disciplinary authorities).

